DYNAMICS OF RUSSIAN-KYRGYZ RELATIONS: FROM THE CENTER-PERIPHERY TO UNILATERAL DEPENDENCE?
Abstract
By Central Asian standards, Kyrgyzstan is a relatively small country. Its natural riches are limited to gold and water resources; other than that it has nothing to offer on the global and regional scale, which explains its insignificant geopolitical weight. Tucked away in a corner of the region, it is isolated from the main routes of Asian freight turnover and its mountains make transit unprofitable (especially compared with its neighbors).
It cannot deal on an equal footing with its large neighbors—Kazakhstan, China, and Uzbekistan; potential investors prefer to keep away from the region with its unstable or potentially unstable countries, such as Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. The image of a backward country, from which its citizens are leaving in hundreds of thousands to seek employment elsewhere and which is short of skilled workers, does nothing to attract money to the Kyrgyz economy. Its economic environment—closed to foreign investors and non-transparent because of corruption and clientelism—can hardly tempt real money.
The country’s geopolitical situation is highly disadvantageous, partly because of outside factors on which the Kyrgyz elite, no matter what shape it is in, has no influence. The country is an obvious regional, Eurasian, and even Asian periphery.1
However, in keeping with Mackinder’s theory of the Heartland as applied to Central Asia,2 people are apt to believe that the country’s situation is not hopeless. This looks like an exercise in wishful thinking.
I have undertaken here to explain how the Kyrgyz leaders tried to respond to the geopolitical developments and to trace the dynamics of the relations with the former Center, very much affected by a certain amount of latent momentum in their bilateral relations. The larger part of the local elite regards Russia as a center of gravity that could and should be consulted. Seen from Moscow, the Kyrgyz capital looks like the center of a former Soviet republic, that is, on the periphery of its sphere of influence to be treated, because of its obvious weakness, with a certain amount of condescension. This approach shaped a certain type of relations and contributed, albeit indirectly, to certain obstacles and problems.
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References
On Kyrgyzstan’s geopolitical situation, see, for ex-ample: M. Suiunbaev, “Kyrgyzstan: A Geopolitical Por-trait,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (31), 2005.
See: S. Matikeeva, “Mackinder’s Legacy: Was It a Prophesy?” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (34),2005.
See: A. Akaev, “Diplomatia sholkovogo puti. Proshloe i nastoiashchee Velikogo Sholkovogo puti.” The text ap-peared on the site of the Foreign Ministry of Kyrgyzstan as an official document of the country’s foreign policy, available at [http://www.mfa.kg/index_ru.php?section=&article=37], 10 August, 2004.
See: M.S. Imanaliev, “Kyrgyzsko-kitayskie otnoshenia na sovremennom etape,” Rukopisi Instituta obshchestven-noy politiki, August 2006.
See: K. Isaev, “Vostok—delo tonkoe,” ili Litso kyrgyzskoy vlasti glazami ochevidtsa, TAS, Bishkek, 2006,pp. 113-115.
The local public treats the American base and the Russian base that appeared in the country two years later differ-ently. While the Americans are treated with a share of caution, the Kant airbase is viewed positively. Any blunder of the American servicemen causes indignation, while the Russians are willingly tolerated. In fact, so far they look like “ours.” For more on the military aspects of the relations between Kyrgyzstan and the United States, see: M. Kazakpaev, “U.S.-Kyr-gyzstan: Partners in Different Weight Divisions,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (39), 2006.
See: L. Imanalieva, “The Main Results of the Democratic Reforms and Foreign Policy in Kyrgyzstan during Its Years of Independence,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6 (12), 2001, p. 82.
See: A. Shumilin, “Rossia i Tsentral’naia Azia: vzaimnoe pritiazhenie,” GlobalAffairs.ru, available at [http://
ww.globalaffairs.ru/live/article.asp?rubric_id=1478&id=4448®ion_id=1299#], 18 February, 2004.
In 2005-2006, the American base issue was a typical example of this: on the one hand, in 2005, the SCO countries (Kyrgyzstan among them) demanded in Astana that America should remove its troops from the region; on the other, Kyr-gyzstan could not reject the much higher rent.
For the text of the treaty see: Kyrgyzstan i Rossia. Istoria vzaimootnosheniy suverennykh gosudarstv (90-e gg.
X v.). Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, Compiled and authored by G.A. Rudov, ed. by V.M. Ploskikh, Ilim, Bishkek, 2001,pp. 33-38.
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federa-tion of 10 June, 1992. For the text of the treaty see: Kyrgyzstan i Rossia. Istoria vzaimootnosheniy suverennykh gosudarstv (90-e gg. XX v.), pp. 40-45.
See: “Protokol ob ustanovlenii diplomaticheskikh otnosheniy mezhdu Rossiiskoy Federatsiey i Kyrgyzskoi Respub-likoy, Kiev, 20 marta 1992 g.,” in: Kyrgyzstan i Rossia. Istoria vzaimootnosheniy suverennykh gosudarstv (90-e gg. XX v.),p. 39.
This should not be overestimated: Russia acquired many “strategic partners.” Strategic partnership with Kyrgyzstan was officially registered in Art 1 of the Declaration of Perpetual Friendship, Allied Relations and Partnership between theRussian Federation and the Kyrgyz Republic of 27 July, 2000 signed in Moscow (see: Kyrgyzstan i Rossia. Istoria vzaimoot-nosheniy suverennykh gosudarstv (90-e gg. XX v.), pp. 167-173).
See: Diplomaticheskiy vestnik, November 2003.
See: Kommersant, 21 January, 2005. Askar Akaev took part in the celebrations of Moscow State University’s 250 anniversary and was present at the reception in the Kremlin.
See: “Feliks Koulov: Rossia—nash luchshiy drug, a druzey nel’zia meniat. Pervyi vitse-premier Kirgizii,” Kom-mersant, No. 95 (3179), 27 May, 2005, available at [http://www.centrasia.ru/news2.php4?st=1117169460], 1 June, 2005.
It should be said in this connection that Russia took prompt advantage of the worsened attitude of the Kyrgyz public toward America’s military presence in the republic. The demonstrative transfer of old aircraft after the incident at the Manas airport was presented as an act of friendship between Russia and Kyrgyzstan.
See: “Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiiskoy Federatsiey i Kyrgyzskoi Respublikoy o statuse pogranichnykh voysk Ros-siiskoy Federatsii, nakhodiashchikhsia na territorii Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki, ot 9 oktiabria 1992 g.,” “Dogovor mezhdu Ros-siiskoy Federatsiey i Kyrgyzskoi Respublikoy o sotrudnichestve v voennoy oblasti, ot 5 iulia 1993 g.,” in: Kyrgyzstan i Rossia. Istoria vzaimootnosheniy suverennykh gosudarstv (90-e gg. XX v.), pp. 76-79.
See: “Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Rossiiskoy Federatsii i Pravitel’stvom Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki o poriadke peredachi Kyrgyzskoi Respublike pod okhranu uchastkov ee gosudarstvennoy granitsy, okhraniaemykh Federal’noy pogran-ichnoy sluzhboy Rossiiskoy Federatsii, ot 17 iulia 1999 g.,” available at [http://www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/
ocumShow_DocumID_84308.html], 10 August, 2004.
See: “Soglashenie mezhdu Kyrgyzskoy Respublikoy i Rossiiskoy Federatsiey o sotrudnichestve po pogranichnym voprosam (Bishkek, 17 June, 1999). Prilozhenie: Polozhenie o poriadke finansirovania Operativnoy gruppy Federal’nykh pogranichnykh sil RF v Kyrgyzskoy Respublike,” in: Kyrgyzstan i Rossia. Istoria vzaimootnosheniy suverennykh gosudarstv (90-e gg. XX v.), pp. 154-165 (see also: D. Fayzullaev, “Rossia-Kirghizia: ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo nabiraet oboro-ty,” Azia i Afrika segodnia, No. 10, 2005, p. 33.
See: “Soglashenie mezhdu Rossiiskoy Federatsiey i Kyrgyzskoy Respublikoy o poriadke ispol’zovania rossiiskikh voennykh ob’ektov na territorii Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki i statuse voennosluzhashchikh Vooruzhennykh sil Rossiyskoy Fed-eratsii v Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki, ot 5 iulia 1993 g.,” in: Kyrgyzstan i Rossia. Istoria vzaimootnosheniy suverennykh gos-udarstv (90-e gg. XX v.), pp. 80-87.
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Status and the Conditions of Deployment of the Russian Base in the Terri-tory of the Kyrgyz Republic of 22 September, 2003. Ratified and enacted on 11 August, 2005.
See: Akipress.org, 26 April, 2004.
The GDP level of 1994 is estimated at 63 percent lower than in 1990 (see: N.A. Volgina, M.S. Gafarly, Slozhnosti i protivorechia perekhoda k sovremennoy rynochnoy ekonomike. Postsovetskaia Tsentral’naia Azia. Poteri i obretenia,Vostochnaia literature Publishers, Moscow, 1998, p. 321). About Kyrgyzstan’s economy see: L. Tchantouridze, “Kyrgyzstan at a Crossroads: Facing the Economic Causes of the Tulip Revolution,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (40), 2006.
or an overview of the Kyrgyz economy see: G. Gleason, Markets and Politics in Central Asia: Structural Reform and Political Change, Routledge/Curzon, London, 2003, pp. 65-81.
See: Vneshniaia torgovlia stran SNG 2003, Mezhgosudartvennyi statistichekiy komitet SNG, Moscow, 2004, p. 232.
See: Vneshniaia zadolzhennost’ stran-chlenov SNG; sostoianie, dinamika, perspektivy, IMEPO RAS, Moscow,1998, p. 31.
See: K. Isaev, op. cit., pp. 89-110.
The Russian side should have received shares of the Kyrgyz chemical-metallurgical concern in the Kemin District,car engines, a joint-stock company, and part of the Kyrgyzkabel plant together with the Bishkek car assembly plant (see:
Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki i Pravitel’stvom Rossiiskoy Federatsii o sotrudnichestve v oblasti elektroenergetiki, ot 28 marta 1996 g.,” “Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki i Pravitel’stvom Rossiiskoy Federatsii o restrukturizatsii zadolzhennosti Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki po gosudarstvennym kreditam, predostav-lennym Rossiiskoy Federatsiey, ot 28 marta 1996 g.,” in: Kyrgyzstan i Rossia. Istoria vzaimootnosheniy suverennykh gos-udarstv (90-e gg. XX v.), pp. 412-414, 442-444, respectively).
See: “Rossia ne spishet dolgi bedneyshim stranam,” Centrasia, 8 March, 2007, available at [http://www.centrasia.ru/
ewsA.php4?st=1173414420], 9 March, 2007.
Russia invests much less than other countries: in the first nine months of 2006, Russia was the sixth in terms of volume of direct investments; its share in the total flow of direct investments being about 3.5 percent, according to the pre-liminary figures of the Bishkek National Institute of Statistics, available at [http://www.stat.kg/Rus/Home/express-invest.html], 7 March, 2007.
In 2002, the company invested about $7.5 million, bringing the total volume of Russia’s investments to $17 mil-lion a year (see: D. Fayzullaev, op. cit., p. 35).
See: Investitsii v Kyrgyzskoy Respublike 2002-2004 godov, The National Committee for Statistics of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, 2005.
See: A. Bel’skiy, “Pokhod Chubaysa na Vostok,” Respublika, No. 4 (04), 3 September, 2004, p. 12; Press release of RAO UES of 21 January, 2004, available at [http://www.rao-ees.ru/ru/pobeda_60/news/news/pr_archiv/show.
gi?pr210104rap.htm], 7 March, 2007.
See: 24.kg, 19 June, 2007.
In 2003, Kyrgyzstan exported 713.9 million kWh of electric power to Russia; in 2004, 1,800 million (see: Vnesh-niaia torgovlia Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki 2002-2004, National Committee for Statistics of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, 2005,pp. 110-111).
Rosatom of Russia, as well as the American AEC corporation, displayed an interest in the project (see: 24.kg In-formation Agency, 26 June and 16 December, 2006).
M. Karayianni, “Russia’s Foreign Policy for Central Asia Passes through Energy Agreements,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (22), 2003, pp. 93-94. In actual fact, this purely theoretical mechanism failed to deliver Kyrgyzstan from its dependence on its neighbor. Every year, the two countries have to settle problems in the sphere of gas deliveries: the republic cannot pay for its gas on time.
See: A. Elebaeva, “Migration in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan: Nature, Trends, and Types,” Central Asia and the Cau-casus, No. 6 (18), 2002, p. 151.
On the whole, one can say that in the last few years the volume of trade with Russia has more than doubled. While in 2000, Kyrgyz export to Russia reached the figure of $65 million, in 2004, it was nearly $138 million; the figures for import are $132.6 and $293.7 million, respectively (see: Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki, National Com-mittee for Statistics of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, 2006, pp. 110-113). Russia outstripped Switzerland, the largest im-porter of Kyrgyz products.
On the eve of the 1917 revolution, there were over 92 thousand Russian-speaking people in the Pishpek and Przhev-alsk uezds (nearly 40 percent of the total Russian population) (for more detail, see: G. Gorborukova, Russkaia diaspora v Kyrgyzstane, Sham Publishers, Bishkek, 2003, pp. 12-48).
See: A. Elebaeva, op. cit., p. 153.
See: Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki, p. 118.
According to the Kyrgyz Committee for Statistics, in 2004-2005 25 thousand Russians moved from Kyrgyzstan to Russia (see: G. Toralieva, “Russkie begut iz Kyrgyzstana. Ostalos men’she 500 tysiach,” Gazeta.kg, 14 February, 2006,available at [www.gazeta.kg], 16 February, 2006).
This status of the Russian language is limited to Kyrgyzstan and Belarus.
See: Law on the State Language of the Kyrgyz Republic of 12 February, 2004, available at [http://www.eurasia-media.ru/law/kr_o_gos_yazyke.shtml], 7 March, 2007. Strangely enough, the Kyrgyz parliament used the Russian language to discuss this law intended to raise the role of the Kyrgyz tongue.
See: “Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Kyrgyszkoy Respubliki i Pravitel’stvom Rossiiskoy Federatsii o pori-adke rasprostranenia program rossiiskikh teleradioveshchatel’nykh organizatsiy na territorii KR, ot 28 marta 1996 g.,” in:
yrgyzstan i Rossia. Istoria vzaimootnosheniy suverennykh gosudarstv (90-e gg. XX v.), pp. 434-436.
For details of journalism in Kyrgyzstan see, for example: A. Sukhov, “Pressa Iuzhnogo Kyrgyzstana: problemy zhurnalistskogo obrazovania,” in: Postsovetskie SMI. Ot propagandy k zhurnalistike, Kavkazskiy institut SMI, Yerevan,2005, pp. 128-138.
This is a fairly stable trend; about 30 percent of students in higher educational establishments study in Kyrgyz (see:
Obrazovanie i nauka v Kyrgyzskoy Respublike,” National Committee for Statistics of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek, 2003,p. 97).
This provision is envisaged by Art 22 of the Agreement on the Principles of Interstate Relations between the Kyrgyz Republic and the R.S.F.S.R. of 21 June, 1991.
See: Rossiiskiy statisticheskiy ezhegodnik 2003, State Committee of the Russian Federation for Statistics, 2003,p. 238. Over time, the number of students wishing to go to Russia will decrease. In 2001 about 300 students began study-ing in Turkey (see: A. Elebaeva, op. cit.).
Distribution of labor migrants is best illustrated by the maps of the flights from Kyrgyzstan.
For what Aygul Ryskulova, head of the State Committee of the KR for Migration and Employment, has to say about the problems of labor migration and new rules for guest workers in Russia, see: IA 24.kg, 11 January, 2007. By the end of 2007, it will be clear how much the Kyrgyz traders lost because of the new rules.
See: A. Elebaeva, “Labor Migration in Kyrgyzstan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (27), 2004, p. 81.
See: A. Elebaeva, “Migration in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan: Nature, Trends, and Types”; idem, A. Elebaeva, “Labor Migration in Kyrgyzstan.” According to a population poll, the permanent population of Kyrgyzstan is 4.8 million.
Interview of the present author with “shuttle traders” who travel between Ekaterinburg, Astana, and Bishkek, July 2002.
See: The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Kyrghyz Republic on the Legal Status of the Citizens of the Russian Federation Permanently Living on the Territory of the Kyrghyz Republic and the Citizens of the Kyrghyz Re-public Permanently Living on the Territory of the Russian Federation of 13 October, 1995, available at [http://www.
usinesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow_DocumID_35203.html], 12 July, 2004. The treaty did not come into force until 6 January, 2001.
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