COMMUNITY ELECTIONS IN RURAL AFGHANISTAN

Authors

  • Friedrich W. AFFOLTER Ed.D., Education Advisor of UN-HABITAT Afghanistan (Kabul, Afghanistan) Author
  • Zabihollah SAWAYZ M.Sc., Member of the Science Academy of Kabul,Chief Technical Advisor for UN-HABITAT’s Literacy and Community Empowerment Program (LCEP) (Kabul, Afghanistan) Author
  • Hamida NOORI MD, Gender Advisor for UN-HABITAT Afghanistan (Kabul, Afghanistan) Author
  • Binod S. SHRESTHA M.Sc., worked as UN-HABITAT’s Rural Program Advisor, now leads the UN-HABITAT Banda Aceh Program (Kabul, Afghanistan) Author

Abstract

 one of the major rural reconstruction and local governance capacity development initiatives of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is the National Solidarity Program (NSP). This community empowerment program, which receives financial support from the World Bank and several other international donors,1 was initiated in 2002   NSP is in essence a “community-driven” development program that distributes blockgrants for community-owned rehabilitation projects, and governance learning. One distinguishing feature of NSP is that communities interested in joining the program first must elect a Community Development Council (CDC), locally referred to as shura. Once the CDC is established, it is being entrusted by the Government to spearhead socioeconomic development initiatives at the community level.  Rarely before in the history of Afghanistan—where illiteracy is high—have rural Afghans (neither men nor certainly women) experienced or participated in secret ballot (one man/ women, one vote) elections.2 The Government’s decision to include rural communities in the NSP project identification, planning and implementation process; and to finance village project proposals by entrusting considerable amounts of money into the hands of village institutions, is also something unheard of in the history of Afghanistan.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how the introduction of a secret ballot election process—that prohibits campaigning and electioneering tactics—has impacted the effectiveness of a major grassroots reconstruction effort in postTaliban Afghanistan. The paper presents the history, goals and objectives of NSP; the NSP election process; and quantitative data from community elections held 1057 villages of 15 districts of the Afghan provinces of Bamyan, Farah, Herat, Kandahar, and Parwan. The paper also discusses the subjective dimensions of communit 

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References

By February 2005, The World Bank had contribut-ed or pledged to contribute $240 Million; in addition, the fol-lowing Governments either contributed or pledged to con-tribute the following amounts of money: Denmark: $9 mil-lion; Germany: $6.1 million; Japan: $11 million; Norway:$1.1 million; United Kingdom: $5.7 million; and United States: $10 million.

See: Ph. Dongier, J. van Dumelen, E. Ostrom, A. Rizvi, W. Wakeman, A. Bebbington, S. Alkire, T. Esmail,M. Polski, “Community-Driven Development,” in: A Soucebook for Poverty Reduction Strategies, ed. by J. Klugman, The World Bank, Washington, DC, 2002, pp. 303—331.

See: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), NSP Operational Manual, MRRD/World Bank,Kabul, 20 March, 2004.

“Conscientization” describes a process “…in which men [sic!], not as recipients, but as knowing subjects, achieve a deepening awareness both of the sociocultural reality which shapes their lives and of their capacity to transform that re-ality” (see: P. Freire, in: Sh.B. Merriam, R.S. Caffarella, Learning in Adulthood: A Comprehensive Guide, Second Edition,Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1999, p. 325. Transformational Learning is a development and change process of personal perspectives used in the interpretation of the meaning of one’s experience, in order to guide future action (see: J. Mezirow,in: Sh.B. Merriam, R.S. Caffarella, op. cit., p. 319).

Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), p. 15.

See: M. Gramberger, Citizens as Partners: OECD Handbook on Information, Consultation and Public Participa-tion in Policy-Making, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris, 2001; N. Uphoff, Local Institutional Development: An Analytical Sourcebook with Cases, Kumarian Press, West Hartford, 1986.

See: A.R. Moten, “Democracy as Development: Muslim Experience and Expectations,” in: Political Development:

n Islamic Perspective, ed. by Zeenath Kausar, The Other Press, Petaling Jaya, 2000, pp. 103—123.

Commanders are military operators originally appointed by rural communities who wished to resist the Russian invasion. Afghans refer to this time as “Jihad Time.” In order to be well-prepared for Jihad activities, commanders would—

ith community financial support—build and arm cadres of village soldiers who would fight under their command. Later,additional financial resources were obtained from Afghan political parties operating outside of Afghanistan (and which, in turn, would receive funds from international political interest groups) (see: A. Hyman, Afghanistan under Soviet Domina-tion, 1964-1991, 3rd rev. edition, Pelgrave MacMillan Press, New York, 1992).

After the withdrawal of the Russians, in-fighting broke out in Afghanistan. As the Russians were gone, villagers were less inclined to sponsor military operations; in addition, the many years of war had already caused considerable material hardships. Whereas some wealthier commanders continued to secure financial support from abroad, less-fortunate command-ers faced financial difficulties and began to claim village tax by force.

According to UNICEF, Afghanistan’s adult male population was—in 2000—51% literate, whereas female adults were 21% literate. Literacy in rural areas is obviously lower than in urban centers (see: United Nations Children’s Fund, The State of the World’s Children 2005: Childhood under Threat, UNICEF, New York, 2004, p. 132.

See, for example: “Sura 57:25” in the Holy Qur’ân—English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary. Re-vised and edited by the Presidency of Islamic Researchers, IFTA, Call and Guidance (1413 H.). Al Madinah Al-Munawa-rah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd Complex For the Printing of the Holy Qur’ân; see also Hadith—Translation of Sahih Bukhari, Transl. by M. Muhsin Khan, Vol.1, 3:56; Vol. 8, 78:619, availa-ble on [http://arthurwendover.com/arthurs/islam/].

See, for example, Nahjul Balaagha: Letters of Imam Alí b. Abi Taalib, Chapter 18, available on [http://

rthursclassicnovels.com/arthurs/islam/letrsnb10.html] (see also: Muslih-uddin Sheikh Sa’di Shirazi, The Gulistan of Sa’di,Transl. by Sir Edwin Arnold, 1899, Chapter 6, available on [http://www.intratext.com/X/ENG0160.HTM]).

Whereas NSP originally mandated the establishment of one CDC per village, it was very soon recognized that women’s voices were more likely to be surfacing in institutional settings where women were among themselves rather than together with men. MRRD therefore amended the one-CDC policy in 2004, in order to allow for women and men CDCs especially in those areas where the idea of mixed CDCs was unacceptable for cultural or religious reasons.

See: Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, Afghanistan—Progress of Provinces: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2003, Central Office of Statistics, Kabul, 2003, p. 98.

See: Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, Afghanistan—Progress of Provinces: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2003, Central Office of Statistics, Kabul, 2003, p. 98.

See, for example: Hadith of Bukhari, Vol. 4, p. 56.

Women’s participation in building up social life of Muslim communities is a well-documented historic fact.

he Prophet Muhammad used to consult on a regular basis with His wife Khadidja, a well-respected business wom-an. Women working outside their homes did so with the knowledge and approval of the Prophet; some women even participated in “Jihad’’ (see: Mohammad Shabbir Khan, Status of Women in Islam, APH Publishing Cooperation, New Delhi, 2001, 110).

In one instance, a community member who previously was employed by UN-HABITAT as a “Social Organiz-er,” and who had been instrumental in setting up and facilitating NSP elections in his community, eventually found himself not elected onto the CDC. A subsequent attempt to declare himself “CDC President” was rejected by the CDC itself. He eventually turned to the Province Governor in an attempt to discredit the program as “anti-Islamic.” The grievance was rejected.

In another instance, a community chose not to elect the Governor’s father—who resided in the community—onto the CDC. When the election process had to be repeated three months later (due to a new influx of returning refugees) the Gov-ernor’s father was elected onto the CDC; however, he was not voted into one of the four executive offices (chair, vice-chair,secretary or treasurer).

In one instance, a local commander appeared with armed gunmen at a CDC/community gathering, demanding the CDC to dissolve and to turn over the NSP blockgrant money. Community members and CDC representatives refused to give in. An intense four-hour argument followed, at the end of which the commander decided to withdraw.

See: International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning,” Asia Report No. 101, Ka-bul/Brussels, 21 July 2005, p. 25.

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Published

2006-04-30

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Section

CIVIL SOCIETY AND TRANSITION PERIOD

How to Cite

W. AFFOLTER, F., SAWAYZ, Z., NOORI, H., & S. SHRESTHA, B. (2006). COMMUNITY ELECTIONS IN RURAL AFGHANISTAN. CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS, 7(2), 75-90. https://ca-c.org/CAC/index.php/cac/article/view/903

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