Abstract
On 23 November 2003 we all witnessed un-expected political developments in Georgia, as a result of which the Shevardnadze regime, absolutely unable to cope with the crying social, economic, and political problems, was re-moved by a crowd driven to despair by a decade of stagnation. This challenge, which put an end to Eduard Shevardnadze’s long political career, is a Damocles Sword of sorts for the new Georgian cabinet and President Mikhail Saakashvili, whose charisma determined the outcome of the November events and kindled hopes for a better future. The new government received a huge credit of confidence which must be repaid.
References
In May 2004, when the situation in Adjaria reached its peak, the non-parliamentary opposition to Saakashvili stepped up its activities in Tbilisi. Had the government failed to promptly defuse the situation, the ranks of the opponents of the revolution would have swelled with new members and antirevolutionary rallies could have taken place.
The U.N. is working in Abkhazia, while the OSCE is involved in South Ossetia. When talking about broader involve-ment, I not only mean a larger number of countries or organizations involved, but also wider missions and mandates of those present.
A certain part of the Georgian political elite favors the second option; it remains to be seen, however, whether Georgia has enough forces to establish peace and stability in case of military intervention in the mutinous regions and, more important still, whether it will be able to prevent destabilization of other regions.
Although Abashidze and certain Moscow politicians tried to evoke the Kars Agreement of 1921.
We should not exclude the possibility of Russia’s interference, but this could only have happened on the basis of Abash-idze’s informal contacts with members of the Russian political and military elite. In South Ossetia the local regime has informal support because of smuggling; at the same time, there is also formal support, in the form of the peacekeeping forces mandate.
This is especially true of the media, politicians and analysts in Russia.
There are the following documents: an agreement “On the Principles of Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Con-flict” signed by Yeltsin and Shevardnadze in June 1992; an agreement “On Further Development of Peaceful Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict and Setting up a Mixed Control Commission” and the regulations “On Mixed Control Com-mission”; an agreement “Decision of the Mixed Control Commission on the Peacekeeping Forces” of 6 December, 1994;regulations “On the Basic Principles of Activity of the Military Contingents and Military Observers” and appendices “On Peaceful Settlement in the Zone of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict and the Rights and Obligations of the Commander of the Mixed Forces.”
[www.pankisi.info].
This is especially true of the fact when the Georgian side discovered and confiscated unguided rockets brought in alleg-edly for the helicopter peacekeeping unit (not deployed in the conflict zone).
14 July, 2004, Washington; the full text can be found at [http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/policy_recs-072104.pdf].
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