THE 2008 GEORGIAN CRISIS AND THE LIMITS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY GOVERNANCE
Abstract
The clashes in the ethnic regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are not only about Georgia’s territorial integrity. Moreover, when analyzed from a different perspective, it becomes clear that the ethnic problems in the region are not only an issue between the ethnic groups and the central government. The ethnic problems in Georgia also depend on a change in the perception of the external actors’ interests. This means that when the solution to problems coincided with the interests of the international actors, Georgia was able to solve the problem, as in the case of Ajaria.1
However, when the solution contradicted the interests of the international actors the clashes could not be resolved and the Georgian government was ineffective, as in the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The clashes determined not only the domestic policy of the Georgian government and the country’s social and economic development, but also Georgia’s foreign policy. Consequently, in order to strengthen its position and maintain its territorial integrity, Georgia shifted to the EU-U.S. axis in order to counterbalance Russia, which supported the ethnic minorities in the region. So it was argued that the democratic breakthrough in Georgia in 2003 happened because the local activists appealed to EU norms and standards and because they received strong support from the EU and its member states.2 Moreover, the EU supported the multilateral efforts to constrain the use of force through arms control and disarmament initiatives and provided financial and technical assistance to projects aimed at combating the accumulation and spread of small arms in Georgia and South Ossetia. The EU set up a rule-of-law operation in Georgia, the EUJUST Themis operation (July 2004), which was not a military mission. Georgia views its relations with the EU as an economic and political partnership that will culminate in EU membership in due course.3
In 2004, the EU and NATO expanded into the former Soviet expanse. The Russians regarded NATO membership of the Baltic countries as an encroachment on the country’s traditional periphery. The Russian leadership was alarmed by the West’s active support of the regime change in Georgia. The West was keenly interested in Russia’s own neighborhood. As the primary Western security organization, NATO epitomizes Russia’s insecurities.4
The first part of the study describes the theoretical framework of governance and explains the management, coordination, and regulation procedures practiced by the security-related international institutions. The second part discusses the Georgian crisis and its historical background, to provide a better understanding of the crisis, and analyzes the interests of the international actors that triggered the crisis. The third part takes a look at the programs being implemented by international institutions with respect to Georgia. The concluding part evaluates the roles and impact of the international institutions during the crisis.
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Aslan Abashidze, leader of the Ajarian Autono-mous Republic, created tension by declaring that he did not recognize the Saakashvili administration that came to pow-er on the coattails of the “velvet revolution.” Later, Saa-kashvili, who wanted to enter the region with “armed forc-es” before the 28 March, 2004 elections, was turned back at the Chorokhi River, the border between Ajaria and the Georgian region of Guria. The crisis almost escalted into an armed conflict when Saakashvili’s response was to im-pose an economic embargo. When the U.S. and Russia intervened, the crisis was subdued and temporarily settled when the sides reached a consensus on 18 March, 2004.The tension between Saakashvili and Abashidze ended on 5 May, 2004 when Abashidze left Batumi for Moscow in the company of Igor Ivanov, the former Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation and Secretary of the National Security Council. After this development, President Saa-kashvili imposed direct presidential rule in Ajaria on the basis of the power vested in him by the Georgian parlia-ment on 6 May, 2004.
See: E.J. Kirchner, J. Sperling, EU Security Govern-ance, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2007, p. 51.
See: Ibid., p. 58.
See: K. Mirwaldt, V.I. Ivanov, “Russia: Struggling for Dignity,” in: Global Security Governance, ed. by E.J. Kirchner,J. Sperling, Routledge, London, 2007, p. 240.
See: E.J. Kirchner, “Regional and Global Security: Changing Threats and Institutional Responses,” in: Global Security Governance, p. 3.
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See: J. Weldes et al., “Introduction: Constructing Insecurity,” in: Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger, ed. by J. Weldes et al., University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1999, pp. 10-17.
See: T. Risse-Kappen, “Identity in a Democratic Security Community: The Case of NATO,” in: The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. by P.J. Katzenstein, Columbia University Press, New York,1996, pp. 357-399.
See: S. Cornell, “Georgia: From Unitary Dreams to an Asymmetric Federation,” in: Small Nations and Great Pow-ers: A Study of Ethno-Political Conflict in the Caucasus, ed. by S. Cornell, Curzon Press, Richmond, 2000, pp. 143-196.
For more detailed information on the roots and the development of the ethnic conflicts in Georgia, see: Y. Anchabadze,
Georgia and Abkhazia: The Hard Road to Agreement,” Caucasian Regional Studies, No. 3 (2&3), Special Issue, 1998,pp. 4-12.
See: A. Rondeli, “Regional Security Prospects in the Caucasus,” in: Crossroads and Conflict: Security and For-eign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, ed. by G. Bertsch et al., Routledge, London, 2000, p. 49.
See: F. Corley, “South Ossetia between Gamsakhurdia and Gorbachev: Three Documents,” Central Asian Survey,No. 16 (2), 1997, p. 270.
In a research study about fighting corruption carried out by Transparency International (see: Transparency International, The 2002 Corruption Perceptions Index, available at: [http://www.transparency.org.html], 22 June, 2010), Georgia is 5th from the bottom among 133 countries. In another research study carried out by the United Nations in 1999, only 20 percent of the government budget was spent on targeted expenses (see: U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Early Warning Assessment, November 2003). Fifty-one percent of Georgia’s population lived below the poverty line and 23.6 percent of the people were unemployed. Between 1989 to the present day, a large number of people have left Georgia to work in Russia and Ukraine (see: D.L. Philips, Stability, Security and Sovereignty in the Republic of Geor-gia. Rapid Response Conflict Prevention Assessment, Center for Preventive Action, January 2004, available at [http://www.
iaonet.org/wps/phd01], 15 December, 2004).
See: Kasým K. Soðuk Savaþ Sonrasý Kafkasya (The Caucasus in the Post-Cold War Era). Ankara: USAK, 2009,p. 71.
See: G. Özkan, Gürcistanda Yeni Yönetim, Etnik Ayrýlýkçý Bölgeler ve Güvenlik (New Government, Ethnic Secessionist Regions and Security in Georgia), in: Orta Asya ve Kafkasyada Güç Politikasý, ed. by M.T. Demirtepe, USAK Yayýnlarý, Ankara, 2008.
For detailed information on the cause, roots, and development of the Abkhazian problem, see: D. Lynch, “Sepa-ratist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts,” International Affairs, No. 78 (4), 2002, pp. 831-848; B. Coppieters, “The Politici-sation and Securitisation of Ethnicity: The Case of the Southern Caucasus,” Civil Wars, No. 4 (4), 2001, pp. 73-94.
See: Kasým K. op. cit., p. 67.
See: V.A. Chirikba, “Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict and Its Aftermath,” in: Caucasus: War and Peace, ed. by M. Tütüncü, SOTA, Haarlem, Netherlands, 1998, p. 79.
See: D. Darchiashvili, “The Russian Military Presence in Georgia: The Parties’ Attitudes and Prospects,” Caucasian Regional Studies, No. 2 (1), 1997, available at [http://poli.vub.ac.be/publi/crs/eng/0201-04.htm], 10 June, 2010.
See: D. Bazoðlu-Sezer, “Russia and the South: Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus,” European Security,No. 5 (2), 1995, pp. 303-323.
When the Soviet Union dominated regional sources, it was the second largest oil and natural gas producer before 1990. Later Russia sold the oil and natural gas bought cheaply from the Central Asian, Caspian, and Caucasian regions primarily to Europe and to the rest of the world at its market value. While the West was trying to create an Eurasian ener-gy corridor from east to west to export the Caspian’s energy resources, Russia tried to preserve its monopoly on the exist-ing pipelines and particularly objected to the U.S.-supported East-West pipeline project. If the regional resources went along the East-West route instead of north, the regional states could transfer their natural resources to the world’s market inde-pendent of Russia. Moreover, as a result of the income that was obtained in the long term from this action, these states could act more independently and adopt a policy supported by the West. Therefore, Russia used every tool at its disposal (polit-ical, military, and diplomatic) to retain control over the regional resources and states and to prevent the participation of the West in these resources (for more information, see: M.P. Amineh, H. Houweling, “Caspian Energy: Oil and Gas Re-sources and the Global Market,” Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, No. 2 (3&4), 2003, pp. 391-406;G. Bahgat, “Pipeline Diplomacy: The Geopolitics of the Caspian Sea Region,” International Studies Perspectives, No. 3 (3),2002, pp. 310-327).
See: A. Cohen, “U.S. Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Building a New ‘Silk Road’ to Economic Prosper-ity,” 1997, available at [http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1997/07/BG1132], 10 June, 2010.
M.T. Klare, “Global Petro-Politics: The Foreign Policy Implications of the Bush Administration’s Energy Plan,”Current History, March 2002, p. 102.
It can be stated that Russia achieved more than one goal by entering Georgia. For Putin, who often states in his speeches that the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. was the greatest disaster/tragedy of the twentieth century, the creation of a Great Russia designed to regain Russia’s strength and save the Russian people from a feeling of defeat and give them the dynamism became his most important objective after coming to power. In this context, Putin’s speech in February 2007,which criticized the U.S. and the unipolar world system, stirred up an acute response.
See: “North Atlantic Council Discusses Situation in Georgia,” NATO, 12 August, 2008, available at [http://
ww.nato.int/cps/en/SID-0745DD58-902BDC72/natolive/news_43416.htm], 20 August, 2008.
See: “West Voices Dismay at Russia’s ‘Unacceptable’ Move,” Spiegel, 26 August, 2008, available at: [http://
ww.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,574537,00.html], 6 April, 2011.
See: “Sarkozy Calls Special EU Meeting on Georgia/Russia,” Euronews, 24 August, 2008, available at [http://
ww.euronews.net/2008/08/24/sarkozy-calls-special-eu-meeting-on-georgiarussia], 6 April, 2011.
See: “Press Conference on Georgia by Heikki Talvitie,” OSCE, 14 August, 2008, available at [http://www.osce.org/io/12323], 23 August, 2008.
See: “Visit to NATO by Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Minister of the Interior of Georgia,” Press Release,12 August, 2008.
It also coordinated assistance to Georgia in 2005, when the country experienced some of the worst flooding in its history, and in 2006, when forest fires broke out in southern Georgia.
EU assists Georgia financially through the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). By means of this instrument, the EU supports the development of democracy, the rule of law and governance, economic growth and reduction of poverty, and peaceful settlement of internal conflicts. Total EU grants to Georgia from various EU financial assistance instruments amounted to 505 million euro between 1992 and 2006. Moreover, Georgia participates in thematic regional programs with respect to democracy and human rights under the ENPI. Georgia has also benefited from assistance under the TACIS Regional Cooperation Program (Interstate Program), and also under the issue-related programs, such as TRACECA, INOGATE, and the Regional Environmental Center for Southern Caucasus in Tbilisi.
The inclusion of Georgia in the European Neighborhood Policy marked a significant step forward in EU-Georgian relations. As a first step in this direction, a Country Report assessing Georgia’s progress toward political and economic reform was published on March 2, 2005. The Country Report highlighted areas in which bilateral cooperation could be feasibly and significantly strengthened. The ENP Action Plan covers a period of five years. The main EU cooperation ob-jectives, policy responses, and priority fields can be found in the Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. On the basis of bilat-eral priorities, a National Indicative Program (NIP) was also adopted in agreement with the Georgian authorities. The NIP covers the period from 2007 to 2010. For this period, an indicative total sum of 120 million has been allocated; in addi-tion to the ENPI national program, Georgia will also benefit from the ENPI regional and interregional programs, plus a number of thematic programs, such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).
The Action Plan focused especially on strengthening democracy, adhering to the rule of law, human rights, and socioeconomic reforms, improving the business climate, alleviating poverty, settling conflicts, resolving justice and secu-rity issues, including border management, harmonizing regulations in various sectors, including energy and transportation,and enhancing regional cooperation.
Between 1997 and 2006, the EU contributed 33 million euro.
[http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/eu_georgia_summary/index_en.htm], 6 July, 2010.
[http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/index_en.htm], 6 July, 2010.
[http://www.eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/mandate], 6 July, 2010.
See: [http://eumm.eu/en/intro], 6 July, 2010.
The EU has provided 6 million in humanitarian aid for people affected by the conflict in Georgia. An international donor’s conference for assisting Georgia’s economic recovery was held in Brussels on 22 October, 2008.
See: Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Brussels, 11 December, 2008, p. 6, availa-ble at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/104630.pdf].
See: Ibid., p. 9.
See: Ibid., p. 10.
See: Ibid., p. 11.
See: F. Parmentier, “Normative Power, EU Preferences and Russia: Lessons from the Russian-Georgian War,” European Political Economy Review, No. 9, 2009, pp. 49-61.
See: “OSCE Chairman Regrets Disagreement on OSCE Future in Georgia,” OSCE, 21 August, 2008, available at [http://www.osce.org/cio/50525], 23 December, 2008.
See: M. Çelikpala, “Security in the Black Sea Region,” Commission on the Black Sea Policy Report II, 2010, available at [http://www.blackseacom.eu/uploads/media/Black_Sea_Policy_Report_II_Security.pdf], 19 June, 2010.
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