GLOBALIZATION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS: A FUTURE WAR FOR THE UPPER KARABAKH
Abstract
Globalization in international relations is perhaps best understood in terms of increased interdependence in the international system. This interdependence manifests itself in both economic and military affairs. Since World War II, the United States has been the leading force behind “globalizing” processes: as economic interdependence leads toward more open markets, and military interdependence makes global affairs more peaceful, it has been in the vital interest of Washington to rid the world of isolationist and militarily autarkic powers.1
With increased interdependence regional conflicts also have become politically globalized. No regional conflict today remains isolated to a particular region despite the fact that very few of them directly affect power hierarchy in the international system. Regional conflicts in part acquire their global significance due to a spread of the phenomenon loosely understood as “soft power.”2 Since the dominant powers in today’s world are either liberal democracies (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, etc.) or trying to play the democratic game (Russia, China, India, etc.), the concepts associated with democratic ideals have become the major currency in soft power transactions. Therefore, regional actors have to pay attention to public opinion and cultural sensitivities prevalent in dominant global powers even though these powers may not be directly affected by regional conflicts. Soft power of public opinion and ideals of international justice and freedom may well push and/or allow hard power to step in to quell or mediate by force a protracted conflict, and this could have disastrous consequences for one or both parties involved in a regional dispute
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This, of course, includes America’s fights against Nazism and various forms of socialism/communism, as well as its more gentle push to get rid of the “friendly” empires of Britain, France, etc.
“Soft power” is best analyzed and explained in J. Nye,Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,Public Affairs, New York, 2005.
See: K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1979.
F. Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, Cornell University Press, Ithaca,New York, 2004.
See: W. Ettmayer, Alte Staaten—neue Welt: Stabilität und Wandel in den internationalen Beziehungen, Trauner Verlag, Linz, 2008.
Such “nation-states” as the Democratic Republic of Congo or Somalia could serve as the best examples of these.
n some, international organizations could have almost as much power as locally elected governments; this could be the case,for instance, in Bosnia and Kosovo (that is, if one recognizes Kosovo as an independent state).
At that time, Afghanistan had three main centers of power or “governments:” the Taliban regime, al-Qa‘eda, and the Northern Alliance cornered by the former two into a northeastern part of the country.
For instance, in 1995, Croatia was successful at retaking by force its breakaway provinces without much damag-ing feedback against the Croatian state, while similar attempts by the government of Georgia in 2008 triggered de facto dismemberment of the Georgian state.
R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.
Discussions of a “unipolar world” that occasionally have occurred since the early 1990s do not make sense, just like a notion of a piece of magnet with only one pole does not. Analytical concept of “poles of power” only makes sense if there are at least two of them in active or potential opposition to each other (for instance, see: C. von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1976, Book I, Chapter 1, or any other authoritative edition of the volume).
Data on world and regional oil and gas production and consumption is frequently published by professional jour-nals, such as World Oil [http://www.worldoil.com/] and Oil & Gas Journal [http://www.ogj.com/], governments, such as the U.S. Energy Information Administration [http://www.eia.doe.gov/], and those who worry about diminishing supplies drum alarm (see: The Oil Drum, “World Oil Production Forecast—Update May 2009,” available at [http://www.theoildrum.
om/node/5395]).
For more on the Caucasus as a region comprised of three nation-states, see: L. Tchantouridze, “The States of the Caucasus and their Neighbours,” in: Coming Together or Falling Apart? Regionalism in the Former Soviet Union, ed. by S.N. MacFarlane, QCIR, Kingston, 1997; De Ya. Breault, P. Jolicoeur, J. Lévesque, La Russie et son ex-empire: reconfig-uration géopolitique de l’ancien espace soviétique, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, 2003.
In addition, one could specifically consider economic links as contributing factor of regional formation (see: V. Pa-pava, Central Caucaso-Asia (Essay on Geopolitical Economy), Siakhle, Tbilisi, 2009, in Georgian; E. Ismailov, “New Region-alism in the Caucasus: A Conceptual Approach,” The Caucasus & Globalization: Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, Vol. 1 (1), 2006).
See: O. Ramsbotham, T. Woodhouse, H. Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2009.
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia [http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html]. The title of this commission itself is biased as it does not imply an interstate war between Georgia and Russia, but “conflict in Georgia.”
When considering possibilities of a future war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the study of their respective stra-tegic cultures would be an important factor in estimating potential outcomes (see: J.S. Lantis, D. Howlett, “Strategic Cul-ture,” in: Strategy in the Contemporary World, ed. by J. Baylis, J. Wirtz, C.S. Grey, E. Cohen, Oxford University Press,London, 2007).
Connections between public opinion and war have long been studied in the West. They deemed to be of signifi-cance even during less interconnected international structures (see: E. Luard, Peace and Opinion, Oxford University Press,London, 1962).
The ongoing rapprochement between Ankara and Erevan has been rejected by some powerful voices in Armenia objecting to giving too many concessions to Turkey (see: “Oskanian Rejects Armenian-Turkey Protocols,” The Civilitas Foundation, 22 September, 2009, available at [http://www.civilitasfoundation.org/cf/discussions/227-oskanian-rejects-arme-nia-turkey-protocols.html]).
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