CIVIL WAR IN CHECHNIA:POLITICAL FAILURE AND STRATEGIC RESPONSE
Abstract
over the last 15 years, Chechnia’s history has been a series of political failures. The last two of these failures, which occurred in 2003, have ushered in a civil war and are currently reflected in the shifting tactics of the conflict. For years to come, they will be played out in terms of personal suffering, regional instability, and geostrategic response. The recent political failure in Chechnia began with the structure of the government that was ratified in the constitutional referendum held in March 2003. The resulting presidential system is incompatible with the chronic fragmentation of Chechen society, particularly along the traditional lines of Chechnia’s 160-some teips, or clans. An individual executive inevitably will benefit some groups over others. In a political society as deeply and elaborately divided as that of Chechnia this can only exacerbate cleavages and increase political alienation. Instead of a presidential system, Chechnia need-ed some variety of consociational institutions, such as those that helped to stabilize the neighboring Republic of Daghestan from 26 July 1994 until a presidential system was imposed there on 26 July, 2003.
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The article was completed on 15 March, i.e. before the death of president of Chechnia Akhmad Kadyrov.
Daghestan adopted constitutional alterations institut-ing a presidential system of government on 26 July, 2003. The republic is required to elect a president by 2006. It is expect-ed that current State Council representatives will serve out their terms, which are set to expire in that year. It is probable that the current Chairman of the State Council, Magomedali Magomedov, will be elected to the presidency in 2006. For a discussion of consociational democracy in Daghestan, see:
. Ware, E. Kisriev, “Ethnic Parity and Political Stability in Daghestan: A Consociational Approach,” Europe and Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 1, January 2001. For discussions of the recentralization process that has undermined Daghestan’s con-sociational institutions and imposed a presidential system see:
. Ware, E. Kisriev, “Russian Recentralization Arrives in the Republic of Daghestan: Implications for Institutional Integ-rity and Political Stability”, Eastern European Constitution-al Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, Winter, 2001; R. Ware, E. Kisriev,W. Patzelt, U. Roericht, “Russia and Chechnia from a Dagh-estani Perspective,” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 4, De-cember 2002; R. Ware, E. Kisriev, “Bending Not Breaking:
aghestan’s Presidential Expedient,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (22), 2003.
See: A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1977.
In practice this would have opened the door to contro-versy since divisions among teips are not always unequivocal and some sub-groups have claims to membership in more than one teip.
Such as the woman who essentially fought her way into the doorway of a military bus near Mozdok on 5 June, 2003.
Such as Zarema Muzhakhoeva who deliberately sabotaged her own mission to blow up a Tverskaya café on 9 July, 2003.
Ironically, critics have argued that Russian security services had a motive to commit terrorist acts against the Russian population in September of 1999 in order to generate popular support for the current conflict. On the other hand, I have argued that the apartment block blasts of September 1999 may have been retribution for federal attacks upon the Wahhabi enclave in the Daghestani villages of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar that were taking place concurrently. The present Islamist tactic of terrorist retribution against a civilian population appears to be consistent with that argument.
Federal forces evidently learned this lesson after disastrous negotiations during the hostage incidents at Budennovsk in June 1995 and Kizliar in January 1996.
In both cases, their actions may have less to do with their regard for Kadyrov and more to do with their common Islamist enemies. Yet some of Russia’s moderate Islamic leaders admire Kadyrov for his political ascendance, and aspire toward similar recognition.
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