CENTRAL ASIA: SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF POST-2014 AFGHANISTAN
Abstract
Its geographic location, domestic political complications, ethno-confessional diversity, and involvement in the global shadow economy keep Afghanistan in the center of the intertwining interests of state and extra-state forces. This threatens the country’s immediate neighbors and even whole regions and explains the never weakening interest of Pakistan, India, Iran, the Central Asian Soviet successor-states, China, and Russia in what is going on in this country.
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The government in Kabul will remain in control of the country’s foreign policy; it will have the right to declare war and apply anti-drug legislation; it will control customs services and mining, but will have limited rights in supervising trade between provinces.
According to many of the Western experts in Afghanistan, the term “moderate Talibans” used by Kabul is nothing but a myth. The attempts to integrate them into administrative structures are fraught with unpredictable repercussions.
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For more details, see: M.T. Laumulin, “Stsenarii razvitiia Afghanistana i pozitsii zainteresovannykh storon,” in:
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See: Afghanistan after 2014: Five Scenarios, FOI, Stockholm, 2012, 100 pp.
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See: Vyzovy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoy Azii, pp. 81-82.
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