Abstract
In 2000, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or the IMU, became the first terrorist group in the post-Soviet space to be included in the U.S. Department of State “List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” Despite its name, the IMU is com-posed of citizens of all the Central Asian states, Chinese Xinjiang province, Chechnia, and some Arab countries. The IMU’s main objective is to create an Islamic state in the Ferghana Valley and consequently in the whole of Uzbekistan. It is sup-ported by Islamic radicals around the world as well as intelligence services of some countries. The IMU also has links to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qa‘eda and fought against the Northern Alliance of Ahmad Shah Masood alongside the forces of the Taliban Movement of Afghanistan. It carried out terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan and made incursions into neighboring Kyrgyzstan. For years the international community and mainly Western states had been blind to the civil war in Afghanistan, the Taliban’s stone-age policy and enormous drug business.
The world regained its sight as a result of the tragedy of 11 September 2001 in the United States that promptly shifted the attention of the international community to Afghanistan. International terrorism’s home, Afghanistan, was bombed. International terrorism’s patron, the Taliban movement, was destroyed. Terrorists lost their home and were deprived of security; their base and financial system were damaged. Though not completely rooted out, the threat of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to Central Asia was greatly diminished. Its military leader is thought to have been killed during the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan and its political leader is believed to be in hiding. Fol-lowing the Operation Enduring Freedom in late 2001, the IMU renamed itself the Islamic Move-ment of Turkestan (IMT), thus openly proclaim-ing its purposes of controlling the entire Central Asian region, disregarding the five existing nation-states and their boundaries.
This paper is about the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s history, structure, objectives, tactics, leadership, and links to other terrorist and religious extremist groups as well as to al-Qa‘eda and bin Laden. I will explain the conditions under which the movement came into existence and flourished in a country that was atheist for decades, and external factors that nourished its existence. In conclusion I will cover the implications the 2001 war in Afghanistan had on the IMU and its future impact on the security of Central Asia.
References
See: B. Pannier, “Central Asia: IMU Leader Says Group’s Goals Is ‘Return of Islam’,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,6 June, 2001 [http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/06/06062001121150.asp].
There are about three million ethnic Uzbeks living in the Middle East and South-West Asia. Of them, two million live in Afghanistan and 700 thousand live in Saudi Arabia (see: “Military and Political Conflicts in Central Asia,” Center for Foreign Policy and Analysis, Kazakhstan, 2000 [http://www.cvi.kz/text/Experts/Kozhikhov_pub/Konflikt_Central_Asia.htm]).
See: A. Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 141.
See: Ibid., pp. 140 and 154.
Turkish Milliy Gurush (National Outlook) organization based in Cologne, set up by Turkey’s former Prime Minister Erbakan, gave away hundreds of thousands of dollars to the IMU, with Erbakan’s consent, to buy arms through Milliy Gurush Secretary Muhammad Kuchak on condition that the IMU would become subordinated to Milliy Gurush and only Erbakan can specify a precise time when the jihad against Uzbekistan would begin. Leading Turkish company Ulker, controlled by Milliy Gurush, generates 1.5 bln. U.S. dollars in profits annually (see: B. Tursunov, “Extremism in Uzbekistan,” The Conflict Studies Research Center, British Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, July 2002 [http://www.csrc.ac.uk/pdfs/K37-hpz.pdf]).
Interview with an Uzbek intelligence official in 2002.
See: A. Rashid, op. cit., p. 144.
See: Ibid., p. 165.
These may not be authentic but provide an idea of the magnitude of the resources available to the IMU.
See: Uzbek newspaper Halq So’zi, 17 August, 2000.
See: A. Rashid, op. cit., p. 164.
See: B. Kudratov, “Ordinary Murder in the Name of Jihad,” Uzbek Information and Analytical Website “Stability” [http://
ww.stability.uz/ubiystvo.html].
A. Rashid, op. cit., p. 139.
Ibidem.
On 10 November, 2001 Washington Post reported that in 1997, members of the group had assassinated regional Uzbek
officials, leaving the head of one on the gate of the home of the Namangan internal affairs chief (see: D. Struck, “Uzbek Taliban Chief Feared in Homeland,” Washington Post, 10 November, 2001, p. A17.
See: A. Rashid, op. cit.
See: S. Jahangir, “The Prompt Islamic Construction of a Caliphate on Blood,” Russian Kommersant newspaper, 18 August,
[http://www.uzland.uz/2000/special4.htm].
The IMU also consisted of criminals who were convicted in Uzbekistan for various crimes but escaped justice.
See: “Military and Political Conflicts in Central Asia.”
See: L. Gibelgaus, “Who Are They: IMU Rebels?” Deutsche Welle, Russian-language version, 25 February, 2003 [http://
ww.dw-world.de/russian/0,3367,2226_A_786870_1_A,00.html].
Interview with an Uzbek intelligence official in 2002.
See: A. Rashid, “Pamirs Offer IMU Secure Base,” Eurasia Insight, 10 April, 2001 [http://www.eurasianet.org/depart-ments/insight/articles/eav041001.shtml].
See: G. Gleason, “Counterinsurgency in Central Asia: Civil Society Is the First Casualty,” Eurasia Insight, 8 January,2001 [http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav010801.shtml].
Muhammad Salih (a.k.a. Salay Madaminov) is a poet and exiled leader of the banned Democratic Party Erk of Uzbekistan,who was President Karimov’s only opponent in the 1992 presidential elections. He was tried and convicted in absentia by the Supreme Court of Uzbekistan for taking part in the coup attempt of 1999. The Uzbek intelligence believes he used his high-level contacts in Turkey while being there in exile to help the IMU receive funds from various Turkish religious, political and business circles, including from Erbakan. He allegedly agreed to any form of government in Uzbekistan if he could be a president. The IMU thought that it could receive legitimacy from the West if Salih, whom international human rights organizations considered to be a democratic oppositionist, were to become a president of Uzbekistan.
See: O. Juma, “Bandits and Their Human Rights Defenders,” UzLand.Uz, 22 February, 2003 [http://www.uzland.uz/
/february/22/06.htm].
See: J. Sinai, “Islamist Terrorism and Narcotrafficking in Uzbekistan,” Foreign Affairs, May 2000, Lexis-Nexis.
See: A. Rashid, “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s Incursion Assists the Taliban,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute,13 September, 2000 [http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=132].
In 2002, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Theo van Boven, visited Uzbekistan that resulted in a report condemn-ing the systemic use of torture by law enforcement and security officials of the country.
The government resumed currency convertibility in November of 2003.
See: A. Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, p. 158.
See: O. Juma, op. cit.
The Uzbek government’s economic failures produced high unemployment rate. But even the employment wouldn’t guarantee better life in the country where the minimum monthly wage is 15-20 U.S. dollars, not enough to maintain a family of 3-4 children. In his book Jihad Ahmed Rashid says that Namangani paid his guerillas monthly salaries of between $100 and $500—
n U.S. dollar bills. This rumor alone was enough to ensure that more recruits would join him (p. 167).
In May of 1999 a group of IMU militants decided to go back to Uzbekistan following a presidential decree granting full amnesty to those who thought they were deceitfully kept in the IMU and would come back to Uzbekistan. Thirty-six IMU
Uzbekistan threatened Tajikistan to use its bombers against the supposed IMU locations if the Tajiks could not control the situation themselves.
See: A. Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, p. 164.
See: “Operational Group of Russian Forces in Tajikistan” [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/ogrv-tajikistan.htm].
The Collective Security Treaty was signed on 15 May, 1992 in Tashkent by presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Kazakh-stan, Armenia, Tajikistan, Belarus and Uzbekistan.
See: A. Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, p. 167.
Interview with an Uzbek intelligence official in 2002.
“Trailer with Radioactive Containers Expelled to Kazakhstan,” UzLand.Uz, 1 April, 2000 [http://www.uzland.uz/2000/
_01.htm#trailer]. In January 2003, BBC reported about the seizure of more radioactive materials at the Uzbek-Turkmen border (see: C. Davis, “‘Dirty Bomb Material’ Seized in Asia,” BBC, 5 January, 2003 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/
stm].
International Crisis Group, “The IMU and the Hizb Ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign,” 30 January,2002 [http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/asia/centralasia/reports/A400538_30012002.pdf], p. 2.
General Tommy Franks, CINC CENTCOM, told journalists in Uzbekistan that Namangani was indeed dead although he did not reveal the source of this information (see: “Uzbekistan Gets U.S. Military Pledge,” The Associated Press, 24 January,2002, Lexis-Nexis). There were however other controversial reports from Russian and Kyrgyz intelligence sources that Naman-gani may still be alive and that he himself spread the rumor of his death intentionally to catch his breath before a new campaign (see: A. McConnell, “Islamic Radicals Regroup in Central Asia,” Eurasia Insight, 15 May, 2002 [http://www.eurasianet.org/
epartments/insight/articles/eav051502.shtml]), although, I think the Russians are interested in such a scenario for the reasons discussed above.
ICG, p. 3.
“Boeviki-islamisty ob’edinilis’ v Islamskoe dvizhenie Srednei Azii,” UzStrateg.Info, the website of the Institute of Stra-tegic and Regional Studies of Uzbekistan, 10 September, 2002 [http://www.uzstrateg.info/frontend/
ndex.cfm?target=news&sub=article&news_id=4887].
See: ICG Asia Report No. 26 Central Asia: Drugs and Conflict, 26 November, 2001.
See: R. Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qa‘eda: Global Network of Terror, Columbia University Press, 2002, p. 171.
“Germany Bans Accused Islamic Organization,” The Associated Press, 15 January 15, 2003, Lexis-Nexis.
ICG, p. 13.
In early 1997 a group in the Ferghana Region of Uzbekistan led by Iu. Akramov left the main body after disputes with
the local leadership; a further split in 1999 reportedly took place in the Tashkent branch when a fairly significant group set up its own party, called Hizb an-Nusra (Party of Victory) (see: Ibid, p. 9).
Ibidem.
See: A. Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, p. 9.
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