INFLUENCE OF THE WORLD CENTERS OF POWER ON KAZAKHSTAN AND NEW GEOPOLITICAL TRENDS IN CENTRAL ASIA
Abstract
The republic is a natural geopolitical core of Central Asia, therefore the game the world centers of power are playing around Kazakhstan is very important for Central Asian politics. This is especially true in a situation where the number of challenges to regional stability is growing, and the threats are becoming increasingly dangerous.
Kazakhstan is located deep inside Eurasia; it is a large state (five times larger than France and four times the size of Ukraine); it is ninth in the world in terms of size (2,724,900 sq km). with the largest territorial production complexes found along its frontiers; the country is fairly vulnerable.
Conventionally speaking, described in geographic, economic, and climatic terms, the geopolitical heartland of the Republic of Kazakhstan, a purely continental country, can be identified as a triangle: Almaty-Semipalatinsk-Aktiubinsk. Its eastern flank touches on the geographic center of Eurasia (the 78th meridian and 50th parallel); it includes vast expanses of hummocky topography (Sary Arka), parts of the Turgay Plateau, and the Turgay Lowland. The heartland is economically undeveloped, its poor transport and information infrastructure being hugely overloaded. The central geopolitical space of the Republic of Kazakhstan faces serious environmental problems, while its natural and climatic conditions are adverse. The heartland is depopulated: with an average population density of 5.8 people per 1 sq km across the country, there are 0.3-0.5 people per 1 sq km in the country’s center.1
Objectively, the North and the South, divided by the depopulated geopolitical Center, might move apart as they are attracted by stronger neighbors. The “void” of the heartland interfered with state development as such, and stimulated regional separatism among the local elites that belong to different tribal unions and pursue different foreign economic aims. Most of the Kazakhs of the Elder Zhuz are closely connected with Uzbekistan (with the South in the wider sense); the Middle Zhuz with Russia and partly (the Naymans and Kereis) with China. The Younger Zhuz looks at Russia yet wants more independence than the other Kazakh alliances.
When it comes to international preferences, the Kazakhstani elite is clearly (albeit convention-ally) divided into the “pragmatists” and the “idealists.” The first group includes nearly all top bureaucrats and clan leaders; the second consists of the absolute minority either from the opposition or petty civil servants. The “pragmatists” are lobbyists and/or partners of large foreign economic structures working in Kazakhstan and leaders of practically all the elite groups. They are guided by fairly primitive common sense: we should cooperate with the countries present on the Kazakhstani market; as soon as they leave, we turn to other companies and, consequently, to other centers of power. This is how most of the top local bureaucrats and leaders of the largest clans think.
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