GEORGIA-RUSSIA: IN SEARCH OF CIVILIZED RELATIONS
Abstract
The relations between Georgia and Russia, which can hardly be called well-ordered, have escalated beyond the bilateral level to become a problem that has caught international attention. Some forces are trying to profit from the present state of affairs, while others are doing their best to bring order to bilateral relations. To achieve this, we should go to the root of the current tension. It is highly tempting to find a scapegoat, but I cannot describe myself as an impartial observer qualified to do this. It is equally wrong “to spread the guilt between the sides” and boast of an objective and unbiased approach. I have undertaken here to discuss the key issues responsible for the current situation and the far from simple quest for a model of civilized relations.
The time has come to bury the past and take a look at the post-Soviet period, during which, it must be said, Georgian-Russian relations have been neither normal nor civilized. Russia is convinced that Georgia’s efforts to move closer to the West, its close contacts with the United States, and its loudly announced intention to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures are nothing more than manifestations of its hostile anti-Russian policy. Georgia is firmly convinced that Russia has not yet abandoned its imperial designs in the republic and is guilty of double standards: while paying lip service to Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is not only actively supporting the breakaway regimes in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, but also intends to annex both regions.
The publications (mainly those that appear in both countries) on Georgian-Russian relations brim with mutual accusations and reproaches. To sort things out, we should first discuss the main stereotypes and myths: to achieve civilized and rational relations we should expose and push them aside. “Ungrateful Georgians” and the “the enemy disguised as a friend.” The following opinions in Russia have survived the death of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union to be reproduced in our time.
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For several years now, the Russian public has been treated to negative information about Georgia spread by the political and journalist communities. There is a commonly shared opinion (53 percent of the polled) that Georgia is the most dangerous country to live in or to travel across. It is the third unwelcome and unfriendly country in the world (af-ter the United States and China). The All-Russia Center for Public Opinion Studies obtained these results during a soci-ological poll of 15-16 April, 2006 in six regions of Russia from 1,600 polled (see: Sakartvelos respublika (The Repub-lic of Georgia), 26 April, 2006).
See: Sakartvelos respublika, 8 April, 2006.
Svobodnaia Gruzia, 8 April, 2006.
At that time, Russia was an enemy: Georgians repeatedly (in 1802, 1804, 1812-1813) rebelled against it; Iran was
an even greater enemy: Prince of Kartli-Kakhetia Alexander, who fled to Iran, called on his supporters in Georgia to rebel and assured them that he would not bring Iranian troops.
Sakartvelos respublika, 3 July, 2005.
See: 24 saati (24 hours), 23 September, 2003.
Under the agreement of 1783 between Irakly II and Catherine II, the Georgian czar pledged to gear his foreign policy to Russia’s interests and take part in all the wars that Russia waged in the Caucasus. In its turn, Russia pledged to keep an armed unit (of two battalions) in Georgia, come to Irakly’s help in the event of an attack, and support his efforts to unify Georgia. Very soon, however, Russia violated the treaty by annexing the Kartli-Kakhetia kingdom in 1801.
Finally, Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Nino Burjanadze openly announced: “Any minister who starts talking about privatization of the gas pipeline will be fired immediately,” while the U.S. Administration gave the Georgian authorities enough money under the Millennium Program to restore the pipeline.
The accusations against the Russian servicemen channeled bilateral relations in a different direction. “By accusing the Russian servicemen of terrorism,” wrote Russian newspaper Kommersant on 25 July, 2005, “Georgia no longer ex-pected bilateral relations to improve.” In actual fact, Georgian politicians said in chorus that they did not want confron-tation with Russia and that they hoped the competent Russian services would help their Georgian colleagues to detain those directly involved in planning and carrying out terrorist acts in Georgia (see: Akhali taoba (The New Generation),28 July, 2005).
Between 1994 and 2003, trade turnover with Russia rose 5.6-fold: from $40 to 225 million. Georgian export in-creased five-fold: from $14 to 75.5 million (see: Iveria, 6 August, 2004). On the whole, out of the total volume of export-ed Georgian products worth $445 million, $76 million went to Russia, or 17 percent of the total. Seventy-five percent of exported wine and 80 percent of exported mineral water went to Russia.
See: Akhali versia (The New Version), 24-25 January, 2007.
Alia, 20-21 January, 2007; Akhali taoba, 20 January, 2007.
Akhali taoba, 20 January, 2007.
Kommersant, 19 January, 2007.
Rezonans, 25 January, 2007.
Akhali versia, 24-25 January, 2007.
24 saati, 7 March, 2007.
Ibidem.
24 saati, 26 January, 2007.
See: Rezonans, 1 December, 2005.
“Rossia khotela by videt’ Gruziu neytral’noy stranoy,” available at [http://www.regnum.ru/news/778077.html],
February, 2007.
See: 24 saati, 7 February, 2007.
Ibidem.
See, for example, an article by Lithuanian political scientist Saulus Lebauskas, in which he predicted an armed
conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008 (Delfi, 21 June, 2007).
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