CORRUPTION FIGHTING AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES IN KYRGYZSTAN: ODAY AND TOMORROW
Abstract
We all know from international experience that higher incomes and higher investments in the economy, as well as longevity are mainly observed in countries with effective and fair state institutions where functionaries move up the career ladder thanks to their personal merits and where there are clear rules of promotion. In these states, citizens are equal before the law while state strategy and the juridical base remain free from the influence of those who pursue their own interests and where independent civil society and the media add to the cabinet’s accountability.
Today Kyrgyzstan, as well as all the other relatively poor CIS members, should go on with their reforms: if slowed down, coupled with the continued accumulation of foreign debts, they run the danger of sliding into even greater poverty.
According to a group of international experts who analyzed the social and economic situation in our republic, its irrational public administration is the main obstacle on the road to reform and a source of the still growing shadow economy and corruption. Administrative reform designed to make the system more rational and more transparent is urgently needed. No economic growth and no effective efforts at combating poverty are possible without improving the quality of public administration. Without this foreign aid will remain useless.
The paper based on information supplied by a group of international experts looks at international anticorruption experience, identifies the causes of this evil and the spheres of its manifestations, speaks about the tasks the government of the Kyrgyz Republic is facing, and assesses the real state of affairs in this sphere
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References
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See: D. Kaufmann, “Challenges in the Next Stage of Anticorruption,” in: New Perspectives on Combating Corrup-tion, Transparency International and the World Bank Institute, Washington, D.C., 1998.
See: P. Collier, “On the Economic Consequences of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers, No. 51, January 1999,pp. 168-183; R. Fisman, R. Gatti, op. cit.
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