GUAM AND THE SCO: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Abstract
Numerous organizations have been born and died on the post-Soviet expanse; the larger part of them left no trace and there-fore can be safely forgotten. Two organizations, however, deserve our special attention. I have in mind the Organization for Democracy and Eco-nomic Development—GUAM and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, not so much because they are rivals of sorts, but because the way they were formed and developed, their response to events, and many other things are similar. Any attempt to compare two international organizations is a thankless task, however, I shall under-take it here.
The SCO and GUAM are not mere rivals—each of them is supported by outside players with great geopolitical ambitions. GUAM is backed by the United States joined recently by the European Union; the SCO has China behind it, which has great designs for the post-Soviet expanse. This ac-counts for their specifics and their attitudes toward Russia, which claims the role of key player on the post-Soviet expanse.
Proof of the above is easily found in the two structures’ history, which reveals not merely the reasons for their emergence, but also the interests of the outside players involved.
The SCO’s status is clear enough: China is obviously interested in it and is working hard to channel it in the desirable direction. Sometimes it succeeds, sometimes it fails, because so far it is treading cautiously so as not to irritate Russia. In short, it has to bear in mind Russia’s interests and ambitions. The expert community, however, agrees that the SCO was set up on China’s initiative, which needed a lever of influence in Central Asia.1
The Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Sphere in Border Areas signed in April 1996 in Shanghai and its component, the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces in the Border Area signed in Moscow in April 1997, laid the foundation of the Shanghai Five; in the late 1990s it was transformed into the “Shanghai Forum,” which in June 2001 became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
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For more detail, see: Kitai v XXI veke: Globalizatsia interesov bezîpasnosti, ed. by G.I. Chufrin, IMEMO RAN,Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2007, pp. 257-287.
The basic border agreement with Russia was signed in November 1997, the additional agreement, in October 2004. The basic border agreement with Kazakhstan was signed in April 1995 and the additional, in September 1997. The basic border agreement with Kyrgyzstan was signed in July 1996 and the additional, in August 1999. The basic agreement with Tajikistan was signed in February 1999 and the additional, in May 2002.
See: Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 6 July, 1996.
See: Joint Communiqué Meeting of the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Strasbourg, 10 Oc-tober, 1997, available at [http://www.guam.org.ua/226.469.0.0.1.0.phtml]. The official site says: “The new organization intends to develop new effective mechanisms of cooperation, restore the considerably weakened economic contacts, and improve the climate of friendly relations for the sake of more harmonized economic development across the post-Soviet territory” (see: [http://www.guam.org.ua/history.phtml]).
Russia might have been justifiably concerned about the fact that a new alliance, which could control the Black and Caspian seas, had appeared next to its European part and the troublesome Northern Caucasus.
Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. 198.
See: R. Allison, “Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia,” International Af-fairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, May 2004, pp. 435-457.
In November 1997, the U.S. and Kazakhstan signed the production sharing agreement for the Kazakhstani part of the Caspian shelf and an agreement on economic and strategic partnership. U.S. President Clinton said that Washington regarded Kazakhstan as the key Central Asian state. In October 1999, Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian states were included in the responsibility zone of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
For more detail, see: K. Syroezhkin, “Central Asia between the Gravitational Poles of Russia and China,” in Cen-tral Asia: The Gathering Storm, ed. by B. Rumer, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, London, 2002, pp. 109-207.
According to the official version, President Karimov arrived at the summit on an invitation from President of Tajikistan E. Rakhmon; there is no doubt, however, that he was invited by Russia or possibly China.
ITAR-TASS, 5 July, 2000.
Panorama, 16 June, 2003.
About China’s interests, see: K. Syroezhkin, “China in Central Asia: From Trade to Strategic Partnership,” Cen-tral Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (45), 2007, pp. 44-46.
Uzbekistan has its own opinions on most of the issues. Its president called on his colleagues not to press on set-ting up an antiterrorist structure with headquarters in Bishkek and a secretariat in Beijing. At the St. Petersburg summit,President Karimov addressed the heads of state, primarily Jiang Zemin: “The SCO could develop into a serious factor of world politics if the organization takes the trouble to soberly assess the post-9/11 situation in the world… The world is changing together with the balance of power. The pragmatism demonstrated by the leaders of Russia and the United States, as well as those leaders who signed the Russia-NATO documents stems from a sober assessment and profound un-derstanding of the new situation. We should take this into account.” This meant that the Uzbek president warned the sum-mit against any steps uncoordinated with the United States. His behavior and his statements caused bewilderment, even among the journalists. The Vremia novostey newspaper asked on 10 June, 2002: “Had the presidents realized that the United States was virtually present at the summit?” President Karimov’s position can easily be explained. In March 2002,during his Washington visit, the sides signed a bilateral declaration in which Uzbekistan was called America’s key strate-gic partner in Central Asia. Upon his return to Tashkent, the inspired and encouraged Uzbek president issued the follow-ing statement: “The main role in defusing tension on Uzbekistan’s southern borders belongs to the United States, its de-termination, and its perfectly trained armed forces, not to the members of the Collective Security Treaty” (Kommer-sant, 16 June, 2002).
See, for example: A.F. Klimenko, “Znachenie Tsentral’no-Aziatskogo regiona. Razvitie strategicheskogo part-nerstva mezhdu Rossiey i Kitaem v ramkakh ShOS i nekotorye napravlenia sovershenstvovania etoy organizatsii,” in:
roblemy stanovleniia Shanghaiskoy organizatsii sotrudnichestva i vzaimodeystviia Rossii i Kitaia v Tsentral’noy Azii,Moscow, 2005, pp. 62-92; A.V. Boliatko, “Strategicheskaia obstanovka v Tsentral’noy Azii i voenno-politicheskie prob-lemy stanovlenia ShOS,” in: Problemy stanovleniia…, pp. 122-134.
ITAR-TASS, 15 March, 2002.
In this context President Karimov’s St. Petersburg speech sounds even more adequate (see footnote 14).
See: A.F. Klimenko, “Analiz izmeneniy v Tsentral’noy Azii posle 11 sentiabria 2001 goda i ikh vliiania na deiatel’nost ShOS,” in: Problemy stanovleniia…, p. 24; S. Luzianin, “Shanghaiskaia shesterka uzhe nikogo ne ustraivaet,”Nezavisimaia gazeta, 6 June, 2002.
Chinese Foreign Minister Shi Guansheng’s proposal “to discuss the possibility of setting up a free trade zone”inside the Six made on 28 May, 2002 at the meeting of foreign ministers of the SCO countries held in Shanghai was not hailed and was not included in the final documents.
See: R. Allison, “Tsentral’naia Azia i Zakavkaz’e: regional’noe sotrudnichestvo i faktor rossiiskoy politiki,”Carnegie Moscow Center. Working Papers, No. 10, 2004, pp. 6-7.
[http://www.guam.org.ua/226.472.0.0.1.0.phtml].
Earlier this sphere was rapidly developing. In January 1999, the GUAM members agreed on joint maneuvering and military exercises and on cooperation in military education. Three months later, Ukrainian, Georgian, and Azeri offic-ers of the staff and paratroopers carried out the first joint exercises at the Georgian cities of Supsa and Poti designed to raise the level of safety of the oil pipelines and terminals in the region. In September 1998, the border guards of the GUAM countries signed a cooperation treaty (see: R. Allison, “Tsentral’naia Azia i Zakavkaz’e: regional’noe sotrud-nichestvo i faktor rossiiskoy politiki,” p. 7).
“GUAM s odnoy ‘U,’” Pravda.ru, 17 June, 2002, available at [http://www.pravda.ru/].
Reuters, 16 June, 2002.
See: R. Allison, “Tsentral’naia Azia i Zakavkaz’e: regional’noe sotrudnichestvo i faktor rossiiskoy politiki,” p. 8.
See: Zakliuchitel’noe Kommiunike Sammita GUUAM 2002, Yalta [http://www.guam.org.ua/181.623.0.0.1.0.
html].
See: A. Volk, “GUUAM: temnoe budushchee organizatsii s neiasnym nazvaniem,” Gazeta SNG, 22 July, 2002.
RIA Novosti, 21 July, 2002.
RIA Novosti, 26 July, 2003.
See: Vremia novostey, 5 May, 2003.
RIA Novosti. 27 April, 2005.
“La declaration des Carpates,” Le Figaro, 12 January, 2005.
See: Ekho, 29 January, 2005.
RTR-Vesti, 5 May, 2005. It looks as if this step was taken under Russia’s pressure. In any case, Uzbekistan left GUUAM and at the same time denounced the documents related to economic integration and trade and economic cooper-ation within this structure, namely the 2001 Yalta Charter; the Memorandum of Understanding among the GUUAM Par-ticipating States on Trade and Transportation Facilitation, and the Agreement on Mutual Aid and Cooperation in the Cus-toms Sphere between the governments of the GUUAM member states (both documents were dated 2003). This means that Uzbekistan left GUUAM for geopolitical rather than economic reasons.
[http://www.guam.org.ua/226.489.0.0.1.0.phtml].
The initiative belongs to Viktor Yushchenko who complained to the GUAM sponsors that the democratic states “could not get rid” of the Russian peacekeepers. In August 2006, at the Tbilisi meeting of the representatives of the defense departments of the GUAM members, it was decided to set up a peacekeeping battalion, which accord-ing to the heads of the Georgian defense ministry “was suggested by the GUAM members for taking part in peace-keeping and humanitarian operations under the U.N., OSCE, NATO, and EU aegis” (Nezavisimaia gazeta, 21 Au-gust, 2006).
Immediately after the parliamentary elections in Moldova, President Saakashvili said with a great deal of conceit:
Europe is living through a geopolitical revolution no one expected. The balance that the continent achieved when the Berlin Wall fell down has been upset once more. The post-Soviet expanse wants reform, democracy, and freedom. Geor-gia, Ukraine, and Moldova, together with Rumania, will pull the Black Sea zone into the European Union. President Pu-tin, who thinks that he can stem the process, will soon watch it flooding Moscow” (“Una rivoluzione scuote Europa. Putin non potra ‘piu’ fermarla,” La Repubblica, 2 March, 2005).
The plan may produce one of two results: either an independent state will appear in the Transnistrian area (some-thing that Moldova is not prepared to accept) or the area will develop into a quasi-state dominated by Ukraine and Co. In both cases, the problem formulated by the summit (restored territorial integrity of the states with separatist conflicts) is not being solved. It seems that Taras Chornovil, one of the Ukrainian opposition leaders, was right when he said that the summit would end in a scandal for Ukraine since “Kiev interfered in the Transnistrian conflict without full understanding of how serious the issue was” (Vremia novostey, 22 April, 2005).
[http://www.kremlin.ru/interdocs/2005/07/05].
Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 6 July, 2005.
Declaration by the Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Astana, 5 July, 2005)
http://0-russia.shaps.hawaii.edu.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/fp/russia/2005/20050705_sco_07.html].
Several days later in his interview with Russian TV, Kurmanbek Bakiev specified: “Since Vladimir Putin raised the question (the time during which the American military base will remain in Kyrgyzstan.—K.S.) I have to say: yes, the situation has changed” (Vremia novostey, 19 July, 2005).
SCO Executive Secretary Zhang Deguang has pointed out: “Export of a ready-made social model will not pro-mote progress; it will create chaos, violate the normal course of political and economic development, and push society backward” (Kazakhstan Today, 5 July, 2003).
Declaration by the Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Vremia novostey, 6 July, 2005.
In October 2005, Russia’s foreign minister first raised the subject in a narrow circle. He said that the time had come for Russia to apply the entire set of levers of economic pressure to inadequately loyal CIS neighbors (Nezavisimaia gazeta, 13 October, 2005).
American Senator Richard Lugar developed the thought at the Riga NATO summit on 27-28 November, 2006:
It would be irresponsible for NATO to decline involvement in energy security when it is abundantly apparent that the jobs, health, and security of our modern economies and societies depend on the sufficiently and timely availability of di-verse energy resources.” The U.S. senator suggested that Art 5 of the NATO Treaty be altered to cover energy security (Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 8 December, 2006).
[http://www.guam.org.ua/181.611.0.0.1.0.phtml].
[http://www.guam.org.ua/181.610.0.0.1.0.phtml].
Under the treaty, construction should be completed in 2009; the pipeline will move about 30 billion cu m of Turkmenian gas to China every year for the next 30 years (see: Kommersant, 19 July, 2007).
On 16 August, Chief Advisor of the U.S. Trade and Development Agency James Wildetrotter and President of the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic Rovnag Abdullaev signed a $1.7 million grant agreement in Baku. Daniel Sullivan, who attended the ceremony, announced that the grant was intended for feasibility studies for two projects: the trans-Caspian gas pipeline through which Central Asian gas would reach Europe and an oil pipeline to be laid along the Caspian bed to connect Kazakhstan with BTC. According to Mr. Sullivan, there was an agreement with the Turkmenian president on the former and with the Kazakh president on the latter achieved during President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev’s visit to Kazakhstan early in August 2007 (see: Kommersant, 21 August, 2007).
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