COOPERATION BETWEEN JAPAN AND AMERICA IN CENTRAL ASIA: EW OUTLINES OF GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

Abstract

In the 21st century the geopolitical configuration of forces in Central Asia acquired new outlines: the United States, the only world’s leader able to extend its influence worldwide, created a network of military bases in Central Asia and built-up strategic alliances there. American presence is a fact and a political reality caused by the Soviet Union’s disintegration and the weakening of Russia’s foothold in the region.
 Washington’s consistent policies designed to involve the local countries in its sphere of influence have produced tangible results and demonstrated that America wants to and can dominate the world. A more or less in-depth investigation of the causes and specific features of U.S. policies in Central Asia, as well as of Russia’s efforts to stem America’s influence in a region that is still a sphere of its traditional interests is beyond the scope of the present article. The role of Japan, the oldest and the most loyal Amer-ican ally, in the Central Asian context is especially interesting. The country helped the United States to penetrate Central Asia and establish control over the strategically key areas.
 Even though Japan is pursuing numerous goals in the region, its Central Asian policy can be divid-ed into periods within the world and regional contexts—an effort which reveals that Tokyo’s foreign policy initiatives are connected with the crucial political events in Central Asia.
 Until 1996 neither Japanese nor American policies betrayed any serious strategic interconnections, since the Western countries were unanimous in their “desire” to help the post-Soviet independent states.
even though financial support on a bilateral basis and within international structures (the IMF, WB, IBRD,etc.), as well as the efforts to establish military, political, and economic contacts to obtain guarantees of nuclear security and nuclear non-proliferation were collective efforts, they cannot be described as pooling efforts for the sake of any strategic goal. And not because there was no such goal, rather there was no clear idea of the desired results.