9/11 AND THE HEARTLAND DEBATE IN CENTRAL ASIA
Abstract
When five independent states emerged in the Central Asian region, in the immediate after-math of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, what also emerged, more or less simultaneously, was a focus on certain geopolitical concepts and constructs that had become defunct in the immediate past. One such concept that became popular was that of the “new great game,” to define the competition for influence, power, hegemony and profits that would now be played out over the “Heartland.”1 It was emphasized that while the original “Great Game” had been about territorial control, the new game was primarily about control over the resources of the Heartland and only secondarily about the strategic geopolitical position of the region.2 This became an integral part of a vast literature and coincided with a revival of interest in and use of geopolitics as a tool for politico-security analysis.
This focus intensified in the post 9/11 scenario when it was argued that control over this region, the crucial “Heartland” of the “World-Island,” would be critical in determining the emerging balance of influence in the context of a vastly changed world order. The assumption, particularly in the post 9/11 scenario, was that Sir Halford Mackinder’s “World-Island” would once again be cen-tral to both U.S. and Russian foreign policy. Strategic analysts returned to the theory of the “Heartland” that had envisioned Russian control over the Eurasian landmass as the “pivot of world politics” and the implications of this for other states.3 However, it would be incorrect to interpret this focus on the Heartland as geographical determinism. Geographical determinism ignores one of Mackinder’s major tenets where he had pointed out that “the actual balance of political power at any given time is, of course, the product, on the one hand of geographical conditions, both eco-nomic and strategic, and, on the other hand, of the relative number, virility, equipment, and organization of the competing peoples.”4
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References
There is, however, debate on the viability of the use of the term “new great game.” For more detail, see: M. Ed-wards, “The New Great Game and the New Great Gamers: Disciples of Kipling and Mackinder,” Central Asian Survey,Vol. 22, No. 1, 2003, pp. 83-102.
Energy politics and the competition over oil and gas became the focus of both Russian and American administra-tions in the Central Asian region. A Russian Security Council Report emphasized that by 2005 Russia’s dependence on CIS energy resources would have increased and that it would be of vital interest to have access to these areas. Similarly, reports under the Clinton administration stressed the need to be active in the region.
The concept of a critical Eurasian Heartland and containment of the power occupying the Heartland had become evident in the writings of a number of commentators even prior to the events of 9/11. Among them Zbigniew Brzezinski referred to Central Asia, the “Eurasian Balkans,” as geopolitically significant for reasons of energy, sociopolitical instabil-ity and potential power domination. Brzezinski argued that America’s primary interest would be to help ensure that no single power comes to control this geopolitical space since preponderance over the entire Eurasian continent serves as the central basis for global primacy. Brzezinski thus made Eurasia the focus of U.S. foreign policy in his writings consistently warn-ing of the advantages that the Heartland power had over the West (Zb. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Pri-macy and Its Geostrategic Imperative, Basic Books, New York, 1997; idem, Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest, The Atlantic Monthly Press, Boston, 1986).
H.J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, April 1904,pp. 437.
S.E. Cornell, “America in Eurasia: One Year After,” Current History, October 2002, pp. 330-336.
Quoted from: B. Woodward, Bush At War, Pocket Books, London, Sydney, New York, Tokyo, Singapore, Toron-to, 2002, p. 118.
Quoted from: “Russia: Communist Leader Says ‘NATO Forces’ in Central Asia a Threat,” RFE/RL Report, 9 Feb-ruary, 2002: available at [www.rferl.org].
See: Nezavisimaia gazeta, 9 October, 2001. Quoted in Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Keeping Central Asia Stable,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4, 2004, pp. 689-705.
Quoted from: I. Torbakov, “Russia Moves to Reassert Influence in Central Asia, Caucasus,” Eurasia Insight,18 December, 2002: available at [http://www. eurasianet.org].
Ibidem.
See: I. Alibekov, S. Blagov, “New Security Organization Could Help Expand Russia’s Reach in Central Asia,”Eurasia Insight, 6 May, 2003: available at [http://www. eurasianet.org].
Ibidem.
See: G. Feifer, “2002 in Review: Putin’s Foreign Policy Not Seen as Harming Relations with the West,” RFE/RL Report, 16 December, 2002: available at [www.rferl.org].
See: A. Cohen, “Uncertainty Still Defines Russia’s Role in Central Eurasia,” Eurasia Insight, 19 September, 2002:
vailable at [http:/www.eurasianet.org].
Quoted from: N. Krastev, “Central Asia: ‘Taliban’ Author Says Russia to Regain Influence in Unstable Region,”RFE/RL Report, 22 March, 2002: available at [www.rferl.org].
Quoted from: Z. Eshanova, “Central Asia: Diplomatic Visits Highlight U.S.-Russian Competition,” RFE/RL Re-port, 3 December, 2002: available at [www.rferl.org].
R. Abazov, “Kyrgyzstan’s Dilemmas,” Analysis of Current Events, Vol. 14, No. 2, May 2002.
On 26 February, 2004, Nezavisimaia gazeta suggested that Moscow is hoping to secure a permanent Russian mil-itary base in Tajikistan (see: Z. Abdullayev, “Tajikistan, Russia Probe Military Partnership,” Eurasia Insight, 15 March,2004: available at [http://www. eurasianet.org]).
See: K. Arman, “U.S. Geopolitical Position Takes Hit in Tajikistan,” Eurasia Insight, 13 July, 2004: available at [http://www. eurasianet.org].
Quoted from: Z. Eshanova, op. cit.
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova formed a group called the GUAM in 1996 and when Uzbekistan joined in 1999 it came to be known as GUUAM. It was formed as a political, economic and strategic alliance among the member states with the objective of enhancing regional economic cooperation through the development of a Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport corridor. It has also become a forum for discussing various levels of existing security problems and promoting conflict resolution. For more detail, see the GUUAM official website available at [www.guuam.org].
See: T. Kuzio, S. Blagov, “GUUAM Makes a Comeback Bid with U.S. Support,” Eurasia Insight, 7 July, 2003:
vailable at [http://www. eurasianet.org].
Ibidem.
Uzbekistan withdrew from the Organization in 2005.—Editor’s Note.
Quoted from: I. Alibekov, S. Blagov, op. cit.
Quoted from: I. Torbakov, “Uzbekistan Set to Diversify its Security Options in the Wake of Recent Militant At-tacks,” Eurasia Insight, 19 April, 2004: available at [http://www. eurasianet.org].
See: M. Lelyveld, “U.S./Russia: Officials Hail Energy Partnership,” RFE/RL Report, 4 October, 2002: available at [www.rferl.org].
For more details of how this was attempted and the role of the oil companies, see: G. Bahgat, “The New Geopol-itics of Oil: The United States, Saudi Arabia and Russia,” Orbis, Vol. 47, No 3, Summer 2003, pp. 447-461.
See: J. Erickson, “Eurasian Manoeuvres,” in: Oil, Transition and Security in Central Asia, ed. by S.N. Cummings,Routledge-Curzon, London and New York, 2003, pp. 255-262.
In the end of March 2004 there were suicidal attacks against the militia in Tashkent. This was followed by a se-ries of bomb blasts in Bukhara. Following these incidents Uzbekistan and Russia negotiated an Uzbek-Russian strategic cooperation pact.
For more details of the debate, see: I. Torbakov, “Policy Makers in Moscow Debate the Limits of Russian Power in the Caucasus, Central Asia,” Eurasia Insight, 2 September, 2004: available at [http://www. eurasianet.org].
J. Erickson, op. cit., p. 261.
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