APRIL 2010 IN KYRGYZSTAN: AS SEEN FROM KAZAKHSTAN
Abstract
In April 2010, the political crisis that has been simmering in Kyrgyzstan over the past few years developed into an armed confrontation between the government and the people, as well as among the various clan and regional groups at the very top of the republic’s political pyramid.1
President Bakiev, deprived of his power (at first in part), legitimacy, and control over the country, tried to regain what he had lost by tapping the political resource of the country’s South. The events that occurred in May made it abundantly clear that a large-scale political conflict, a civil war, and a split in the republic were only a step away. The 2005 events, which toppled Akaev’s regime, demonstrated that for its continued political development, the republic must acquire a strong vertical of power and move toward a strong presidential government, which alone could pull the country out of the crisis and set it on the path of sustainable development.2 The compromise reached (which, albeit, proved incomplete) gave rise to the hope that the new president would be able to cope with this historic mission.3
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References
See: N. Borisov, “Kyrgyzstan: k chemu privela ev-olutsia form prvalenia,” Rossia i musulmanskiy mir (Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS), No. 3, 2009, pp. 95-100.
See: A. Esenbaev, “‘Revolutsia tiulpanov’ v Kyr-gyzstane i osobennosti transformatsii politicheskoy sistemy:opytka osmyslenia,” Rossia i musulmanskiy mir, No. 7,2009, pp. 78-84; S.N. Cummings, “Domestic and Internation-al Perspectives on Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Tulip Revolution:’ Motives,Mobilization and Meanings. Introduction: ‘Revolution’ not revolution,” Central Asian Survey (Oxford), 2008, Vol. 27,Issue 3-4, pp. 223-228; S.N. Cummings, M. Ryabkov, “Sit-uating the ‘Tulip Revolution’,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 27,Issue 3-4, 2008, pp. 241-252; Sh. Juraev, “Kyrgyz Democra-cy? The Tulip Revolution and Beyond,” Central Asian Sur-vey, Vol. 27, Issue 3-4, 2008, pp. 253-264; D. Lewis, “The Dynamics of Regime Change: Domestic and International Factors in the ‘Tulip Revolution’,” Central Asian Survey,Vol. 27, Issue 3-4, 2008, pp. 265- 277; E. Marat, “Criminali-zation of the Kyrgyz State Before and After the Tulip Rev-olution,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (ISDP,Stockholm), 2008, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 15-22; A. Temirkulov,Informal Actors and Institutions in Mobilization: The Pe-riphery in the ‘Tulip Revolution’,” Central Asian Survey,Vol. 27, Issue 3-4, 2008, pp. 317-335.
R. Abduvalieva, “Kyrgyzstan’s Security Problems Today,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2 (56), 2009,pp. 72-81.
The republic’s Ministry for Economic Development and the State Committee for Migration quote the figure of about$1.2 billion of annual remittances and the share of the migrants’ money in the republic’s GDP at over 30 percent.
See: A. Rasul, Z. Ergeshov, “Migratsionnye protsessy v Kyrgyzskoy Respublike: vyzovy i riski dlia strany,” Mezh-dunarodnye issledovania. Obshchestvo, politika, ekonomika (ISPI, Astana), No. 1, 2009, pp. 186-190; A. Esenbaev, “Sovre-mennye migratsionnye protsessy v Kyrgyzstane,” in: Postsovetskie migratsii: otrazhenie v migratsiiakh, ed. by Zh.A. Za-yonchkovskiy, G.A. Zayonchkovskaia, Adamant Publishers, Moscow, pp. 377-403; A. Doolotkeldieva, “Kyrgyz Migrants in the City of Moscow,” Mezhdunarodnye issledovania. Obshchestvo, politika, ekonomika, No. 1, 2009, pp. 80-93; V. Ruget,
B. Usmanalieva, “Citizenship, Migration and Loyalty towards the State: A Case Study of the Kyrgyzstani Migrants Work-ing in Russia and Kazakhstan,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 2008, pp. 129-141; M. Schmidt, L. Sagynbekova,
Migration Past and Present: Changing Patterns in Kyrgyzstan,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 27, Issue 2, 2008, pp. 111-127;A. Zhaparov, “The Issue of Chinese Migrants in Kyrgyzstan,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2009,pp. 79-92.
See: L. Baum, “The Energy Industry in the Kyrgyz Republic: Current State, Problems, and Reforms,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6 (54), 2008, pp. 101-112.
A volume of 5.5 billion cu m is the critical point at which the turbines will grind to a standstill.
See: B. Torogeldieva, “The Formation and Nature of Political Culture in Present-Day Kyrgyzstan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (55), 2009, pp. 126-134.
It was a weekday, something which the Social-Democrats had not expected. They would have preferred the fall when, they believed, public indignation would have become even fiercer. The opposition expected the world crisis to hit the guest workers from Kyrgyzstan who might have voted against Bakiev. Choosing a weekday as election day caused heated debates: the president’s administrative resource allowed him to manipulate voters who work in the government service (doctors, teachers, bureaucrats) and students. They needed permission from their superiors to go to the polls.Permission followed.
Social anthropologists describe the Kyrgyz’ political culture as the command-and-obey tradition; people are indif-ferent to the country’s political culture, they never respond to what the political institutions do; they are not interested in central power and concentrate on local developments. A widespread disregard for law and order is one of the hallmarks of the nation’s political culture: people know next to nothing about the laws and government mechanisms; they mistake the person who executes state power for the institutions of state power.
In March 2009, Sadyrkulov and Director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies at the President of the RK S. Slepchenko met their deaths under mysterious circumstances. A top bureaucrat of the Akaev regime, Sadyrkulov kept his post after the 2005 revolution and remained friendly with A. Toyganbaev, Akaev’s son-in-law.
It was expected that this nationwide consultative structure would have 750 members: the local kurultais were to elect one deputy from 441 ayyl districts and 18 settlement administrations; each of 23 district and regional towns and cit-ies were to send 3 delegates; the capital had to elect 10 deputies, the city of Osh, seven. Labor migrants were granted the right to elect 35 members, while religious confessions received 20 seats. One-fifth (150) of the seats were to be appointed according to a quota at a national forum.
The project promoted the idea that “consultative democracy” (Russia between the February and October revolu-tions of 1917 is one of the pertinent examples) was the best instrument to be applied at the transition stage. Indeed, it is much better than no democracy at all: consultations, that is, discussions, are the first step toward political pluralism.
See: E. Kabulov, “On the Results of the Presidential Election in Kyrgyzstan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus,No. 4-5 (58-59), 2009; A. Doolotkeldieva, “Presidential Elections in Kyrgyzstan: Strategies, Context, and Implications,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2009, pp. 5-9.
Kirgiztelecom was sold for $40 million, then, according to Otunbaeva, resold to Fintur, an international compa-ny, for $400 million. Severelektro, evaluated eighteen months previously by an independent structure at $137 million, was sold for $3 million.
Rosa Otunbaeva filled the post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kirghiz S.S.R.; she was Soviet Ambassador and member of the Collegium of the U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry. She was twice appointed as Foreign
Minister of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan; U.N. Special Representative to Georgia; and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plen-ipotentiary of Kyrgyzstan to the United States and the U.K. In 2005, she was among the leaders of the March revolution.
n December 2007, elected to the parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic, she joined the opposition Social-Democratic faction.
n October 2009, she became a leader of this faction. At the Kurultai in March 2010, she was elected leader of the opposi-tion. In Europe, she is generally regarded as a good diplomat. Rosa Otunbaeva, a graduate of the Philosophy Department,Moscow State University, is fluent in four foreign languages.
The opposition blames the president’s brother Zhanysh Bakiev, who headed the Protection of the State Service. According to unconfirmed information he ordered to open fire at those who, on 7 April, stormed the government building. his means that he should be held responsible for the casualties among the opposition’s supporters.
A. Atambaev, one of the republic’s first cooperators, was minister of industry and trade. After parting ways with Bakiev, he joined the opposition. A highly ambitious man, he cannot remain part of any team for any length of time.
T. Sariev is head of the Ak-Shumkar Party with the largest parliamentary faction and an experienced financier and successful stock broker who made it rich as a Komsomol functionary during perestroika; he is often described as a crafty manipulator.
O. Tekebaev is deputy for the new Constitution platform (read: ideology), a former schoolteacher who was repeat-edly elected to the parliament, and leader of several opposition parties.
A. Beknazarov is deputy for the defense and security structures (with the exception of the army), a lawyer, former prosecutor general, a popular orator, and leader of the Talas rioters; he is another highly ambitious politician in the Inter-im Government.
Some of the political émigrés who fled the country to avoid persecutions are toying with the idea of coming back:
dil Baysalov, former head of the For Democracy and Civil Society Coalition, plans to return from Sweden; Bakyt Beshi-mov, former head of the Social-Democratic faction; former Ambassador of Kyrgyzstan to Malaysia Ravshan Jeenbekov,former deputy Kubatbek Baybolov, and Ruslan Isakov, son of Ismail Isakov, from the United States. Removed from his post in 2005, Askar Akaev has shown no intentions of returning to active politics.
Those experts who personally know Rosa Otunbaeva describe her as an “outstanding woman; a super activist, a
fiery orator, and a very open and straightforward person who faithfully believes in the democratic demagogy of the early 1990s—free elections, the free press, human rights, etc. She is convinced that Western-style democracy can be established in her country, which will then look like Switzerland. She has absolutely nothing in common with the current realities of a developed tribalist society. In short,” these people say, “she is a female alter ego of Askar Akaev.”
Some experts suggest that “external management” should take the form of an international military-political-eco-nomic consortium of the interested sides—China, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, the U.S., and Canada (which owns the goldmines). To avoid nepotism, managers should be invited from third countries (India is mentioned as one of them). Young ethnic Kyrgyz now living abroad (in Russia, the United States, and Europe) should be invited to fill, temporarily, the posts of secondary importance. 25 Here is one of the explanations of the 2005 events. Some experts believe that Kurmanbek Bakiev, a figurehead of the southern clans, played the main role in the regime change. Removed from active politics by the Northerners, the South-erners nursed grudges against the regime. The Americans were even more interested in removing Akaev, generally regarded as a pro-Russian politician. Later, he said in so many words that he had lost his post because he refused to let the U.S. de-ploy AWACS-vectored weapons (allegedly needed for the Enduring Freedom operation) in his country, since they were absolutely useless against the Taliban, but very useful when it came to monitoring flights over Chinese and Russian terri-tory. The opposition riots began two week later. There are numerous facts pointing to the direct and active involvement not only of American NGOs (the Soros Foun-dation and the International Institute for Democracy), but also of American diplomats stationed in Bishkek. At the technical level, it was the Southern criminal community that toppled Akaev and his regime. The opposition used Western mon-ey to come to terms with criminal “bands;” the law-enforcement structures proved unable to stand up to the concerted ac-tions of the organized crime and Western-backed opposition that poured out into the streets.
See: A. Jekshenkulov, “Rossia-Kyrgyzstan: etapy razvitia mezhgosudarstvennykh otnosheniy i ikh perspektivy,”in: Tsentral’naia Azia: vneshniy vzgliad. Mezhdunarodnaia politika s tsentral’noaziatskoy tochki zrenia, F. Ebert Foun-dation, Berlin, 2008, pp. 277-293; N.M. Omarov, “Vneshniaia politika Kirgizstana posle 24 marta 2005 goda: osnovnye tendentsii i perspektivy,” in: Vneshnepoliticheskaia orientatsia stran Tsentral’noy Azii v svete globalnoy transformatsii mirovoy sistemy mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy, ed. by A.A. Kniazev, A.A. Migranian, OFAK, Bishkek, 2009, pp. 155-161; N.T. Muratalieva, “Voennoe prisutstvie SShA i Rossii kak factor vliania v otnosheniakh mezhdu Kitaem i Kir-gizstanom,” in: Vneshnepoliticheskaia orientatsia stran Tsentral’noy Azii v svete global’noy transformatsii mirovoy siste-my mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy, pp. 179-186; V. Sokolov, A. Sarygulov, “Sovremennai Kirgizia: mnogovektornost ili bezvektornost razvitia?” Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 2, 2010, pp. 139-149; E. Huskey, “Foreign Policy in a Vulnerable State:
yrgyzstan as Military Entrepot between the Great Powers,” The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2008,pp. 5-8.
Tehran, in turn, stated that the arrested terrorist admitted that he had been doubling as an American, British and Israeli agent and that he had been sent to the Transit Center to meet a high American official.
Its cost was quoted as $5.5 million; earlier, Americans had already allocated several million to be spent on a training center for the Kyrgyz Special Forces.
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