DETERMINISM VERSUS FRICTION: A CRITIQUE OF MACKINDER
Abstract
Mackinder was not a determinist,” declared Colin S. Gray, arguably the most celebrated contemporary scholar of geopolitics.1 He has further proclaimed that Mackinder’s classic geopolitical theory “has outlasted the criticisms.”2 An ardent advocate of Mackinder, and of geopolitics as an enduring and “overwhelmingly relevant” field of study, Gray defends it vociferously: “Unfortunately, proclamation of the demise of geopolitics is at best premature, and much more likely is simply wrong-headed.”3 On the other hand, Christopher J. Fettweis is confident that “geopolitical analysis is already as obsolete as major war itself.”4 Whilst geopolitics as a field of academic study has slowly descended into relative insignificance in the West, especially after the end of the Cold War, it has thrived throughout the former Soviet Union. Zbigniew Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard has few competitors in ex-Soviet republics in terms of popularity among students majoring in International Relations.5 The “rose revolution” in Georgia of November 2003, the Ukrainian “orange revolution” of early 2005, the so-called “tulip revolution” in Kyrgyzstan of March 2005, and the ongoing endeavor to “spread democratic values” throughout the former Soviet Union by Western nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), might all be seen as suggestive of the continuing relevance of Hal-ford Mackinder’s “Heartland” concept if one accepts the popular view that it is the United States government who is behind all these transformations.
This paper seeks to contribute to the debate as to whether Mackinder’s theories, after one hundred years, are to be taken seriously, or to be regarded with sober reservations. To do so, it would be appropriate to contrast his conceptions with those of other thinkers, as well as my own observations. Thus, I first offer some reflections with respect to Mackinder’s well-known formula on international politics, proceeding then to discuss how much emphasis we ought to place on geo-graphical factors when dealing with strategic issues. Other sections will inquire into the land power-sea power debate and discuss to what ex-tent Mackinder’s writings offer us a truly theoretical knowledge, given the fact that he is often included in the realist tradition within International Relations theory. This paper will argue, from that same realist theoretical position, that his writings are deeply flawed, and add nothing to our understanding of the international relations of contemporary Central Asia.
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References
C.S. Gray, The Geopolitics of the Superpower, The University of Kentucky Press, Lexington, 1988, p. 7.
C.S. Gray, “In Defence of the Heartland: Sir Hal-ford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On,” in:
lobal Geostrategy: Mackinder and the Defence of the West, ed. by Brian Blouet, Frank Cass, London, 2005, p. 24.
Ibid., p. 20.
Ch.J. Fettweis, “Revisiting Mackinder and Angell:
he Obsolescence of Great Power Geopolitics”, Compara-tive Strategy, Vol. 22, No. 2, April-June 2003, p. 119.
When referring to an academic field of study, Inter-national Relations is written with capital letters, whereas as a social phenomenon, as real-world relations among nations,it is used with small letters.
H. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The Geographical Journal, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, April 1904,p. 437.
Ibid., p. 443, from Mackinder’s response to his critics at the end of the discussion following his presentation of his thesis to the Royal Geographical Society.
During the first years of its independence Israel’s “protector” was Stalin’s U.S.S.R., then France and the U.K.,epitomized during the Suez War of 1956, and from the 1960s up until now—the U.S.
This leads us to the dilemma of parsimony in theorizing, on the one hand, and of all-inclusiveness or eclecticism on the other. It can be argued that theoretical parsimony is often misleading, while eclecticism inhibits a cogent, theoreti-cal, strategic thinking. It seems more desirable to me to be inclined to analyze every situation in its own right, rather than to be misled by parsimonious theories.
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book I, Modern Library, New York, 1951, p. 24. Transl. by John Finley.
L.M. Johnson-Bagby, “Fathers of International Relations? Thucydides As a Model for the Twenty First Century,”in: L.S. Gustafson, Thucydides’ Theory of International Relations, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 2000,p. 29.
K.N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, p. 41.
mphasis in the original.
Azerbaijan is vital to the U.S. not only in terms of economic interests, one could contend, but also for geopoliti-cal reasons, in line with Mackinder, as an outpost from where Russia and Iran could be pressured. However, if that is the major concern for U.S. strategists, there are enough alternatives to Azerbaijan.
Alfred Mahan’s definition of strategy and tactics is instructive here. As long as one is in direct contact with the adversary on the battlefield, tactics are in play, according to him, whereas strategy is detached from direct contact. “Before hostile armies or fleets are brought into contact (a word which perhaps better than any other indicates the dividing line between tactics and strategy), there are a number of questions to be decided… All these are strategic questions…” (A.Th. Mahan, The Influence of Sea-Power Upon History, 1660-1783, Hill and Wang, New York, 1957. Original: 1890, p. 7). Emphasis in the original.
H. Mackinder, op. cit., p. 436.
H. Mackinder, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 4, July 1943,p. 604.
Ibid., pp. 601-602.
C.S. Gray, “In Defence of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On,” p. 21.
The twelve aircraft carriers owned by the United States guarantee the undisputed command of the world seas by America, which is the key element in her overall military-political preponderance in the world.
H. Mackinder, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,” p. 602.
C.S. Gray, “In Defence of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On,” p. 25.
The Oxford English Reference Dictionary, ed. by J. Pearsall and B. Trumble, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press,Oxford, 1996, p. 1496.
C.S. Gray, “In Defence of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On,” p. 22.
See, for example: W. Cohen, The Asian American Century, Basic Books, New York, 2002.
Ch. Seiple, “Uzbekistan: The Civil Society in the Heartland,” Orbis, Spring 2005, pp. 246-247.
H. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” p. 443.
C.S. Gray, “In Defense of the Heartland: Sir Halford Mackinder and His Critics a Hundred Years On,” p. 28.
Ibid., p. 29.
See: S. Sagan, K. Waltz, The Spread of nuclear weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2nd edition, W.W. Norton, Balti-more, MD, 2001.
See: K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1979.
H. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” p. 423.
Ibid., p. 438.
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