Abstract
The very contradictory processes going on in all political parties of Uzbekistan are caused by the dynamic changes in their role in the country’s political life. This observation is based on an analysis, first, of the ratings of their involvement in public life; second of their election platforms; third of the unfolding political rivalry; fourth of the statements made by their leaders; and fifth of their tactics. Today, while the progressive elites work toward reviving the status of their parties, some of the party leaders have demonstrated that they are not ready to accept any reforms. Naturally enough, the republic, which is still living through the transition period, has not yet ac-quired influential parties of the Western type. The local parties have not learned how to attract supporters and keep them between election campaigns, how to formulate targeted programs from public sentiments, or how to translate these programs into life. The parties leaders and the head of state have repeatedly admitted this. The continued chaotic social stratification1 and the highly personalized nature of political organizations are also responsible for the parties’ inadequate development. I should say that the absence of a communist party (such parties function in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) is a very contradictory phenomenon caused by an underestimation of the importance of having a complete range of political viewpoints in society. This ban on left-wing parties is only encouraging right-wing sentiments. It is wrong to say, however, that the country lacks political parties with any amount of experience and with recognizable leaders. The oldest of our parties, the National-Democratic Party of Uz-bekistan (NDPU) set up in 1991, and its activity con-firm that there are enough people in the capital and outside it with adequate experience of party work,2 who know how to enlist supporters, carry out an elec-tion campaign with satisfactory results, and even how to apply the latest political know-how. These party functionaries, however, lack other qualities very much needed for everyone engaged in public activities: political culture, popularity, and faith in the future of democratic reforms in the country.
At the same time, the parliamentary factions and certain local organizations of large political parties have already acquired enough influence to appoint people to top posts and carry out certain financial decisions. For example, the chairmen of the Oliy Majlis (the parliament) committees and their deputies can criticize the government and dis-cuss execution of the state budget; and the heads of the regional branches of certain parties, such as the NDPU and the Fidokorlar National Democratic Party (Self-Sacrifices), can influence decision-making at the municipal level. Party functionaries are obviously independent figures with important political roles to play. In the social context of the present transition stage of development people look at party functionaries as important figures, close to businessmen or state employees (teachers, doctors, officers, etc.).3
References
Here I have in mind social stratification of the working class (workers employed at large, including the defense, plants in Tashkent, Chirchik, Almalyk, Samarkand, Navoi, etc.) and the collective farm peasantry, as well as noticeable migration of the scientific and technical intelligentsia, that is, the three strata which can, in principle, form large stable parties.
I have in mind the process of large-scale party development that started in the Uzbek S.S.R. in about 1989, when a multiparty system appeared; it acquired clear organizational forms in 1990 with the abolition of notorious Art 6 of the Soviet Constitution about the C.P.S.U. as “the leading and guiding force of Soviet society.” There were two more peaks of party development in Uzbekistan: in 1994 and 1999 during the first and second parliamentary elections.
Under Art 4 of the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Political Parties, judges, public prosecutors, investigators, officers of the Interior Ministry structures and the national security bodies, the military, foreign citizens, or stateless persons cannot be members of political parties.
The 1999 parliamentary elections, as a result of which prominent members of the local intelligentsia became deputies,confirmed that political techniques play their role together with money and the administrative resource.
In 1999, on the eve of parliamentary elections, the experts of Izhtimoiy fiqr, the largest public opinion center,found out that 45.5 percent of the polled were absolutely sure about the differences in the party programs and aims. Accord-ing to express polls carried out by a group of independent sociologists in Tashkent, 67 percent of the polled saw no differences between the parties.
This situation is further aggravated by the fact that under the 1992 Constitution, the local administrators (in regions and cities) also head the local kengashes of people’s deputies (that makes them the heads of the executive and legislative branches of power at one and the same time). This obviously cripples the checks and balances system. (Administrative re-form, however, has already limited the previously unlimited power of the local executive structures.) The central power believed that the fact that prior to 2004 the kengashes of people’s deputies could nominate their candidates to the elected bodies of all levels was keeping administrative influence in check to a certain extent.
The party scored a political victory by attracting Iulduz Usmanova, the most popular pop singer, to its ranks; it also en-listed support of the best film directors, cameramen, artists and designers, as well as promotion experts.
The position of any republican party at the elections in the Samarkand Region can be regarded as the second important indicator (after Tashkent) of its strength. In 2004, too, the region will attract political parties due to its powerful business and information structures.
The contradictory trends of industrial development in the formerly industrially developed Tashkent Region will create more problems in the coming election campaign. It seems the party candidates will have to clearly formulate realistic programs of industrial revival.
In 1999-2003, as a result of this, the party lost several of its most active supporters of the middle and lower ranks, who later joined the Liberal-Democratic Party.
An Oliy Majlis deputy can do this during regular trips to his constituency.
Only the members of the Fidokorlar Central Council dedicate all their time to parliamentary activities.
President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov publicly criticized party leader Prof. E. Norbutaev, a prominent lawyer, for the party’s political ambitions, which never coincided with the number of votes it received.
Today, the party offers the following figures about its membership: there are about 33,500 members in its 1,700 grass-root cells; the figures look doubtful when compared with the number of party cards issued.
Former U.S. State Secretary James Baker demanded that Tashkent legalize Birlik; the Uzbek authorities refused to suc-cumb to pressure.
I have limited my analysis of the opposition groups which appeared by May 2003 because this problem, as well as the regional elites, deserves special consideration.
In September 2003, the document about the most urgent economic reforms produced by the round tables was actively commented on at foreign Internet sites, including the sites of the U.S. State Department.
The last round table was held at the Kumushkan recreation area outside Tashkent, where the documents and an applica-tion about registering a new party were signed. It was there that the initiative group asked the head of state for a meeting to be held, which took place on 7 October, 2003.
It was very hard to insist on the liberal-democratic nature of the future party since, on the whole, liberal democracy is closely associated with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. It is interesting to note that this coincided with criticism of liberalism in Kazakh-stan. To a certain extent the Liberal-Democratic Party of Japan was selected as the pattern for the new party.
Its first leader Kobiljan Tashmatov (one of the leading bankers in Uzbekistan and a Fidokorlar deputy) knew more than others about the farmer movement in the country. A charming person and a skilful leader, who was born in the Ferghana Region and knew how to attract considerable funds, he promptly set up local structures of the new party.
The decree of the head of state issued after the well-known August 1991 events in Moscow is still in force in Uzbekistan.
t banned party activities in creative unions, educational establishments, etc. Under Art 5 of the Law on Political Parties, members of political parties can take part in the events their parties organize out of hours and at the parties’ expense.
For example, one of the issues carried an open letter to the Governor of the Tashkent Region K. Tuliaganov and some other equally highly critical documents.
According to the election laws, it is the task of the Central Election Committee to establish the election procedure. It is its responsibility to guarantee that the laws are observed in the process and to prevent the executive structures from interfering in the process.
The NDPU presents itself as a party which takes the interests of the most vulnerable social groups to heart.
The first Political Council of the MEB-LDPU included the khokims of the Khorezm, Surkhandarya, Samarkand, and Djizak regions. So far, the party has betrayed no intention of inviting heads of district and city administrations to join its ranks.
Everything said about the local councils being ill-prepared to accept the reforms is not true. On many occasions the local councils (especially in Tashkent, Chirchik, Samarkand, and elsewhere) did not agree with regional administrations, public pros-ecutors, and other officials.
According to the republican laws, people join parties as individual members, yet the laws say nothing about certain sides of the activity of parliamentary factions and party groups. In the future, the parties’ greater involvement in state administration will require further specification of certain contradictory issues (related to deputies who change factions, deputies’ responsibility to their factions, etc.).
Similar analyses were conducted in the past, too. This one was organized on the eve of the enactment of the new Law on Elections to the Oliy Majlis (which entered into force on 1 July, 2004); for this reason it seems to be more accurate and free from administrative influence.
The rating was based on the four factors enumerated above (number of events; number of people involved; media cov-erage; expert opinion).
The recent change in leaders (A. Jalalov, a well-known philosopher, a former presidential candidate, was replaced by relatively young A. Rustamov) was a tactically wise move.
The fact that the party is headed by Academician T. Daminov, a well-known doctor, and has a large number of medics in its ranks makes it an organization of one profession.
The subject of the middle class dominates in the political vocabulary; in August 2002, when addressing the 9th session of the Oliy Majlis, the president outlined a policy for all-round protection of the business class.
Today, due to the difficulties with implementing socioeconomic reforms and in order to promote national consolidation,the formation of blocs (between LDPU and NDPF, for example) would be the best answer from the tactical and ethical view-points.
After the 1999 elections, the Vatan tarakkieti and Fidokorlar parties formed one party called Fidokorlar.
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