THE 18TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA: NCONCLUSIVE RESULTS, URGENT TASKS, SHAKY COMPROMISES

Authors

  • Konstantin SYROEZHKIN D.Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Chief Scientific Associate of the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan (Almaty, Kazakhstan) Author

Abstract

The struggle at the very top of China’s political establishment reached its peak on the eve of the 18th Communist Party Congress, which largely predetermined the balance of political forces in the upper echelons of the Communist Party and the decisions made during the congress. The compromise regarding the top figures casts a dim light on the party’s political future. While the retreating Hu-Wen Tandem managed to maintain its position, it is too early to declare that the “reformers” have achieved a final victory; in many respects, the 18th Congress proved to be “transitional.” The final balance of power will likely become clear in five years, after the next, 19th CPC Congress, which will probably clarify the direction of the “fifth generation” of the country’s leaders. The next five years can be characterized as a time of compromises. It must be acknowledged that the criticized Hu-Wen Tandem left the country in relatively good shape, having compiled a reasonable “roadmap” with no alternative in sight. It remains to be seen whether the new party and country leaders will succeed in averting social upheavals and fulfilling the tasks set forth by the 18th Congress while adhering to the roadmap.

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References

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According to prominent Chinese sociologist Sun Liping, there are people who would like to return to the past; they argue that the reforms of the 1990s infringed on the rights of workers of state enterprises and other working people who had to pay for their housing and medical services. They insist that it was bureaucrats and rich people who profited from the market. There are liberals who want to go on with the reforms without social orientation. Another group favors socially-oriented reforms (quoted from: V. Skosyrev, “Politicheskaia drama v KNR stala detektivom,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 April,2012).

The “naked official” (luo guan), an official with no property inside the country who has moved his family, relatives,and money abroad and has property outside China.

See: I. Ivanov, “Iz Kitaia massovo utekaiut dengi i uezzhaiut zazhitochnye liudi,” The Epoch Times Internet Portal,17 December, 2012; Lin Jane, “Bogatstva natsii gotoviat k vyvozu,” The Epoch Times Internet Portal, 17 December, 2012; Liu Xiaozhen, “China Economic Weekly publikuet otchet o chinovnikah, sbegaiushchikh za granitsu,” The Epoch Times Internet Portal, 20 June, 2012, available at [http://www.epochtimes.ru/], 25 June, 2012.

See: Lin Feng, “Hu Jintao: Partiia nakhoditsia v kriticheskom polozhenii,” The Epoch Times Internet Portal, 1 July,2012, available at [http://www.epochtimes.ru/], 10 June, 2012. 5 According to prominent Chinese sociologist Sun Liping, there are people who would like to return to the past; they argue that the reforms of the 1990s infringed on the rights of workers of state enterprises and other working people who had to pay for their housing and medical services. They insist that it was bureaucrats and rich people who profited from the market. There are liberals who want to go on with the reforms without social orientation. Another group favors socially-oriented reforms (quoted from: V. Skosyrev, “Politicheskaia drama v KNR stala detektivom,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 April,2012).

The “naked official” (luo guan), an official with no property inside the country who has moved his family, relatives,and money abroad and has property outside China.

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According to Dongxiang, a journal published in Hong Kong, on 26 October the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CC CPC met in Beijing for a closed meeting, at which Xi Jinping was scathingly critical; he pointed to “several whys:” Why is there tension between the people and the party and the government? Why is the level of popular confidence in the party low? Why is the level of satisfaction of the people with the local governments and personal moral qualities of the local officials low? Why do people give low marks to the party, government, state offices, and their personnel? Why is the level of popular support of the party’s course and politics low? The future secretary general said that it must be admitted that there were burning problems and the legality of certain methods of government was doubtful; he added that the “bell was tolling” for the legitimacy of the Communist government (quoted from: I. Ivanov, “Xi Jinping priznal krizis zakonnosti pravleniia kompartii v Kitae,” The Epoch Times Internet Portal, 29 October, 2012, available at [http://www.epochtimes.ru/], 30 October, 2012).

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The four others are: Marxism-Leninism, the idea of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping’s theory, and Jiang Zemin’s important thoughts relating to the Three Represents.

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[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/18cpcnc/2012-11/15/c_131976383.htm].

Ibidem.

Early in the 1990s, Deng Xiaoping, who had left his party and state posts but retained a lot of authority with the country’s leaders, formulated a foreign policy and security strategy that later became known as the 24 Character Strategy:(lengjing guancha; zhanwen jiaogen; chenzhe yingfu; taoguang yanghui; shanyu shouzhuo; jiuebu dangtou) “observe calmly;secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” Later four more characters (yousuo zuowei) were added: “to be able to accomplish something.”

[http://www.china.org.cn/china/18th_cpc_congress/2012-11/16/content_27137540_9.htm].

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Published

2013-02-28

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Section

ELECTIONS AND REGIME CHANGE

How to Cite

SYROEZHKIN, K. (2013). THE 18TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA: NCONCLUSIVE RESULTS, URGENT TASKS, SHAKY COMPROMISES. CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS, 14(1), 102-121. https://ca-c.org/CAC/index.php/cac/article/view/1565

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