THE INSTITUTION OF PRESIDENCY IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES: PERSONALIZATION VS. INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Abstract
Much has been written about the institution of presidency and its traps, which are especially dangerous in political regimes undergoing transition.1 Some authors agree that during transition to a new regime, the presidential form of government (as an alternative to deposed dictatorship) makes it harder to consolidate democracy, while the parliamentary (or parameterized semi-presidential form) leads to stronger democracy. I have already written that today political institutionalization and consolidation of political regimes pose a greater challenge for the Soviet successor-states than making the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. In other words, they must achieve political stability and manageability.2 None of the post-Soviet political regimes of the CIS countries can be described as a consolidated democracy. They differ in “the presence or absence of consolidation and stability of their political regimes.”3
It seems that the Central Asian region is more vulnerable than the rest of the post-Soviet expanse to threats to political consolidation: there are too many pending social, economic, demographic, environmental, and ethnic problems. The list is longer still: zero experience of pre-Soviet statehood; no consensus among the states on border issues; politicization of Islam; the threat of terrorism; and having an unstable Afghanistan as its closest neighbor. This explains why some authors look at the five Central Asian states as a homogenous entity, while the degree of manageability and the extent of regime consolidation differ from country to country.
Political institutionalization is the most important single factor of regime stability interpreted as rationalizing (Max Weber) political institutions as sustainable, meaningful, and reproducible forms of behavior. The level of political institutionalization “is the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings” (the family, clan, or class) or an individual.4
Downloads
References
See, for example: J. Linz, “The Perils of Presiden-cy,” Journal of Democracy, No. 1, 1990, pp. 51-69; S.
ainwaring, “Presidentialism, Multipluralism, and Democ-racy: The Difficult Combination,” Comparative Political Studies, No. 26, 1993, pp. 198-228; M. Shugart, J. Carey,Presidents and Assemblies, Cambridge, 1992; A. Figueire-do, F. Limongi, “Presidential Power, Legislative Organiza-tion, and Party Behaviour in Brazil,” Comparative Politics,No. 32, 2000, pp. 151-170, etc.
See, for example: N.A. Borisov, “Institutsionalizat-siia instituta prezidentstva i perspektivy konsolidatsii po-liticheskikh regimov na postsovetskom prostranstve,” Poli-tia, No. 3, 2011
S. Huntington, Politicheskiy poriadok v meniaush-chikhsia obshchestvakh (Political Order in Changing Soci-eties, Yale University Press, New Haven, London, 1968),Moscow, 2004, p. 21.
See: Ibid., p. 39; Political Order in Changing Soci-eties, p. 20.
See: Politichesky atlas sovremennosti: opyt mnogomernogo statisticheskogo analiza politicheskikh sistem sovremennykh gosudarstv, A.Yu. Melvil. Head; M.V. Ilyin,E.Yu. Meleshkina, et al., Moscow, 2007, pp. 67-225.
See: J. McGregor, “The Presidency in East Central Europe,” RFR/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1994,pp. 12-16.
See: A. Krouwel, Measuring Presidentialism of Central and East European Countries, Amsterdam, 2003.
See: N.A. Borisov, op. cit.
For more on the methodology of my calculations, see: ibidem.
See: The Constitution of Turkmenistan, available at [http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/_ru/laws/?laws=01dw], 20 September 2011.
See: Nations in Transit 2010, available at [http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=551], 15 September,2011. According to this methodology, the highest index corresponding to consolidated democracy is 1 score; the lowest index corresponding to consolidated autocracy is 7 scores.
Majilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available at [http://www.parlam.kz/ru/mazhilis/history],20 September, 2011.
[http://www.parliament.gov.uz/en/].
See: Reshenie Konstitutsionnogo suda Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki ot 14 Sentyabrya 2007 g., available at [http://www.erghana.ru/news.php?id=7089], 15 September, 2011.
See: J. McGregor, op. cit.
See: A. Krouwel, op. cit.; O.I. Zaznaev, Poluprezidentskaia sistema: teoreticheskie i prikladnye aspekty, Kazan,2006, pp. 192-193.
Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan “O vnesenii izmeneniy i dopolneniy v Konstitutsiiu Respubliki Kazakhstan” ot 21 maya 2007 goda No. 254-III, available at [http://online.prg.kz/Document/Default.aspx?doc_id=30103613 &sublink=0],20 September, 2011.
See: Konstitutsionny zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan “O Pervom Prezidente Respubliki Kazakhstan—Lidere Natsii ot 20 iiulia 2000 goda No. 83-II (s izmeneniyami i dopolneniyami, vnesennymi Zakonom Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 14 iiu-nia 2010 goda No. 289-IV), available at [http://www.kazpravda.kz/c/1276558396], 20 September 2011.
The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic was enacted by the Law of the KR of 27 June, 2010; adopted by the referendum of 27 June, 2010, available at [http://www.gov.kg/?page_id=263], 20 September, 2011. Its efficiency has not been tested because it will be enacted in full after the presidential and parliamentary elections.
See, for example: Kontseptsia dalneyshego uglublenia demokraticheskikh reform i formirovaniia grazhdanskogo obshchestva v strane, Report by President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov at the joint sitting of the Legisla-tive Chamber and the Senate of Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan on 12 November, 2010, available at [http://press-service.uz/#ru/news/show/ dokladi/koncepciya_dalneyeshego_uglubleniya_demo], 15 September, 2011.
See: The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, available at [http://pressservice.uz/ru/content/constitution/#ru/content/ constitution/konstituciya_uzbekistana/page/6], 20 September, 2011.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2011 AUTHOR
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
You are free to:
- Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format for any purpose, even commercially.
- Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially.
- The licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms.
Under the following terms:
- Attribution — You must give appropriate credit , provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made . You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
- No additional restrictions — You may not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.
Notices:
You do not have to comply with the license for elements of the material in the public domain or where your use is permitted by an applicable exception or limitation .
No warranties are given. The license may not give you all of the permissions necessary for your intended use. For example, other rights such as publicity, privacy, or moral rights may limit how you use the material.
