EARLY WARNING MECHANISMS AND CONFLICT PREVENTION (With a Reference to the OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension)
Abstract
International organizations are increasingly realizing the significance of information collection and early warning for conflict prevention. High-quality and continuous information gathering is “the nervous system of the humanitarian enterprise; without it, any form of principled action—whether now or in the future—is paralyzed.”1 Early warning analysis and early response thus lie at the heart of conflict prevention.
This article addresses the design and deployment of early warning mechanisms, with a reference to the context of the OSCE economic and environmental dimension. Specifically, three parts are distinguished. The first one addresses the meaning and the importance of early warning for conflict prevention. Part two overviews major early warning mechanisms that have been considered and, for some of them, that are currently used. The OSCE is considered in the third part.
The OSCE case is particularly important because the OSCE is presently the world’s main regional security organization that, to a large extent, complements the U.N. system. Furthermore, after the adoption of the OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension on 2 December 2003, there is a growing emphasis on economic and environmental roots of threats and challenges to security. The (2006) Belgian Chairmanship of the OSCE is giving a high importance to economic matters in its work, in addition to the human, political and military aspects of security. Considering OSCE regions, that include the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia, early warning should be seen as essential. These regions and others have been confronted with open conflicts most often separatism among ethnic communities that had enormous costs in terms of lost lives and displacement of entire populations. The negative tendencies observed in some OSCE participating states might also have economic roots, namely the combination of mass poverty with wealth and power accumulated in a few hands. The outcomes of past conflicts and, for some countries, prevailing economic and social conditions can be a source of tensions that should not lead to unnecessary turbulences.
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See: Carnegie Commission Report on Preventing Deadly Conflict 16, New York, 1997.
Ibidem.
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H. Adelman, “Defining Humanitarian Early Warning,” in: Synergy in Early Warning Conference Proceedings,ed. by S. Schmeidl, H. Adelman, Toronto, Canada, 15-18 March, 1997, pp. 1-9.
Ibidem.
F. Hampson, D. Malone, From Reaction to Conflict Prevention, International Peace Academy (IPA), 2002,p. 16.
Ibidem.
See: A. Austin, Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science? Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transforma-tion, 2001.
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The pitfalls outlined here are drawn directly from G. King, L. Zang, op. cit.
See [http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/about.htm].
See [lnweb18.worldbank.org/ essd/essd.nsf/CPR/ConflictAnalysis].
This section is based on a phone conference with Jorge Roldos, Research Department, International Monetary Fund, 20 October, 2004 (see also: IMF Working Paper, “Assessing Early Warning Systems: How Have They Worked in Practice?”March 2004).
See [http://www.swisspeace.org/fast/default.htm].
See: G. King, W. Lowe, An Automated Information Extraction Tool for International Conflict Data with Perform-ance as Good as Human Coders: A Rare Events Evaluation Design, Harvard University, 2002.
Ibidem.
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See: G. King, W. Lowe, “An Automated Information Extraction Tool for International Conflict Data with Performance as Good as Human Coders: A Rare Events Evaluation Design,” International Organization, Vol. 57, No. 03, July 2003, pp. 617-642.
See: St. Shellman, B. Stewart, Media Generated Data: The Effects of Source Bias on Event Data Analysis, Paper presented at International Studies Association (ISA), San Diego, March 2006.
This section draws on a phone conference with Guy Dunn, Director Political and Economic Forecasting Unit, 19 October, 2004 (see also: [http://www.wmrc.com/]).
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