GUAM AND THE SMALLER GAME IN THE POST-SOVIET EXPANSE

Authors

  • Nikolai SILAEV Ph.D. (Hist.), Senior Fellow, Center for Caucasian Studies, Moscow Institute (University) of International Relations (Moscow, Russia) Author

Abstract

The recent political transformations in the post-Soviet expanse are often described as a “Big Game,” meaning a confrontation among the global actors: America, the EU, and Russia.

We are used to hearing about how Russia is being squeezed out of its traditional and “natural” sphere of influence—the former Soviet territory—by the West with the help of pro-Western political groups in the Soviet successor states. It has become commonplace to assert that political freedom and democracy, Western values, and the Western civilizational model have spread across the postSoviet expanse and that they are opposed by Eastern authoritarianism and imperialism. Politically, these two approaches are mutually exclusive; but if assessed in absolute magnitude, disregarding their ideological and emotional aspects, we find that they stem from the same logical basis.

I mean that the logic of “Western expansion” and “democratization” describes the Soviet successor states and post-Soviet societies as targets of influence of the largest world actors, rather than entities of international politics with willpower, interests, and strategies of their own. In the event these countries are allowed to retain the “right to remain entities,” their willpower, interests, and strategies  are described in an extremely simplified way—as the European choice of ideological conceptions. Both the Russian and Western expert communities tend to perceive only the enlarged view of the postSoviet expanse and more likely than not are unable to discern and analyze the details. In fact, the Big Game paradigm draws us away from a more detailed discussion of the newly independent states’ foreign policies. 

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References

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Georgia believes that the OSCE should be improved and its institutions reformed.” Turkmenistan abstained because of its traditional neutrality, while Azerbaijan, unwilling to quarrel with an influential European institution, abstained as well: the presidential election, highly important for legitimizing Ilham Aliev’s regime, was less than twelve months off. Ukraine, which normally did not coordinate its foreign policies with the CIS, signed the document.

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Ekspert, a Russian business weekly, wrote the following in this respect: “The ties between Western Ukraine, the pillar of the present Ukrainian rulers, and the Trans-Dniester Region are much closer than one might imagine. During the war in the area, Ukrainian volunteers, some of them from the western regions, fought side by side with Russian volunteers.

uring the years of the unrecognized republic’s semi-legal existence, West Ukrainian bureaucrats and businessmen estab-lished close contacts with the local elite. This was not limited to the need to maintain transit traffic to Russia and back,but was also promoted by fairly close personal ties and business interests. All types of contacts with the Trans-Dniester Region supply many Ukrainian politicians, Orange politicians, some of them from the close presidential circle, with money” (A. Protopopov, “Seraia zona,” Ekspert, No. 10 (504), 13 March, 2006).

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The Kiev declaration on setting up the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development-GUAM of 23 May,2006 said that the member states “declare that economic pressure and monopolization of the energy market cannot be ac-cepted. They emphasize the need to work more actively toward achieving energy security by diversifying the transporta-tion routes for energy fuels from the Central Asian and Caspian regions to the European market,” available at [http://www.guam.

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On the eve of the Kiev summit, Ukraine suggested that the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline be extended to Gdansk in Poland to move Caspian oil to the East European markets. “We are convinced that this is a profitable and unique model,”said Viktor Iushchenko (Interfax-Ukraina, 12 May, 2006).

The second edition of the Orange coalition created by Ms. Timoshenko’s second advent as the prime minister will hardly change the situation: the Oranges have lost the political and ideological dynamism that motivated them early in 2005.

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Published

2006-08-31

Issue

Section

REGIONAL POLITICS

How to Cite

SILAEV, N. (2006). GUAM AND THE SMALLER GAME IN THE POST-SOVIET EXPANSE. CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS, 7(4), 90-98. https://ca-c.org/CAC/index.php/cac/article/view/960

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