ENHANCING KAZAKHSTAN’S PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES: NTEROPERABILITY AND REGIONAL COOPERATION
Abstract
Prior to September 2001, it is fair to say that the principal motivation behind foreign involvement and interest in Central Asia remained strategic and economic, energy; and for the United States its interests were generally secondary and derivative of the interests of others, allies, competitors and commercial actors. Post 11 September and as a result of its commitment to its international, anti-terrorist campaign, however, U.S.
relations with the states of Central Asia and its security interests in the region changed dramatically.
These states are now on the front lines of the war on terrorism and several states continue to provide critical support to U.S. and allied military forces conducting operations in Afghanistan. The U.S.
Military has been much more proactive in the region, recruiting states into the counter terrorist coalition, establishing a presence, and expanding its security cooperation and direct military assistance programs, as well as encouraging several of its al-lies to do the same. More than ten years after independence, many of these states remain unstable and are confronting growing problems with the illegal cross border movement of contraband, armed op-position and terrorist groups, the possible spillover of combat operations from neighboring states, and tension and disputes among neighbors that could escalate. In this environment the local militaries have a valuable function, if properly structured, equipped and trained to confront these types of missions. In most cases the Soviet legacy has hampered in developing needed capabilities more than helped them and they are not adequately prepared. Moreover, it is unlikely that they will be able to responsively make the necessary transition on their own, with-out outside assistance being required.
In the post-9/11 world, U.S. and allied formations are operating in several of these states and it programs, as well as encouraging several of its al-lies to do the same. More than ten years after independence, many of these states remain unstable and are confronting growing problems with the illegal cross border movement of contraband, armed opposition and terrorist groups, the possible spillover of combat operations from neighboring states, and tension and disputes among neighbors that could escalate. In this environment the local militaries have a valuable function, if properly structured, equipped and trained to confront these types of missions. In most cases the Soviet legacy has hampered in developing needed capabilities more than helped them and they are not adequately prepared. Moreover, it is unlikely that they will be able to responsively make the necessary transition on their own, with-out outside assistance being required.
In the post-9/11 world, U.S. and allied formations are operating in several of these states and it becomes more imperative that the capabilities of these local forces be improved, along with their ability to operate with Western ground and air units.
he following analysis charts the course of the varied progress of Kazakhstan’s peacekeeping capabilities, and its focus on interoperability with NATO forces will be considered together with the goal of promoting regional security cooperation.
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References
See: Sh. Gareyev, “Military Cooperation: Uzbekistan and the U.S.A.,” Winter 1997-1998 [www.pacom.mil/forum/
ZBEK.html]. Four of the Central Asian Republics joined NATOs PfP in 1994, Tajikistan finally joined in 2002. On multilateral military exercises see: J. Moffat, “Central Asia: U.S. to Participate in Joint Military Exercise,” RFE/RL, 29 August, 1997.
See: “CENTRASBAT’98,” Defense Technical Information Center Web Site [http://www.dtic.mil/soldiers/feb1999/fea-tures/].
See: J. Nichol, “Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service, 18 May, 2001 [http://www.cnie.org/nle/inter-76.html].
See: “NATO PfP Exercise Cooperative Nugget’97” [www.saclant.nato.int/pio/EVENTS/Exercises/COOP%20Nugget/
n97.htm; “Fact Sheet on CENTRASBAT‘2000,” www.usembassy.uz/centcom/military.htm]; “Exercise Cooperative Osprey 2001,” February 2001, NATO Web Site [www.nato.int/docu/ims/2001/i010227e.htm].
Author’s interviews with western military officers, October 2003.
Author’s interviews with western military officers and officials from the Kazakhstani MOD, October/November 2003.
See: “KAZBAT Will Be Equipped on NATO Standards,” Kazinform News Agency, Astana, 28 October, 2002.
Author’s interviews with military officials from the Kazakhstani MOD, November 2003.
The notion of WO is not very important in a U.S. battalion as the senior ranking NCO would be the Sergeant-Major as-
sisted at company levels by First Sergeants. See: U.S. Army: Heavy, Light Brigade Tables of Organization & Equipment (TOE)
http://www.orbat.com/site/toe/index.html].
Lt. Col. W. Lahue, “Security Assistance in Kazakhstan: Building a Partnership for the Future,” DISAM Journal, Fall 2002/Winter 2003, p. 14.
Ibidem.
See: “Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress,” III: Foreign Policy Objectives—Newly Independent States (NIS) Region, May 2003 [www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fmtrpt/21233.htm]; R.N. McDermott,
The Kazakh Military Looks West,” Central Asia Caucasus Analyst, Washington DC, 16 July, 2003.
See: G.W. Goodman, Jr., “Central Asian Partners: Low Key Spadework by Green Berets Reaps Valuable Benefits for War in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Journal International, January 2002, p. 60.
In September 2003, the CIP was reorganized into the Main Directorate of International Relations (MDIR).
See: “U.S. Servicemen Improving Kazakhstani Sergeants’ Skills,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty, BBC Monitoring Service,0748 GMT, 14 November, 2003.
See: “Kazakhstan Sends another Cadet to West Point,” News Bulletin of the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the U.S.A. and Canada [www.kazakhembus.com], 18 June, 2003.
Author’s interviews with military officials from the Kazakhstani MOD, November 2003.
See: “Kazakhstan Receives Military Aid From Turkey,” Khabar TV, Almaty, BBC Monitoring Service, 1100 GMT, 11 Oc-tober, 2003; “Kazakhstani Army to Get 1.5 Million Dollars From Turkey,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty, 29 October, 2003.
See: “International Military Exercises End in Kazakhstan,” Eurasianet Daily Digest [http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/
azakhstan/hypermail/200307/0043.shtml], 25 July, 2003.
Author’s interviews with U.K. MOD, August 2003.
Author’s interviews with military officials from the Kazakhstani MOD, November 2003.
See: “Peacekeeping Subdivisions Assemble Volunteers,” Kazinform News Agency, Astana, 30 January, 2002.
See: “Kazakhstani Peacekeepers May Be Sent to Afghanistan,” Kazinform, Astana, 1 February, 2002.
“President Nazarbaev about Afghanistan, KAZBAT and its Mission,” Kazinform, 7 February, 2002.
See: AP, 15 February, 2002; E. Jumagulov, “Kazakhstan: Afghan Peacekeeping Controversy,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), London, 15 February, 2002.
See: “The Question of Transferring KAZBAT to Afghanistan is not Aroused Yet,” Kazinform, 22 April, 2002.
See: “KAZBAT Will Take Part in Peacekeeping Operation in Afghanistan,” Kazinform, 1 July, 2002.
“Kazakhstani President Appealed to the Parliament to Send Kazakhstani Peacekeepers to Iraq,” Kazinform, 30 May, 2003.
Ibidem.
See: “Nearly Half of Almaty Inhabitants Against Kazakhstani Peacekeepers’ Departure to Iraq,” Kazinform, 1 July, 2003.
“Kazakhstani MP Queries Presence of Peacekeepers in Iraq,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty, 20 November, 2003.
Author’s interviews with western military officers, October 2003.
See: “Kazakhstani Military Engineers Remove 7,500 Explosive Devices in Iraq,” News Bulletin of the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the U.S.A. and Canada [www.kazakhembus.com], 19 September, 2003.
See: “Kazakhstani Defence Minister Sees Off Peacekeepers to Iraq,” Khabar TV, Almaty, BBC Monitoring Service,1300 GMT, 19 August, 2003; “Kazakhstan Sends Second Group of Peacekeepers to Iraq,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, 20 August, 2003;
Kazakhstani Peacekeepers in Kuwait to Learn How to Defuse U.S. Bombs in Iraq,” Komsomol’skaia pravda Kazakhstana, Almaty,BBC Monitoring Service, 20 August, 2003.
See: The Military Balance, 2003-2004, pp. 101, 111.
See: “Kazakhstani Peacekeepers Destroy Over 300,000 Rounds of Ammunition in Iraq,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty,
GMT, 22 October, 2003.
See: “Kazakhstan Sending Peacekeepers to Iraq,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty, BBC Monitoring Service, 0630 GMT,
August, 2003; “Kazakhstani Peacekeepers Destroy Munitions in Iraq,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty, 10 September 2003;
Kazakhstani Peacekeepers on Good Terms with Locals—Defense Minister,” Kazakhstan Today News Agency, 26 September,2003; “Kazakhstani Peacekeepers Neutralize 100,000 Rounds of Ammo’ Mines in Iraq, ” Interfax-Kazakhstan, Almaty, 11 Oc-tober, 2003.
See: “Kazakhstani Peacekeepers Destroy Over 300,000 Rounds of Ammunition in Iraq.”
“Kazakhstan and the War Against Terrorism,” The Caspian Information Center [http://www.caspianinfo.org/
tory.php?id=5].
See: “NATO and Kazakhstan: Meeting 21st Century Challenges Together,” Speech by NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson, Almaty, 10 July, 2003 [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s0370710a.htm].
Author’s interviews with western military officers concerning the shortcomings of CENTRASBAT, June/July 2003.
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