PUBLIC OPINION, DEMOCRACY, AND AUTHORITARIANISM IN CENTRAL ASIA
Keywords:
Central Asia, Tajikistan, public opinion, elites, political regimes, political preferences, democracy, neopatrimonialism, elections, values, forms of citizen engagement.Abstract
Based on Tajikistan’s experience, this article examines the evolution of views, values, and preferences of the population of the Central Asian (CA) countries that support the sustainability of their political regimes. Based on public opinion poll results, this article presents the population’s preferences regarding the political system, sheds light on its attitude toward state power and its institutions and gives assessments of the current regime and efficiency of different forms of citizen engagement. It also looks at the ways citizens participate in state governance and how effectively value judgments are being implemented.
The paper shows that despite the differences in the traditional social institutions of the CA states, as well as in the development paths they have chosen, they are all evolving according to the neopatrimonialism model. However, the evolution of political views in the CA societies shows that democratic values and preferences continue to occupy an important place in the mass consciousness. From this it follows that the government’s necessitated support of certain elements of de mocracy is generated not only by its desire to create a façade or its willingness to make concessions to foreign donors and the international community, but also by social pressure. At the same time, the population’s political views and preferences are contradictory and fragmented. They form the base for mass support of democracy, on the one hand, and for social consensus regarding restrictions of citizen rights and recognition of the privileges of heads of state, including patrimonial supremacy, on the other.
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It is difficult to agree with M. Laruelle’s statement that by the time the Soviet Union disintegrated the national iden-tity of each of the republics was already clearly established and recognized by its population (see: M. Laruelle, “Vneshniaia politika i identichnost v Tsentralnoi Azii,” Pro et Contra, Nos. 1-2, January-April 2013, p. 14). Ethnic territories did not begin to form in Central Asia until the beginning of the 1980s. Their lack of formation in the Ferghana Valley continues to feed ethnonational and border conflicts.
See: M. Atkin, “Tajik National Identity,” Iranian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1993; I. Bashiri, “Tajik Ethnicity in His-torical Perspective,” 1998, available at [http://www.angelfire.com/rnb/bashiri/Ethnicity/Ethnic.html]; S.C. Levi, “Turks and Tajiks in Central Asian History,” in: Everyday Life in Central Asia: Past and Present, ed. by J. Sahadeo, R. Zanca. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2007; S. Abashin, Natsionalizmy v Srednei Azii: v poiskakh identichnosti, Aleteiyia, St. Pe-tersburg, 2007.
This article is limited to a brief review of Western studies, since a comparison of the transit conceptions of Western
researchers and academics from the CA countries requires a separate study.
See: J.J. Linz, A.C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America,and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington D.C., 1996; G. O’Donnell, P. Schmitter, L. White-head, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington D.C., 1986.
See: G. Nodia, “The Democratic Path,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13/3, 2002.
See, for example: K. Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
he following passage is typical of the Western discussion: “The strong tradition of family or ‘clan’ ties and community structures … became more important during transition. …They also contributed to the non-transparent capture of political and economic power by various clans. Appointments to positions of political and economic responsibility tend to be allocated on the basis of trust and patronage, rather than through competitive selection… Power structures are based on a delicate balancing of the allocation of privileges and power between clan structures to maintain political and social stability and the lack of dissent by rival clans. Apart from contributing to political exclusion, this balancing arguably contributes to the inability of economies to benefit from the efficiencies of market systems. It also encourages a preference for economic growth models that guarantee rents (unearned income) and control over rent allocation to people in privileged positions” (UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS, Beyond Transition. Towards Inclusive Societies, Regional Human Development Report, Bratislava, 2011, p. 50,available at [http://europeandcis.undp.org/home/show/BCD10F8F-F203-1EE9-BB28DEE6D70B52E1]).
See: Politicheskii protsess v Tsentralnoi Azii: rezultaty, problemy, perspektivy, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences—Center of Strategic and Political Research, Moscow, 2011; A. Seifert, “Der politische Prozess in Zentralasien und die Systemfrage,” in: OSZE-Yearbook 2011, Vol. 17-2011, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2013,S. 205-206.
See: M. Laruelle, “Discussing Neopatrimonialism and Patronal Presidentialism in the Central Asian Context,” De-mokratizatsiya, The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2012, pp. 301-324; M. Laruelle, “Vneshniaia politika i identichnost v Tsentralnoi Azii.”
See: M.B. Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.,2005.
See: After the Czars and Commissars: Journalism in Authoritarian Post-Soviet Central Asia, ed. by E. Freedman,R. Shafer, Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 2011.
See: M. Omelicheva, “Democracy and Dictatorship in Central Asia in Political Science,” Published online February 2013, available at [http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0060], 26 November, 2013.
See: A. Seifert, op. cit.
See: A. Ilkhamov, “Neopatrimonialism, Patronage and Factionalism in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan,” in: D. Bach, M. Gazi-bo, Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond, Routledge, 2012, p. 189.
See: E. Trifonov, “Uzbekistan: portret v sredneaziatskom inter’ere,” available at [http://www.index.org.ru/others/rifonov.html], 12 December, 2013.
See: S. Closson, “State Weakness in Perspective: Strong Politico-Economic Networks in Georgia’s Energy Sector,”
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 61/5, 2009, pp. 759-778; B. Christophe, “From Hybrid Regime to Hybrid Capitalism? The Political Economy of Georgia under Eduard Shevardnadze,” in: Potentials of Disorder, ed. by J. Koehler, C. Zürcher, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003.
See: I. Ohayon, S. Serrano, “The Post-Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia: Another South?” in: Back to the South?Sovereignty and Development in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Paris, 2014, p. 16.
See: M. Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism, Carnegie Endowment for Interna-tional Peace, Washington D.C., 2003.
A. Fisun, Demokratiia, neopatrimonialism i globalnye transformatsii, Konstanta, Kharkov, 2006; M. Laruelle,Vneshniaia politika i identichnost v Tsentralnoi Azii.”
See: “Transformatsiia v Tsentralnoi Azii: stolknovenie protivopolozhnykh kontseptsii?” available at [http://www.ostsoviet.ru/print.php?pid=88], 19 December, 2013.
See: Ibidem.
16% in 1996 (see: S. Wagner, “Public Opinion in Tajikistan,” in: Voices of the Electorate Series, Washington, 1997,p. 4).
See: Ibid., p. 10.
See: Ibid., p. 6.
See: Ibid., p. 3. It should be kept in mind, that some of the pro-democratic respondents were part of this group, who responded most frequently with “I am undecided” to questions about political orientations and preferred political system.
In 2000-2008, Tajikistan’s economy grew at a rate of approximately 8% every year. After the crisis, the growth rates dropped to 3.4% in 2009, but then recovered to almost the precrisis values. In 2012 and 2013, economic growth amounted to 7.5% (see: [http://www.worldbank.org/ru/country/tajikistan], 31 January, 2014).
Questions about attitude toward political parties and the opposition, as well as about the Tajik population’s political preferences were not included in this analysis since they require separate examination.
See: B. Hierman, “What Use was the Election to Us? Clientelism and Political Trust amongst Ethnic Uzbeks in Kyr-gyzstan and Tajikistan,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 38 (2), 2010; İ. Tunçer-Kılavuz, “Political and Social Networks in Tajiki-stan and Uzbekistan: ‘Clan’, Region and Beyond,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2009; A. Seifert, op.cit.
See: H. Boboyorov, “The Role of Collective Identities in Shaping Local Governance Institutions in Southern Khatlon of Tajikistan,” in: ESCAS XI Conference 2009 on “Studying Central Asia: In Quest for New Paths and Concepts?” Budapest,Hungary, 2009.
No electricity and access to the Internet.
See: A. Seifert, op. cit., p. 206.
See: M. Laruelle, “Discussing Neopatrimonialism and Patronal Presidentialism in the Central Asian Context.”
A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America,Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 179.
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