THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION AND REGIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS
Abstract
Today Central Asia is one of the most unique regions of the world, since it has several institutional formations in which essentially all of its countries participate. This phenomenon appears to be spurred on not only by the dynamics of the processes occurring in these states and throughout the region as a whole, but also in the area around it. One of the largest regional structures in Central Asia is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The sum territory of its member states covers more than 30 million sq. km of the Eurasian continent, thus ensuring them geostrategic access to Europe in the West and the Asia Pacific Region in the East. In so doing, the total number of residents of the SCO countries is close to 1.455 billion (approximately 25% of the planet’s entire population). 1 The status of Russia and China as permanent members of the U.N. Security Council has significantly raised the political potential of this organization in resolving the key problems of international and regional security. An important stage in the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was the Tashkent summit held on 16-17 June 2004. It marked the end of the institutional formation of the SCO: in 2002, its Charter was adopted, in 2003, a permanent secretariat was instituted in Beijing, and in 2004, the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) was formed, the general headquarters of which is in Tashkent. The Central Asian countries view the SCO as an effective forum for mutual dialog. The opening of RATS in Tashkent is also in keeping with the U.S.’s interests, since Washington supports any form of opposition to terrorism, and the fact that RATS is located in Tashkent indicates Uzbekistan’s active participation in this sphere. 2
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References
See: V. Abaturov, “K Tashkentskomu sammitu Shankhaiskoi organizatsii sotrudnichestva,” Ekonomicheskoe obozrenie, May 2004, p. 4.
See: “Vremia prakticheskikh deistvii,” Narodnoe slovo, No. 130 (3483), 24 June, 2004.
M. Oresman, The SCO: A New Hope or to the Grave yard of Acronyms? PacNet Newsletter, No. 21, 22 May, 2003 [http://www.csis.org/pacfor/pac0321.htm].
Zhao Huasheng, “China’s Interests and Posture in Central Asia,” in: Documents of the Fourth International Conference on the Situation in Central Asia and the SCO, Shanghai Institute of International Studies, Shanghai, 2004, p. 155.
See: An Huihou, “The Grave Aftermath of the Iraq War and its Revelation; Some Thoughts on Ethnic and Religious Issues in the Post-Iraq War Middle East,” International Studies, Vol. 5, 5 September, 2004 (Journal of China Institute of Inter national Studies), pp. 15-44; Liu Baolai, “Trend of Middle East Situation in 2004,” Foreign Affairs Journal, No. 71, March 2004, pp. 49-57 (Journal of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs); Li Lifan, Ding Shiwu, «Geopolitical Interests of Russia, the U.S. and China in Central Asia,» Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (27), 2004, p. 142.
See: Jo Barton (Chairman of the U.S. Congress Energy and Trade Committee), Statement at a meeting with the Ambas sador of the Republic of Kazakhstan K. Saudabaev, Washington, 10 March, 2004.
See: R. Williamson, Report on Wilton Park Conference 722. «The Caspian and Central Asia: Stability and Develop ment,” January 2004 [http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk].
Li Lifan, Ding Shiwu, op. cit., p. 140.
Ibidem.
F. Khamraev, “NATO-SCO: Struggle against Terrorism and/or for Domination in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2 (26), 2004, p. 68.
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