FERGHANA AS FATA?1
Keywords:
Ferghana Valley, FATA, the Great Game legacy, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, global war on terror, economic interdependence, security dynamics, security issues.Abstract
The Ferghana Valley and FATA, two areas of regional importance, are gathering global consequence. Their unique geographic/geopolitical location and security issues have made them the main reference objects of Central and South Asian regional security complexes. In the era of the global war on terror, they are growing increasingly attractive for terrorists and extremists. The Ferghana Valley and FATA share a common legacy: the divide and rule policy of colonial powers alienated ethnic, cultural, and civilizational units and created a circumstance responsible for the current and future processes in these regions. The share of security factors (the triad “interests-threats-security), however, in the Ferghana Valley and FATA is not identical.
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References
FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas)—an administrative unit of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
N. Lubin, B.R. Rubin, Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue in the Heart of Central Asia, The Century Foundation Press, New York, 1999, p. 14; M. Laumulin, “SCO—‘grandiozny geopoliticheskiy blef’? Vzgliad iz Kazakhstana,” Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Russie. Nei. Visions, No. 12, 2006, p. 7.
A. Matveeva, “EU Stakes in Central Asia,” Chaillot Paper, Institute for Security Studies, European Union, Paris,No. 91, July 2006, p. 37.
See: T. Donnelly, “Ferghana as FATA? Central Asia after 2014 — Outcomes and Strategic Options”, Connections:
he Quarterly Journal, Vol. XI, No. 1, Winter 2011.
See: “Unrest in Uzbekistan: Fata Ferghana”, The Economist, 11 June, 2009; “Uzbekistan: If a Taliban Outpost Falls in Pakistan, Is the Ripple Felt in the Ferghana Valley?” Eurasianet, 26 May, 2009, available at [http://www.eurasianet.org/
epartments/insightb/articles/eav052609.shtml]; A. Rashid, “Tajikistan: The Next Jihadi Stronghold?” New York Review of Books, 29 November, 2010, available at [http://goo.gl/0wJU7].
T. Donnelly, op. cit., p. 18.
Its total area, which includes the watersheds, is about 84 thou. sq km (see: National Encyclopedia of Uzbekistan, Vol. 9,National Encyclopedia of Uzbekistan State Scientific Publishers, Tashkent, 2005, p. 199; O. Abdullaev, Ferghana Valley:
ocioeconomic Development, Namangan Publishers, Namangan, 2000, p. 18, both in Uzbek).
The Uzbek part about 19 thou. sq km (out of the valley’s total 22 thou. sq km): the Namangan Region, 7.44 thou. sq km;Ferghana, 6.8 thou. sq km and Andijan, 4.2 thou. sq km (see: National Encyclopedia of Uzbekistan, Vols. 1, 6, 9, 2000-2005,pp. 362 [Vol. 1], 251 [Vol. 6], 195 [Vol. 9]).
There are over 8.5 million living in three regions of Uzbekistan (2.8 million live in Andijan; 3.2 million, in Ferghana,and 2.5 million in Namagan regions; the valley’s Kyrgyz part is home to over 2.5 million (450 thou. live in the Batken, 1 million in the Dzhalal-Abad and 1.1 million in the Osh regions); the Sogd Region of Tajikistan has a population of 2.4 million.
See: The Andijan Region, available at [http://www.ut.uz/andijan/andizhanskaya-oblasty] (see also: National Encyclo-pedia of Uzbekistan, Vol. 1, 2000, p. 327).
See: O. Abdullaev, op. cit., p. 64.
For instance, the share of agriculture in Uzbekistan’s GDP has shrunk from 30.1% in 2000 to 16.8% in 2013 (see:
Report of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan I. Karimov at the Meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers on the Results of Social and Economic Development in 2013 and the Key Economic Priorities for 2014, 18 January, 2014, available at [http://
ww.press-service.uz/ru/news/4875/]).
According to Asian Development Bank estimations, the average literacy rate of people aged 15 and above in Central Asia is 99.3% (see: Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Member Countries: Regional Cooperation Strategy and Program (2005-2007), ADB, July 2004, p. 56).
Uzbekistan has about 6% of plough land in the valley; Tajikistan 16%, and Kyrgyzstan 50% (see: Uzbekistan State Committee for Land Resources. Atlas, Land Resources of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 1st ed., Tashkent, 2001, рр. 12-13 (in Uzbek); O. Abdullaev, op. cit., pp. 148-157).
The main channels are the Grand Ferghana (an inter-state channel 370 km long); the Northern and Southern Ferghana,the Grand Andijan, and the Grand Namangan channels.
This includes the hydropower resources of the rivers Naryn and Kara Darya, the Andijan, Kasansay, Kayrakkum,Karkidon, and Panan water reservoirs, and the Uchkurgan and Andijan hydropower stations.
National Encyclopedia of Uzbekistan, Vol. 11, 2005, p. 17; O. Abdullaev, op. cit., p. 185.
B. Babadjanov et al. “Islam in the Ferghana Valley: Between National Identity and Islamic Alternative,” in: Fer-ghana Valley: The Heart of Central Asia, ed. by S.F. Starr, B. Beshimov, I.I. Bobokulov, P. Shozimov, M.E. Sharpe, New York, London, 2011, p. 304.
For more details, see: Ibid., p. 326.
M.B. Olcott, “Velika li ugroza jihada v Tsentralnoy Azii?” available at [uisrussia.msu.ru/docs/nov/pec/2009/2/Pro EtContra_2009_204.pdf].
See: “Malikov: Liudi iz “Tabligi Jamaat”—ne ekstremisty,” available at [http://rus.azattyk.org/content/kyrgyzstan_
alikov/24979209.html].
M. Kalishevskiy, “Kyrgyzstan. ‘Islamizatsia’ neobratima?” 27 January, 2014, available at [http://www.centrasia.ru/
ewsA.php?st=1390856880].
See: T. Sarbagyshev, “Salafism v Kyrgyzstane—put k radikalizatsii,” 14 January, 2014, available at [http://www.
entrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1389711240].
Early in 2014, the Defense Council of Kyrgyzstan was entrusted with the task of drafting the State Concept of Policy in the Religious Sphere of Kyrgyzstan until 2020 (see: [http://www.kabar.kg/rus/society/full/74717]).
See: B. Babadjanov, “‘Tablig’—politicheskaia organizatsia tsel kotoroy—islamizatsia mira,” available at [http://
ww.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1234595940]; A. Keldibek, “Shchupaltsy religioznogo spruta okhvatyvaiut silovye struk-tury Kyrgyzstana,” available at [http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1362719640]; T. Keneshev, “Idei ‘Tabligi-jamaat’
vladevaiut umami kyrgyzstantsev,” available at [http://www.arba.ru/forum/6943].
The events of 2009 and 2010 in the Rasht Valley and in 2012 in Gorno-Badakhshan show that the “i’s” have not been dotted in the informal part of the national reconciliation agreement (redivision of spheres of influence and business) (for more details, see: E. Chausovsky, “Militancy in Central Asia: More Than Religious Extremism,” Security Weekly, 9 August, 2012,available at [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/militancy-central-asia-more-religious-extremism?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_
edium=email&utm_campaign=20120809&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=aa6bb89fc950407bb3ed07da 3ecda137]; Th. Ruttig, “Talebs in Tajikistan? The ‘Terrorist Spill-Over’Hype,” 10 October, 2013, available at [http://www.
fghanistan-analysts.org/talebs-in-tajikistan-the-terrorist-spill-over-hype]; S. Peyrouse, “Battle on Top of the World: Rising Tensions in Tajikistan’s Pamir Region,” August 2012, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, available at [http://
ww.gmfus.org/archives/battle-on-top-of-the-world-rising-tensions-in-tajikistans-pamir-region/]).
The routes of drug trafficking run from Khorog to Osh and from Kulob to Dushanbe and Khujand to be moved to Russia, Europe, and China.
See: A. Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Penguin Books, New York, 2003, p. 144.
See: A. Abdrakhmanova et al., “Is Uzbek Guerrilla Force Planning Homecoming?” IWPR Special Report, 18 Novem-ber, 2009, available at [http://iwpr.net/report-news/uzbek-guerrilla-force-planning-homecoming].
According to certain sources, there are about 350 thou. ethnic Uighurs living in Central Asia, mainly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
XUAR is over 4 thou. km away from China’s sea routes, which confirms that fundamental geographic imperatives are important for the realization of interdependence and should be taken into account when discussing integration of the trans-portation sectors of XUAR and Central Asia.
See: “Special Report: Pakistan,” The Economist, 11-17 February, 2012, p. 4.
See: Sh. Nawaz, “FATA—A Most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and Terror in the Federally
Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2009, pp. 1-2.
A.E. Snesarev, Afghanistan, Russkaia panorama, Moscow, 2002, p. 61, available at [pashtoon.ru/downloads/files/
nesarev.pdf].
V.V. Bartold, Raboty po istoricheskoy geografii i istorii Irana, Prepared for publication by E.V. Zeymal, V.A. Livshits,Reprinted from 1971 edition, Vostochnaia literatura, Moscow, 2003, p. 93.
The Pashtun cavalry formed the core of the personal guard of Nader Shah; it was commanded by Ahmad Shah Ab-dali, founder of the Afghan state.
See: A.E. Snesarev, op. cit., p. 59.
See: Ibidem.
Significantly, to avoid direct contacts, both empires did not leave point blank in the buffer area. The Wakhan Corridor,a narrow strip of mountains between the Pamir and Hindu Kush, was transferred to Afghanistan, a legal act supported by Brit-ish subsidies (see: B.R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 2nd ed., Yale University Press, 2002, p. 49).
See: V.V. Bartold, op. cit., p. 96.
See: I. Khan, “Challenges Facing Development in Pakistan’s FATA,” NBR Analysis, Vol. 19, No. 3, August 2008, p. 16.
Th.M. Sanderson, D. Kimmage, D.A. Gordon, From the Ferghana Valley to South Waziristan: The Evolving Threat of Central Asian Jihadists, A Report of CSIS Transnational Threat Project, March 2010, p. 11.
See: F. Taj, Taliban and Anti-Taliban, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011, p. 87.
In 1997, the region voted at the national elections for the first time. Today, there are 12 FATA deputies in the Na-tional Assembly and 8 in the Senate (see: N.A. Shinvari, Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion and Society in Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, Vol. V, CAMP, 2012, p. 22).
See: N.A. Shinvari, op. cit., p. 21.
See: I. Khan, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
According to Ahmed Rashid, “the foreign policy we pursue is still essentially rooted in the Cold War syndrome” (see:
akistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, Transcript by Federal News Service, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 22 March, 2012, p. 1).
The following figures provide an exhaustive picture of the FATA social infrastructure: one doctor per 7,670 people,the country’s average being 1,226; the literacy level (17.42%) is 2.5 times lower than the average national (which is 43.92%),the figures for men being 29.51% and for women 3%. There is no social infrastructure and no higher educational establishments (see: Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (Strengthening and Rationalization of Administration), Draft Report 2006, Islam-abad, April 2006, pp. 63-65. Quoted from: Sh. Nawaz, op. cit., p. 8).
The radical Taliban ideology strengthened the status of the mullahs, a position of secondary importance in traditional Pashtun society; they depended for functioning on the maliks and, therefore, had no political consequence (see: Th.M. Sander-son, D. Kimmage, D.A. Gordon, op. cit., p. 14).
According to Farhat Taj, more than 200 tribal chiefs and those who wanted to organize lashkar (tribal militia) to drive foreign fighters from South Waziristan were murdered (see: F. Taj, op. cit., p. 83).
See: Ibid., pp. 82-120.
It was in January 2001 that Juma Namangani together with 300 militants finally left Tajikistan on board Russian heli-copters. In the summer of 1998, in Afghanistan, Yoldosh and Namangaini announced that they had set up the IMU (see: A. Rashid,
They’re Only Sleeping: Why Militant Islamicists in Central Asia Aren’t Going to Go Away,” New Yorker, 14 January, 2002,available at [http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2002/01/14/020114fa_FACT]).
See: F. Taj, op. cit., pp. 91, 102. The latest events have confirmed that the IMU militants are under pressure from three sides—“a combination of ethnic violence, CIA drone strikes, and Pakistan Army operations” (see: Th.M. Sanderson, D. Kim-mage, D.A. Gordon, op. cit., p. V). It should be said that starting in 2001, practically all the top IMU leaders, including Tohir Yoldosh and also Mullah Nazir and the leader of the Pakistan Taliban Baitullah Mehsud, were killed in drone attacks.
There are no territorial disputes in the classical legal sense because the local countries have accepted the uti posside-tis (as you possess) and non-violability of borders principles. This ruled out territorial disagreements and lowered the possibil-ity of serious conflicts.
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