GEORGIA ON THE EVE OF ANOTHER ELECTION CYCLE

Authors

  • Malkhaz MATSABERIDZE D.Sc. (Political Science), professor at Ivan Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (Tbilisi, Georgia) Author

Abstract

On 1 October 2005, five one-candidate (majority) constituencies went to the polls to elect their parliament deputies.1 Even though the results could not tip the balance of forces in the country’s legislature where the ruling bloc and its supporters dominate absolutely, they added heat to the already fairly hot confrontation between the government and the opposition. The ruling party wanted to prove that its high rating remained intact, while the opposition hoped to demonstrate that the public was already on its side. The election was expected to demonstrate whether the institution of elections was functioning properly in a country in which mass falsification of election results in the past provoked a “velvet revolution” and which was entering another election cycle (in 2006, the country will elect local administrations, in 2008, the parliament, and in 2009, the president) 

 In a country where the falsification of election results triggered a revolution and the old government was overturned, the new leaders naturally bear enormous responsibility for ensuring fair and objective elections. This is not an easy task for several objective and subjective reasons.

A “velvet revolution” speaks of the weakness and the strength of the democratic forces at one and the same time: it is a unique phenomenon which cannot be reproduced after any falsified elections. It starts when the absolute majority is fed up with its leaders and hopes to live better if they are overturned. This means that the “angry voters” take to the streets, not so much to defend their democratic rights as to remove the people at the helm. Falsified elections do not cause “velvet revolutions”— they merely trigger them. Post-revolutionary euphoria renders a rational choice impossible: the victors are in the limelight and the dazzled nation expects them to work miracles. Whereas in Ukraine, only the presidential election was carried out amid post-revolutionary euphoria, in Georgia, where the revolutionary forces were much stronger, they won both the presidential election of 4 January, 2004, with Mikhail Saakashvili elected as president, and the parliamentary election of 28 March, 2004, when the bloc of the Rose Revolution leaders carried the day.

The revolutionary leaders promised a much better life to the entire nation, yet ideas about it differed greatly. More than that, many expected lavish dividends here and now. After a while, however, came the realization that life was not improving as fast as it had been expected, while new problems created a negative background for what had been achieved. In fact, these achievements are taken for granted.

For this reason, the guests who came to Tbilisi to celebrate the second anniversary of the Rose Revolution agreed that much had changed for the better; at the same time, a large part of the public and the opposition are talking about wasted opportunities and failures which did not allow the new leaders to make life even better. 

 

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References

“Additional” seems to be a more apt description for this election officially called “midterm.”

See: Rezonansi, 12 May, 2005 (in Georgian.)

See: Novye 7 dney newspaper, 3-9 June, 2005.

The new mechanism of staffing the Central Election Commission works in the following way: anyone wishing to become a commission member should apply to the State Chancellery. It received 32 applications from those wishing to fill the post of chairman and 483 applications from those who wanted to fill one of the six posts of commission member (Re-zonansi, 28 May, 2005). A special commission selected 30 names out of 483 applicants and several names out of 32 appli-cations. On 30 May, the president submitted the 12 names of those who wanted to be members and one name for chairman.

nder the law, the president should supply two names for each position—it is for the parliament to select the best candi-date.

The opposition made up of the Republicans, Conservatives, the New Industrialists alliance, and the Svoboda po-litical alliance offered the government an alternative. They insisted that, once the professional requirements were satisfied,the president should share the right to nominate candidates with the political organizations and that the results of previous elections should be taken into account (Novye 7 dney, 3-9 June, 2005).

Rezonansi, 30 May, 2005.

Zavtrashniy den, 3 October, 2005.

See: 24 chasa newspaper, 4 June, 2005.

Rezonansi, 30 May, 2005.

See: 24 chasa, 19 October, 2005.

See: Rezonansi, 12 November, 2005.

Novoe pokolenie, 3 October, 2005.

See: Ibidem.

24 chasa, 3 October, 2005.

See: Zavtrashniy den, 3 October, 2005.

See: Novaia versia, 3 October, 2005.

24 chasa, 3 October, 2005.

Novaia versia, 2-3 February, 2005.

24 chasa, 11 February, 2005.

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Published

2006-02-28

Issue

Section

WHAT MAKES THE PARLIAMENTAR Y AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS SPECIFIC

How to Cite

MATSABERIDZE, M. (2006). GEORGIA ON THE EVE OF ANOTHER ELECTION CYCLE. CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS, 7(1), 54-60. https://ca-c.org/CAC/index.php/cac/article/view/849

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