THE CAUCASUS: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE SECURITY SPHERE
Abstract
An adequate level of national security requires regional cooperation; even the countries on the opposite sides of a military-political confrontation have to cooperate, at least to preserve their non-military security. One of the traditional liberal formulas, cooperation is possible in peace, as well as at the height of conflict,1 puts the above in a nutshell. Hence the question of whether interstate regional cooperation is unlimited, or whether it is bound by certain factors created by the structure and dynamics of security-related relationships. In other words, is the cooperation potential of the West European countries equal to that of the Caucasian states? Today the answer is “no.” This raises two more questions. First, which of the specifics of the regional relations in the security sphere in the Cau-casus limit the local states’ ability to regulate their security-related cooperation? Second, which of the possible developments may lead to an efficient security system in the Caucasus based on cooperation?
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See: A.L. Ross, “The Theory and Practice of International Relations: Contending Analytical Perspectives,” Strategy and Force Planning, Second Edition, ed. by The Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, Naval War College Press, New-port, RI, 1977, pp. 45-62.
B. Buzan’s conceptual model of the security complex based on the idea of interdependence of the key national security interests of a geographically distinctive group of states is used to describe the current security system in the Caucasus. Correspondingly, the interstate security complex there is formed on the basis of the intertwined security interests of the three South Caucasian states (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia), and the powers of the traditional extra-regional triangle (Russia, Turkey and Iran), as well as on a great share of American interests (see: B. Coppieters, “Conclusions: The Caucasus as a Security Com-plex,” in: Contested Borders in the Caucasus, VUBPress, Brussels, 1996; S.E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers. A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon Press, 2001, and also J. Eivazov, “The Antiterrorist Campaign and New Geo-political and Security Trends in the Regional Systems of Central Asia and the Caucasus,” Central Asia and the Caucasus,No. 4 (16), 2002).
I believe that at the current stage the national security aspects of all states involved in the regional system are intertwined and have the following structure composed of three components: (1) material-resource component (territory, kindred population,and natural resources); (2) perceptional-behavioral component (the perceptions of friendship/hostility shaped by the practice of contacts and corresponding behavior: the enemy image, alliances, and counter-alliances); (3) mutual dependence generated by transnational (ecological) threats to all.
See: B. McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge University Press,1999, p. 90.
See: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p. 121.
See: J.M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,”International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1988, p. 485.
R. Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, January 1978, p. 167.
See: R.O. Keohane, L.L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Sum-mer 1995, p. 45.
K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1979, p. 186.
B. McSweeney, op. cit., p. 90.
See: B. Buzan, op. cit., p. 120.
See: K.N. Waltz, op. cit., p. 187.
B. McSweeney, op. cit., p. 91.
Here I have in mind two vectors of bloc building: Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan and Russia-Armenia-Iran.
B. Coppieters, “A Regional Security System for the Caucasus,” Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol. 5, Issue 1&2, 2000 [http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/crs/crs_2000/crs00_cob01.html].
See: K.N. Waltz, op. cit., p. 187.
Ibid., p. 88.
R. Jervis, op. cit., p. 172.
See: L. Ross, op. cit.
K.N. Waltz, op. cit., p. 91.
A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization,Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992, p. 395.
A. Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, Summer 1995, p. 73.
Ibidem.
Ibid., p. 81.
See: K. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Greenwood Press, Princeton, 1957, p. 31.
See: A.L. Ross, op. cit.
K.N. Waltz, op. cit., p. 186.
R. Jervis, op. cit., p. 171.
The initial conception used the mechanism to explain how cooperation in economy, science, and technology, and the
dividends it produces, promoted cooperation in the political and military spheres (see: Ph. Schmitter, “Three Neo-Functionalist Hypothesis about International Integration,” International Organization, Vol. 23, Issue 1, Winter 1969, pp. 162-165).
B. Coppieters, “A Regional Security System for the Caucasus.”
R.O. Keohane, L.L. Martin, op. cit., p. 43.
See: Ibid., pp. 43, 46.
Partnership for Peace: Framework Document issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meet-ing of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10 January, 1994 [http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm].
See: R.O. Keohane, L.L. Martin, op. cit., p. 49.
See: Ibid., p. 45.
See: Nash vek, 7 April, 2000.
See: M. Emerson, “Approaches to the Stabilization of the Caucasus,” Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol. 5, Issue 1&2,
[http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/crs/crs_2000/crs00_emm01.html].
See: M. Emerson, “Approaches to the Stabilization of the Caucasus,” Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol. 5, Issue 1&2,2000 [http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/crs/crs_2000/crs00_emm01.html].
See: M. Emerson, N. Tocci, E. Prochorova, “A Stability Pact for the Caucasus in Theory and Practice—A Supplemen-tary Note,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, September 2001, p. 117.
On the one hand, there was no agreement on whether Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorny Karabakh, and Chechnia should participate in this structure along with the regional states; on the other, there were doubts about Iran’s possible involvement and its status.
This was formulated by President Heydar Aliev at the Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999 (see: M. Emerson, op. cit.).
This is precisely why the EU is not considered an independent external component of the Caucasian security complex (see: B. Coppieters, “Conclusions: The Caucasus as a Security Complex,” pp. 215-225; S.E. Cornell, op. cit., pp. 396-400.)
B. Buzan, op. cit., pp. 219-220.
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