Abstract
Gas excess is what attracts Gazprom of Russia to Central Asia: it buys gas from the local countries to export it to Western Europe. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have already signed long-term agreements on selling nearly entire gas excess to Russia; Kazakhstan will probably sign a similar document in the near future. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have concluded with Russia long-term agreements on cooperation in the gas sphere, under which they farmed out to Gazprom their (negligible) gas sectors. Gazprom acquired the right to use their territories for gas transit. Against the background of Gazprom’s hectic activity in the CIS countries (with political support of the RF government) the Central Asian countries have already become the most integrated part of the “gas-unified U.S.S.R.” For the countries that use Central Asian gas today or will use it in the future (Ukraine, in the first place) Russia’s monopoly is fraught with high prices and, more important still, political pressure. Having captured the Central Asian gas market Russia will turn its attention to the countries, across which gas reaches Europe (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova). If joint ventures on Russian conditions are set up on the basis of Beltransgaz and the gas transportation consortium of Ukraine, Moscow will impose its gas prices on the EU. The European Union’s growing requirements and Russia’s monopoly on gas deliveries from the CIS countries to Europe will, finally, send the gas prices up on the Eurasian market.
Our reasoning is based on an analysis of Russia’s expansion to the gas sector of the Central Asian countries. Their highly autocratic regimes, poverty, demographic problems, as well as the efforts to Islamize the local countries are fraught with military, ethnic, and religious conflicts.
References
This main pipeline will move 30 bcm of gas; it will be 1,050 km long; preliminary cost is $1 billion. Turkmenistan is prepared to pay for the stretch on its territory; Ukraine is prepared to pay for 780 km. It is expected that the pipeline will be com-missioned in 2007; Ukraine has already been working on feasibility studies.
According to BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2003, as of late 2002 the proven gas reserves were 2.01 tcm;Turkmenistan’s own assessments are 2.86 tcm).
Auditing (that costs $1.1 million) may reveal that the gas reserves were overstated. Auditing ordered to assess the pos-sibility of laying the Trans-Afghan gas pipeline will make it possible to estimate the total gas reserves on the basis of the exact figures.
In 2002, the republic produced 53.5 bcm of gas (an increase of 3.9 percent as against the previous year); in 2003,59.09 bcm (11 percent more than in 2002); the country exported 43.4 bcm, or 10 percent more than in 2002. In 2004, it is planned to produce 74 bcm; to export 58 bcm. By 2010 it is planned to produce 120 bcm.
After 2010 the republic should increase gas production every year by 5 bcm (the 2010 level corresponds to the republican plans). Domestic consumption will not considerably increase. Ukraine will extend the present contract for 25 years more with the same delivery volumes. Russia will get the minimum possible contracted amounts. The Trans-Afghan pipeline will be commis-sioned in 2015 (instead of 2010 as was planned).
The figures by the end of 2002 are the following: proven natural gas reserves—1.87 tcm; industrial reserves, over 1 tcm.
he country has a wide network of main gas pipelines of the total length of over 13,000 km with the stretches of export pipelines (CAC and Bukhara-Urals). In 2002 the Uzbekneftegaz produced 57.672 bcm of gas (1.8 percent more than in 2001). In 2003, the country produced 57.481 bcm of gas (0.3 percent less than in 2002). By 2010 Uzbekistan plans to export 20 bcm of gas.
The project is named according to the largest gas field with the reserves of up to 100 bcm.
The project also includes construction of a gas chemical plant with the capacity of 6 bcm, two compressor stations;200 km of a main pipeline and other infrastructure facilities. The Russian companies are expected to invest $760m out of the total$960m. The share of Itera that had withdrawn from the project was redistributed among the other participants. It is expected that Gazprom may join the project, too.
As of late 2002 the proven reserves of natural gas were 1.84 tcm; hypothetical reserves on the continent and the Caspian shelf have been estimated at 8.3 tcm. The republic uses a system of transit main pipelines (over 9,000 m long) to move its gas to European Russia, Ukraine, the U.K. and the Southern Caucasus.
In 2003 the republic produced 14 bcm.
The first line was built in 1966 to be used for moving gas from the southeastern gas fields of Turkmenistan.
About 3,939 km of the CAC run across the territory of Kazakhstan.
On 25 November, 2003 head of Itera I. Makarov asked Gazprom to ensure transportation of 7 bcm of gas from Turkmen-istan via Uzbekistan for his company. Gazprom refused for want of “idle capacities.”
On the other hand, KazTransGaz suggested that a Kyrgyz-Kazakh joint venture be set up to restore and use the Kyrgyz stretch of the Bukhara-Tashkent-Taraz-Bishkek-Almaty gas pipeline. It is expected that its authorized fund will be formed, on the parity basis, from Kazakhstan’s investments in the restoration of the existing stretch of the pipeline and building a new pipeline,and from Kyrgyzstan’s stretch of the pipeline. If Kyrgyzstan refuses to form the JV, Kazakhstan plans to build a by-pass that will cost it $70m (the existing main pipeline between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan crosses the Kyrgyz territory in three places).
Islamabad demanded that Tehran guarantee the volumes needed to load the new pipeline. “We want to see with our own eyes that there is enough gas in Southern Pars. We do not want a repetition of the Trans-Afghan project. We planned to import Turkmenian gas from the Dauletabad fields when we discovered that Russia had earlier claims to it,” said a highly placed Paki-stani official.
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