THE MULTILATERAL STRUCTURES AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF RUSSIA’S SECURITY POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA
Abstract
In 1991, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist and when Russia lost the larger part of its economic, political, and military potential, it had to build up its foreign policy under the new conditions from scratch. In the next 15 years, its policy went through several development stages, each of them marked by revised foreign policy trends and approaches.1 At the first stage, Moscow concentrated on broader relations with the West and, for that reason, temporarily moved away from the former Union republics. However, as soon as the West and the countries of the region increased their pressure on the post-Soviet expanse, the Kremlin promptly revised its foreign policy ideas to turn the limelight on the CIS. In 1993, the then RF Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev elaborated a new foreign policy conception for the Russian Federation that, together with continued relations with the U.S. and Western Europe, spoke about developing cooperation within the CIS and protecting Russia’s interests and the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities, as well as conflict settling across the post-Soviet expanse, which was described as a sphere of Moscow’s special responsibil-ity.2 Russia’s military doctrine likewise dwelt on the key military-strategic aspects of Russia’s polices in the Near Abroad. Meanwhile, the socioeconomic situation in the post-Soviet expanse was rapidly worsening; the area was swept by destabilization caused by separatism and ethnic strife. This, in turn, ignited armed conflicts. Having assumed responsibility for conflict settlement and stronger security and peace in the region, Moscow envisaged the possibility of using force in its new military doctrine. In view of NATO’s eastward movement and stronger Western and regional pressure, the Russian leaders had to take urgent measures to limit this influence and keep foreign forces at bay in the post-Soviet expanse. While defending its interests, Moscow renounced its pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons to protect its territory as well as that of its allies against external enemies. It was obviously an effort to “tie” the militarily and economically weak CIS members to it by strengthening joint security. The outside world interpreted Russia’s new foreign policy course in the CIS as Moscow’s neo-imperialist ambitions and its desire to preserve its military presence and political influence in the region.3
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References
For more detail, see: L. Selezneva, “Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy: Between Doctrine and Pragmatism,” Eu-ropean Security, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2004, pp. 10-27.
See: A.Z. Rubinstein, “The Transformation of Russian Foreign Policy,” in; The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. by Karen Dawisha, New York, 1997, p.43.
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For more detail, see: K. Kurova, Rol’ Rossii i SNG v uregulirovanii voennykh konfliktov v Zakavkazie, Institute of International Relations at Warsaw University, available at [http://www.mpa.ru/files/sb1/3.doc].
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See: Kontseptsia natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii, endorsed by the Decree of the RF President of
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See: S. Minasian, “CIS: Building a Collective Security System,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (19), 2003,p. 133.
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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan were full-fledged members of this organization from the very beginning;in 2000, Uzbekistan was given the status of observer and joined it as a member a year later. Since 2001, the organization has been functioning as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
For the text of the treaty see: A. Kniazev, Afganskiy konflict i radikal’nyi islam v Tsentral’noy Azii. Sbornik do-kumentov i materialov, Bishkek, 2001, pp. 25-28.
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See: [http://www.ln.mid.ru/va_sob.nsf/0/43256be30031180b43256c87004c5af2?Open Document]. Art 7 of the CST says that deployment and functioning of the objects of the collective security system on the territories of member states is regulated by special agreements (see: A. Kniazev, op. cit., p. 26).
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See: A. Tikhonov, “Tsentr Antiterrora,” Krasnaia zvezda, available at [http://www.redstar.ru/2005/06/21_06/
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The border disputes with China along the Russian stretch were mainly settled under Mikhail Gorbachev. In post-Soviet times, border issues remained unsettled mainly along the Central Asian stretch of the former Soviet-Chinese border.
ussia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan acted together at the negotiations with China.
For more detail, see: Zh. Huasheng, Kitai, Tsentral’naia Azia i Shankhaiskaia organizatsia sotrudnichestva, Mos-cow Carnegie Center, Moscow, 2005, pp. 5-6.
See: The Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO, available at [http://www.cvi.kz/old/text/ SHOS/
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See: “Podpisana Khartia ShOS,” available at [http://www.dni.ru/news/russia/2002/6/7/10556.html], 7 June 2002.
When deliberating on Mackinder’s geopolitical theory, Zbigniew Brzezinski pointed out that Washington should exercise stronger control in the Heartland or even increase its influence in it to preserve its world domination. This served as the theoretical starting point of the new American policies (see: D. Gordon, “The Hegemonic Imperative: on The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives by Zbigniew Brzezinski,” The Mises Review, Winter 1998,available at [http://www.mises.org/misesreview_ detail.asp?control=115].
For more detail, see: Zh. Huasheng, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
See: “Strany ShOS staviat vopros o date vyvoda voennykh baz Antiterroristicheskoy koalitsii iz Tsentral’noy Azii,”available at [http://www.akipress.org/], 06. 07. 2005.
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Some Russian political circles were convinced that Moscow should have interfered to stop the Tulip Revolution,but were not supported by the RF government (see: “Rossiiskie politiki kommentiruiut situatsiiu v Kirgizii,” available at [http://www.akipress.org/], 24 March 2005.
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