KYRGYZSTAN AT A CROSSROADS: ACING THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE TULIP REVOLUTION

Authors

  • Lasha TCHANTOURIDZE Ph.D., Adjunct Professor,Department of Political Studies,Research Associate, Center for Defense and Security Studies,The University of Manitoba (Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada) Author

Abstract

The 24 March, 2005 Tulip Revolution has pointed out some of the most pressing problems that Kyrgyzstan currently faces. The Akaev administration was brought down by a popular uprising, which was occasioned more by economic hardship and deprivation than by political oppression. As a consequence, the post-revolutionary Kyrgyz leadership has inherited very acute economic and financial problems that they will have to address in order to avoid future public outbursts of fury.

Kyrgyzstan’s stability and future development, however, does not solely depend on its leadership. The country’s relationship with powerful international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has no less significance for its future economic prospects, and political maturity. So far, these two organizations did nothing but damage in Kyrgyzstan, as they have undermined economic and social fabric of the country, and effectively prepared a fertile ground for the March 2005 crisis.

The Central Asian region is politically volatile, and economically remote. Kyrgyzstan faces potentially very violent political challenges from Islamic extremists and criminal groups. After the Tulip Revolution, these challenges continued to be magnified by economic hardship and deprivation of its population. Unless the new Kyrgyz leadership exercises caution, and due diligence in its economic policies, their blind following of the IMF and WTO guidance may ruin the country and lead it toward more political violence. 

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References

See: M. Dabrowski, R. Antczak, “Economic Reforms in Kyrgyzstan,” Russian and East European Finance and Trade, Vol. 31, No. 6, November-December 1995, p. 6.

See: “Country Profile: Kyrgyzstan,” Library of Congress—Federal Research Division, November 2005, p. 7, avail-able at [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Kyrgyzstan.pdf].

See: M. Dabrowski, R. Antczak, op. cit., p. 7.

See: Ibid., p. 8.

See: Ibid., p. 19.

See: “Country Profile: Kyrgyzstan,” p. 9.

See: A. Bauer, N. Boschmann, D. Green, K. Kuehnast, A Generation at Risk: Children in the Central Asian Repub-lics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 1998, p. 4.

See: R. Pomfret, K. Anderson, Economic Development Strategies in Central Asia Since 1991, Blackwell Publish-ers, Oxford, 2001, p. 191.

See: “Country Profile: Kyrgyzstan,” p. 7.

See: “Social Economic Situation of the Kyrgyz Republic,” National Statistical Committee, available at [http://

ww.stat.kg/Eng/Home/Social.html].

For more on the IMF and its agenda see: J.E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents, W.W. Norton & Com-pany, New York, 2003.

See: Ibid., pp. 73-78.

See: M. Dabrowski, R. Antczak, op. cit., p. 25.

See: M. Spechler, Free Trade, Free Markets: Central Asia on the Edge of Globalization, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., New York, 2004, p. 71.

See: Ibidem.

See: Ibidem.

See: K. Jenkins, “The Kyrgyz Revolution: One Step Ahead or Two Steps Back?” Central Asia—Caucasus Ana-lyst, 21 September, 2005, available at [http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=3663].

See: M. Spechler, op. cit. According to the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) method, Kyrgyzstan’s GDP is U.S. $8.5 bil-lion (The CIA World Factbook 2005, available at [http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/]); however, the PPP fig-ures should be questioned when they derive from the economies that do not have developed political, financial, and legal institutions that are essential to fix the value of national capital, and generate wealth.

See: K. Jenkins, op. cit.

See: “Country Profile: Kyrgyzstan,” p. 6.

See: Ibidem.

See: Ibid., p. 8.

See: M. Ablezova, G. Botoeva, T. Jukusheva, R. Marcus, E. Satybaldieva, “A Generation at Risk? Childhood Poverty in Kyrgyzstan,” CHIP Report No. 15, The Childhood Poverty Research and Policy Center, 2004, pp. 41-46.

See: Ibid., p. 18.

See: M.B. Olcott, Central Asia’s New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 1996, pp. 91, 98-99. 26 See: M.B. Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC,2005, p. 107.

For an optimistic evaluation of the IMF reforms, see a presentation by the World Bank Resident Representative to Kyrgyzstan Michael S.V. Rathnam, “Foreign Investment During the Transition: How to Attract It, How to Make Best Use of It,” a paper presented to the International Conference in Honor of the Fifth Anniversary of the Kyrgyz Som—Challeng-es to Economies in Transition: Stabilization, Growth and Governance, Bishkek, 27-28 May, 1998, available at [http://

ww.imf.org/external/np/eu2/kyrgyz/pdf/rathnam.pdf].

There has been a noticeable demographic shift in Kyrgyzstan since the 1990s, whereas many people migrated to urban areas and left mostly agricultural southern provinces, and moved to northern areas in search of employment.

M. Ablezova, et. al., op. cit., p. 13.

See: Ibid., pp. 13-14.

See: Ibid., p. 14.

See: M.B. Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, p. 108.

See: Ibid., p. 113.

See: “Definition: The Reasons for the Establishment of Hizb ut-Tahrir,” available at [http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/].

See: “Country Profile: Kyrgyzstan,” p. 16.

See: Ibid., p. 15.

See: Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid., p. 4.

M. Dabrowski, R. Antczak, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

See: A. Aslund, The Kyrgyz Republic: Reinforce Economic Growth through Lower Taxes and Better Governance,published by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 June 2004. Professor Aslund worked as an economic advi-sor to President Akaev from 1998 to 2004, a position funded by the United Nations Development Program. There could be a good explanation why his 2004 report reads like a work of fiction—as he acknowledges in the Introduction of his report,his analysis is based on his visit to Kyrgyzstan in May 2004, when he spent one week and one day in the country, “and extensive reading of analytical reports before and after that trip” [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/

ndex.cfm?fa=view&id=1564&prog=zru].

See: E. Huskey, “Kyrgyzstan: the Fate of Political Liberalization,” in: Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus, ed. by Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, p. 261.

See: “Glava missii OBSE v KR: My ne khotim panikovat’, no rasstraivayet otsutstvie konsensusa sredi uchastnikov politicheskogo processa v KR,” Akipress Information Agency, 17 February, 2006, available at [http://news.akipress.org/news/

.

See: “‘Kumtor’ proigral isk,” Moya Stolitsa, 17 February, 2006, available at [http://www.msn.kg/page.shtml?option=item&year=6&mon=2&id=13017].

See: “Country Profile: Kyrgyzstan,” p. 8.

See: Ibid., p. 14.

See: Ibid., p. 13.

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Published

2006-08-31

Issue

Section

REGIONAL ECONOMIES

How to Cite

TCHANTOURIDZE, L. (2006). KYRGYZSTAN AT A CROSSROADS: ACING THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE TULIP REVOLUTION. CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS, 7(4), 61-69. https://ca-c.org/CAC/index.php/cac/article/view/955

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