PROBLEM-2014 AND CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY
Abstract
The author analyzes the outcome of the 12 years of the counterterrorist operation in Afghanistan and the problems it has created. He looks at some of the political aspects related to the 2014 pullout and the main threats and challenges to regional security emanating from Afghanistan. The external threats to regional security, their potential exacerbation because of the coalition withdrawal, and their potential localization are likewise analyzed. He also examines the SCO’s possible involvement in settling the Afghan problem and the fields and spheres in which this organization could apply its potential.
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According to the RF Federal Service of Drugs Control, the Afghan drug barons produce 94% of the world’s volume of opiates. Head of the Federal Service Victor Ivanov has quoted the following figures: every year Afghanistan produces and sells drugs totaling $65 billion. Every year $17 billion-worth of drugs are moved along the so-called northern route; a large or even the largest share of them is used in the transit countries. Thirty-five percent of narcotics transported from Afghanistan reaches Russia (see: “RF napomnit NATO ob obiazatelstvakh po borbe s Afghanskimi narkotikami,” RIA Novosti, 19 March,2010, available at [http://www.rian.ru/].
See: Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, New York, May 2013, p. 13.
See: I. Khokhlov, “Proizvodstvo opiynykh narkotikov (geroina) v Afghanistane: infrastruktura narkobiznesa,”available at [http://www.nationalsecurity.ru/library/00021].
There is information that the coalition servicemen buy drugs wholesale at the markets of Kandahar, move them to the airbase in Bagram, then by air to the American base in Incirlik (Turkey), and then to the base in Pristina (or to Rumania,Georgia, Germany, and other countries) (see: I.N. Komissina, “Nezakonnoe proizvodstvo narkotikov v Afghanistane,”Problemy natsionalnoy strategii, No. 1, 2010, pp. 33-34).
See: A.A. Kniazev, “O narkokriminalnom komponente sovremennykh politicheskikh protsessov v stranakh Tsentralnoy Azii v kontekste afghanskogo narkoproizvodstva,” Informatsionno-analiticheskiy portal Materik, 24 March, 2010,available at [http://www.materik.ru/]; Afghanistan Opium Survey 2010. Summary Findings, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, New York, September 2010, p. 1; A.H. Cordesman, The Afghan Narcotics Industry: Extended Summary, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 12 November, 2009, p. 10.
International Narcotics Control Board. 2010 Report, New York, January 2011, p. 96.
According to information made public in December 2008 at a London conference of the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS), in the previous 12 months the Taliban spread its permanent presence to 72 percent of Afghanistan, up from 54 percent in November 2007 (see: [http://www.icosgroup.net/2009/media/media-press-releases/eight_
ears_after_911/]).
The central government retains its responsibility for foreign policy, domestic security and democratic “rules of the game” on a countrywide scale; the regions are becoming more independent, which gives them the opportunity to use the already existing base of legitimacy and identity; the local administration should be elected and should be transparent.
Mixed sovereignty is an even more decentralized model. This approach would take many powers that are now held in Kabul and delegate them to the provincial or district level. Mixed sovereignty would grant local authorities the additional power to rule without transparency or elections if they so choose—as long as they do not cross the three “redlines” imposed by the center. The first redline would forbid local authorities from allowing their territories to be used in ways that violate the foreign policy of the state. The second would bar local administrations from infringing on the rights of neighboring provinces or districts. The third would prevent officials from engaging in large-scale theft, narcotics trafficking, or the exploitation of state-owned natural resources.
These variants would preserve a central state with autonomous regions and democratic institutions and with the power and incentive to deny the use of Afghan territory for destabilizing Pakistan or planning attacks against the United States and its allies.
A decentralized democracy in Afghanistan would face three critical challenges. The first, of course, is the Taliban,who oppose democracy in principle and are likely to resist this approach as aggressively as they now resist centralized democracy. The second challenge is the limited administrative capacity of the Afghan state. Third, the country’s malign power brokers would likely resist such an option. A transparent electoral democracy would threaten their status, authority, and ability to profit from corruption and abuse. The “internal mixed sovereignty” will create even more problems. First, governors would be free to adopt regressive social policies and abuse human rights. Second, corruption would also be prevalent—indeed, for prospective governors, the opportunity for graft would be an essential part of the system’s appeal. Third, the central government would have to strike a bargain with the country’s power brokers, requiring them to refrain from large-scale abuses in exchange for tolerance of moderate local corruption and a share of foreign assistance. Even this kind of bargain, however, would probably be resisted by the country’s strongmen, who have grown used to operating without restraint (see: S. Biddle, C. Fotini,A. Thier, “Defining Success in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, No. 4, 2010).
Ahmad Wali Massoud, brother of late Ahmad Shah Massoud, spoke about that in June 2011 at a conference on Scenarios for Afghanistan and Regional Security Transformation held in Almaty. He was supported by Aziz Arianfar, Director of the German-based Center for Afghanistan Studies (see: “Afghanistanu nuzhen status neytralnoy strany pod egidoy OON,”RIA Novosti, 11 June, 2011, available at [http://www.rian.ru]; Aziz Arianfar: “Edinstvenny vykhod iz tupika—vernut Afghanistanu neytralitet,” International Information Agency Ferghana, 20 June, 2011, available at [http://www.fergananews.
om/]).
See: Zamir Kabulov: “Nuzhno idti v Afghanistan s otkrytym serdtsem,” Information portal Afghanistan.Ru, 25 May,2011, available at [http://www.afghanistan.ru/].
The report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations says that between 2002 and 2010 the United States extended
aid totaling $51,803 billion to Afghanistan; $18.78 billion were poured into the economy, the social sphere, and state institutions; $32.89 billion were spent on setting up and training the Afghan national army and the police; $127.5 million, on anti-narcotics efforts (see: Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan. A Majority Staff Report, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 8 June, 2011, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 2011, p. 34).
Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan, pp. 1-2, 5, 29-30.
G. Friedman, “The 30-Year War in Afghanistan,” Stratfor (US), 29 June, 2010. In mid-March 2010, a secret meeting was held in the White House to discuss how to proceed with the Afghan Taliban. In recent years the United States has been more and more frequently talking about a dialog with those of the Taliban members who were not involved in crimes; who laid down arms and recognized the Constitution, in short “moderate” members. Judging by the leaks in foreign press these talks are underway with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia as active brokers. So far there have been no results (see: K. Belianinov,A. Gabuev, “Esli vrag ne sdaetsia, ego ugovarivaiut,” Kommersant, 17 March, 2010; V. Skosyrev, “Obama podderzhal peregovory s ‘Talibanom’,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 17 March, 2010).
[http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13830750]; [http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/robert-gates-confirms-us-peace-talks-with-taliban/story-e6frg6so-1226078756876].
Talking to journalists in his residence in Kabul, Karzai said: “I again call on my brothers, the Taliban, dears, Hizb-i-Islami to take this opportunity and say yes to the call of the people. This is a rare chance.” He addressed those who lived in emigration and who fought in Afghanistan to come back and establish peace for the sake of their country’s prosperity and stability (see: [http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010/06/04/jirgas-offer-rare-chance-taliban-karzai]; “Karzai pozval bratiev-Talibov na ‘Loya jirga/Bolshoy sovet’,” BaltInfo Agency, 28 November, 2009, available at [http://www.baltinfo.ru/]).
See: A. Reutov, “Talibov otdelili ot ‘Al-Qaedy’,” Kommersant, 20 June, 2011.
Here I will not discuss the internal threats and challenges to regional security, even though they dominate today; after 2014 the larger part of them will become even more dangerous. At the same time, the internal threats and challenges are only indirectly connected to what is going on in Afghanistan and the future pullout.
Here I have in mind the concept which lumps together the Afghan and Pakistani problems in the so-called AfPak and Greater Central Asia strategy.
Information about a new structure set up at the U.S. Department of State to deal with religious communities in other countries is highly illustrative in this respect.
D. Malysheva, Tsentralnoaziatskiy uzel mirovoy politiki, IMEMO RAN, Moscow, 2010, p. 13.
There is information that precursors come from China, Pakistan, India, Europe, and the Middle East on a regular basis.
he Bakiev clan controlled the flow of drug trafficking across Kyrgyzstan, this is one of the most pertinent examples of how top politicians in Central Asia patronized the narco-business (see: K. Fayzullina, “Ekonomika narkotrafika opiatov cherez Tsentralnuiu Aziiu,” Internet portal Islam in CIS, 9 August, 2013, available at [http://wwww.islamsng.com/].
See: “Perspektivy rossiisko-natovskogo sotrudnichestva po ‘afghanskomu voprosu’,” Internet portal Afghanistan.Ru,10 March, 2008, available at [http://www.afghanistan.ru].
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