UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE ORANGE REVOLUTION1

Abstract

Throughout the 1990s, Ukraine balanced between the world’s main centers of power in an effort to preserve its officially declared European and Euro Atlantic course along with a high level of mutually advantageous eco-nomic cooperation with Russia and other CIS members.  This policy meandered along with the changing conditions and the nature of bilateral relations with the country’s key partners—Ameri-ca, Russia, the EU, and NATO. Nuclear disarmament and curbed hyperinflation (1994) helped Ukraine overcome international isolation and establish cooperation with the United States and NATO: in 1996, it received the status of the U.S.’s strategic partner, and in 1997 Ukraine signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
 Ukraine’s stronger position in the West and its contacts with the Central European structures helped it settle certain conflicts caused by the Soviet Union’s disintegration. I have in mind the Ukrainian-Russian agreements on the Black Sea Fleet, the basic state agreements with Russia and Rumania, and the country’s permanent contacts with Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova.
 Looking back, it can be said that Kiev has been consistently and successfully moving ahead in the Euro Atlantic and post-Soviet directions.
Ukraine has obviously been trying, more or less consciously, to adapt itself to the emerging inter-national system. However, although under Pres-ident Kuchma Ukraine’s relations with NATO were an obvious priority, they were still hampered by negative domestic processes and a depressed economy. The economic community became convinced that the state should work hard to mend the holes and restore Ukraine’s economy to its former health. There was also the firm conviction that economic rebirth could be attained through mutually advantageous relations with Russia, long-term cooperation with Asian countries, and energy projects with Azerbaijan and Central Asia (primarily Turkmenistan, as well as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan). The 1998 financial crisis interfered with the economic cooperation programs being implemented with Russia for 1998-1999; in 1999-2000 the devalued grivna (the Ukrainian monetary unit) helped the Ukrainian economy revive: in 2004 its growth reached a record rate of over 12 percent.

In this context, the official course for European integration looked like a declaration of intentions, the fulfillment of which demanded much faster growth of the GDP and democratic developments. The political crisis of 2000 cut short the country’s contacts with the West and worsened its relations with the United States, which hastened to voice its unfounded suspicions that Ukraine sold Kolchuga detectors to Iraq in 2002. Naturally enough, Kiev’s foreign policy lost much of its previous drive and concentrated on purely technical matters. The conflict, how-ever, unfolded in the context of sustainable eco-nomic growth.
In February 2003, President Kuchma shocked the government and the parliament by accepting Vladimir Putin’s invitation to join Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia in forming a Single Economic Space (SES). No political issues were discussed during the negotiations of the frame-work conditions. The agreement itself does not presuppose an international status.

 The domestic political conflict reached its boiling point during the presidential elections of 2004 and brought a new group to power, which completely changed the country’s foreign policy and its macroeconomic ideas.