THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION IN AFGHANISTAN: CERTAIN ASPECTS OF STRATEGY
Abstract
Settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan has been and remains one of the most urgent tasks of world politics. It is becoming increasingly clear that pacification calls for nonmilitary methods: the counterterrorist coalition has failed. With each passing day, the war is pushing the people of Afghanistan deeper into an abyss and making any solution next to impossible.1
The huge efforts of the international community and the coalition forces have done nothing to improve the situation; it is going from bad to worse: radical forces are regaining their positions to add an edge to the already high tension, while the militants are stepping up their terrorist activities. The trouble broiling in Pakistan is having a negative effect on everything that is going on in Afghanistan; Hamid Karzai’s corrupt and incompetent government has merely added to the obvious impotence of power in Kabul.2
The situation in the country is extremely unstable despite the fact that coalition forces have been stationed in the country for 9 years now. The destructive forces have stepped up their activity in the country’s north (the Balkh and Kunduz provinces), as well as in other parts of the country that were recently considered “safe,” which is arousing particular concern. It should be said that the Taliban has mastered fundamentally new tactics: today suicide bombers are its inalienable part.
The scores of international conferences and meetings expected to solve the Afghan problem have proven useless; there is no more or less specific plan of action either. This means that the international community has learned to live with the problem.
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From the speech President of the Republic of Uz-bekistan Islam Karimov delivered at the plenary session of the Millennium Development Goals U.N. Summit, 20 Sep-tember, 2010.
See: J. Daly, “Pragmatichnaia otsenka geo-politicheskoy i strategicheskoy situatsii v Afghanistane,”Narodnoe slovo, 10 November, 2009, pp. 1-2.
“NATO Must Keep Military Pressure on Taliban: Rasmussen,” 16 October, 2010, available at [http://www.sabanews.net./net/en/news226456.htm].
In Russia, drug addiction is a “national catastrophe;” over 2.5 million are registered as drug users; a dose of hero-in can be bought for as little as $2.5 (a bottle of vodka is much more expensive). In 2009, 120 thousand drug dealers and drug pushers were sentenced to various terms in prison (in China the figure is twice as low—60 thousand).
See: S. Iskanderov, “Afghansky opium—narkobizness ili geopolitika?” 29 June, 2010, available at [http://www.newsaz.com/authors/51/20100629032735857.html].
See: Speech by the President of the Russian Federation D. Medvedev at the International Forum on Drug Produc-tion in Afghanistan: A Challenge to the International Community, Moscow, 9 June, 2010, available at [http://
ww.kremlin.ru/news/7996] (see also: “Rossia predlozhila mirovomu soobshchestvu kardinalnye mery protiv afghanskoy narkougrozy,” Rossiiskaya gazeta—Federalny vypusk, 10 June, 2010, available at [http://www.rg.ru/2010/06/10/narko.html];R. Weitz, “Afghanistan: Rossia prizyvaet k rasshireniiu vzaimodeystvia ODKB i NATO v dele borby s narkotikami,”18 November, 2010, available at [http://russian.eurasianet.org/node/58443]; Speech by Viktor Ivanov, SADC Chairman and FDCS Director, at the enlarged ambassador-level session of the Russia-NATO Council in Brussels on 24 March, 2010,available at [http://stratgap.ru/pages/strategy/3662/3886/4391/print.stml]).
See: N. Zamaraeva, “Pakistan-Afghanistan: proval torgovogo tranzitnogo soglashenia: chto za etim stoit?” availa-ble at [http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2010/15-07-10b.htm]; N.V. Galishcheva, “Iuzhnoaziatskiy vector vneshneekonom-icheskoy politiki Indii,” Mirovoe i natsionalnoe khozyastvo, No. 1 (12), 2010.
See: V. Korgun, “SShA v Afghanistane,” Azia i Africa segodnia, No. 6, 2008, p. 46.
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