CENTRAL ASIA AS A REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX1
Abstract
According to the Failed States Index developed by the Foreign Policy magazine, for the last five years three of the CA states, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, have been among the 60 weakest states in the world. Turkmenistan “left” this group only in 2011. Kazakhstan is the only CA state, which has been considered to be a relatively sustainable state.2 Despite these alarming statistics, the region gave the impression of relative stability. There have not been any major conflicts in CA since the Tajik civil war. However, the tragic events in the South of Kyrgyzstan of June 2010 have revealed the vulnerability of the region to various security threats. For two decades of independent existence, CA has attracted significant academic attention. Nowadays, one can distinguish several directions in the literature devoted to the analysis of CA and its particular countries. Some studies focus on the interests of great or regional powers in the region. Many scholars explore the political systems of CA countries by studying the undemocratic nature of CA regimes, while others focus on transnational threats to regional stability, such as the influence of Islamic terrorism, religious extremism, and organized crime.
However, despite the wide variety of security studies on CA, until now, one can discern a lack of inclusive analysis focusing on a combination of different aspects of the regional security. The present article argues that the current security architecture in CA can be better explained by considering all levels of CA insecurity. In this regard, the combination of Barry Buzan’s Regional Security Complex theory and Karl W. Deutsch’s concept of security community proves to be a valuable tool for analyzing the regional security.
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The longer version of this article was presented as a Research Paper for the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, European Institute of University of Geneva (GCSP/EIUG), Master of Advanced Studies (MAS) in International and European Security.
See: “The Failed State Index 2010,” Foreign Poli-cy, available at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/
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See: Tsentral’naia Azia 1991-2009, ed. by B.K. Sultanov, KISI, Almaty, 2010, pp. 11-36.
B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, ECPR Press, 2007, p. 160.
Ibidem.
See: Ibid., p. 159.
See: Ibid., p. 182.
See: A.J. Bellamy, Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, p. 6.
See: K.W. Deutsch et al., Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957, p. 36.
Ibid., 66.
See: Ibid., pp. 123-133.
See: R. Giragosian, “The Strategic Central Asian Arena,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2006,pp. 139-159.
V. Paramonov, A. Strokov, The Evolution of Russia’s Central Asia Policy, Defense Academy of the United King-dom (DAUK), Shrivenham, June 2008.
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As a result of the Chinese-Soviet conflict during the late 1960s Soviet armed forces were significantly concentrated in the CA countries bordering China. The Xinjiang region is the source of significant security concerns for China as Uy-ghur separatist movement wants to separate the region and establish an independent state of “Eastern Turkestan.” In this regard, CA countries are of special attention to China as the independence of CA could inspire Uyghur separatists.
See: V. Paramonov, A. Strokov, op. cit.
See: V. Paramonov, O. Stolpovski, op. cit.
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See: “Robert Blake: Soglashenie po tranzitnomu centru mezhdu Kyrgyzstanom i SShA imeet silu do 2014 goda,”
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See: Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC), Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, 2011, p. 11.
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See: G. Petrov, “Conflict of Interests between Hydropower Engineering and Irrigation in Central Asia: Causes and Solutions,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2010, p. 53; St. Hodgson, “Strategic Water Resources in Cen-tral Asia: In Search of a New International Legal Order,” EUCAM Policy Brief, No. 14, 10 May, 2010.
See: E. Akhmadov, “Uzbekistan Exits Central Asia’s Common Energy System,” CACI Analyst, 26 November, 2009,available at [http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5226], 20 January, 2011.
See: Ibidem.
Due to geography connection between some areas of Tajikistan is only possible through Uzbekistan in wintertime.
See: S. Majidov, “Tajikistan-Uzbekistan Relations Freeze over Roghun Project,” CACI Analyst, 17 February, 2010,available at [http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5271], 31 January, 2011.
See: “Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential,” Asia Report, No. 33, International Crisis Group (ICG)Osh/Brussels, April 2002, p. 18.
See: Ibid., p. 20.
Islamic factor as a destabilizing factor revealed itself in several occasions: the civil war in Tajikistan (1991-
, the Batken events in Kyrgyzstan, IMU fighter inroads into Uzbekistan (for more information, see: O. Sidorov, The Islamic Factor in Central Asian Countries’ Domestic Stability,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (43), 2007,pp. 15-16.
See: Ibid., p. 17.
See: EU Central Asia Drug Action Program, available at [http://cadap.eu/ru/node/29], 4 August, 2011.
See: Ibidem.
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See: S.E. Cornell, N.L.P. Sandström, “The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security,” Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 53, No. 4, 2006, p. 16; S.E. Cornell, R.A. Spector, “Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists,”The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2002, pp. 193-206.
See: “Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential.”
See: Ibidem.
See: E. Marat, The State-Crime Nexus in Central Asia: State Weakness, Organized Crime, and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Silk Road Paper, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, October 2006.
See: H. Peimani, Conflict and Security in Central Asia and Caucasus, ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2009.
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See: Ibid., p. 10.
See: MDG Monitoring Database, 25 April, 2011, available at [http://www.mdgmonitor.org/].
See: Tajikistan on the Road to Failure, ICG, Osh/Brussels, 12 February, 2009; C. Kindelan, “Central Asian Energy Crisis Leaves Millions of Tajiks without Heat,” 4 February, 2008, available at [http://www.groundreport.com/World/Central-Asian-Energy-Crisis-Leaves-Millions-of-Taj/2854707].
See: Uzbekistan: The Andijan Uprising, ICG, Bishkek/Brussels, May 2005.
See: Ibidem.
To be precise 187 people according to official data (Prosecutor General, Report on the investigation of Andijan events for Olij Mazhlis (Parliament)), 7 September, 2005, available at [http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1126077420],
March, 2011, and 300-500 according to OSCE (Preliminary Findings on the Events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 13 May,2005, OSCE ODIHR, Warsaw, 20 June, 2005).
See: A. Baltabaeva, “Kyrgyzstan’s Intention to Return Uzbek Refugees Causes Concern,” CACA, Vol. 6, No. 13,2005, pp. 14-15.
See: Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, KIC, 2011, pp. 45-46.
See: Tsentral’naia Azia 1991-2009, p. 44.
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