SPREAD OF JIHAD: THE ORIGINAL FACTORS AND THE SCOPE OF ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS
Abstract
Russia has been trying to put out the flame of resistance in the Northern Caucasus for 200 years now. Historians and political analysts came up with all sorts of explanations: the mountain peoples’ predatory nature; British and Turkish influence; the mutinous leaders of Sheik Mansour, and imams such as Ghazi-Muhammad, Shamil, and Najmuddin Gotsinsky; the socioeconomic crisis; and the subversive activities of foreign extremist organizations. In fact, resistance has been fed by the simple fact that the Caucasian Muslims cannot accept the rules, laws, and sociopolitical norms of the Russian state. “From what we know about the history of the Cau-casus we can conclude that the anti-Russian revolts of the locals were not brought about by chance people like Shamil or even by the very strict teaching of the Murids. The main reason was hatred of Russian domination.”1 Our contemporary Iakov Gor-din says the same: “To harshly impose European ideas transformed into an ‘over-regulated’ variant typical of Russia on a fundamentally different system of world perception was a fatal mistake.”2 Many of those who try to analyze the reasons for the region’s mutinous nature fall into the same trap. They follow their own logic (far removed from the cast of minds of a Caucasian Muslim resolved to fight the state) in an effort to explain why extremist and radical movements are gaining momentum. Even though such researchers do not go beyond the superficial and secondary causes of political-religious extremism, they claim a pro-found and exhaustive analysis of its roots and further development. Here I would like to dwell on the deep-rooted factors which go back to the violently tectonic layers of the local nations’ consciousness and their historical memory and are feeding the radical movements and resistance in the Northern Caucasus.
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Quoted from: Ia.A. Gordin, Kavkaz: zemlia i krov,St. Petersburg, 2000, p. 30.
Ibid., p. 84.
According to Bagautdin (who is an Avar) and belongs to the Naqshbandi tarekat headed by Shek Said-Afandi Atsaev (of Chirkey), in Soviet times too there were people in the remote villages of the Gergebil District of Daghestan who studied the Koran and the Shari‘a in underground places for so long that they could no longer stand the daylight. Muhammad-rasul (Darghinian),imam of the mosque in the town of Izberbash town, who represented the village of Gubden, the people of which were known for their continued devotion to their religious duties (including the hijab), during cruel repressions said that the rural and district administrations had refrained from opposing the local ban on burying Communist party functionaries at the local cemetery. Ac-cording to Zelimkhan, a Chechen, his uncle, the Minister of the Interior of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, secretly prayed five times a day in his office.
See: G. Alkadari, Asari Daghestan, Makhachkala, 1929, p. 54.
A.S. Pushkin, Polnoe sobranie sochineniy, in ten volumes, Vol. VI, Moscow, Leningrad, 1949, p. 647.
See: A.E. Rozen, Zapiski dekabrista, Irkutsk, 1984, pp. 389-390.
Ibid., p. 390.
See, for example: A.S. Kulikov, S.A. Lembik, Chechenskiy konflikt. Khronika vooruzhennogo konflikta 1994-1996,Moscow, 2000, p. 23.
A. Saidov, Tayna vtorzhenia [www.chechpress.com].
Significantly, in recent years the ranks of mojaheddin in Daghestan have been swelling with people from regions that were least Islamic under Soviet power: Lakhs, Lezghians, Nogais. Rabbani Khalilov and Idris Bakkunov, one of the leaders of a terrorist group which kills members of the law enforcement structures, are Lakhs. A large group of mojaheddin taken prisoner or killed during the fighting in June 2004 in Makhachkala were Lezghians. Nogais who took part in blasting the building of the Federal Security Service of Ingushetia were found and destroyed in Kizliar in the summer of 2004.
During the fight between federal forces and the Gelaev group in the Tsuntin District of Daghestan, two Russian soldiers left to guard an armored carrier that had lagged behind the army column were killed by civilians who acted on their own. What is more, for over 18 months the law-enforcement structures have been unable to track several terrorist groups of Daghestanian mojaheddin who live in secret flats and move around Makhachkala in their cars. They are obviously supported by the local peo-ple—something that was impossible two or three years ago.
See, for example: A. Larintseva, T. Samedov, O. Alenova, “Kol’tso kavkazskoy natsional’nosti,” Kommersant-Vlast,29 September-5 October, 2003.
V.D. Krotov in his article “Geopolitika i bezopasnost Iuga Rossii” has written: “The current crisis can be weakened, but not eliminated altogether. This is the main thing to be said about it.” Sovremennye problemy geopolitiki Kavkaza, 2002.
“Kto budet vospityvat imamov?” Novoe delo, No. 45, 7 November, 2003.
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