GUAM AND THE REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
Abstract
The Soviet Union left behind what is now called the post-Soviet space—a political picture that radically differs from the one of the previous period. Fifteen new independent states destroyed the rigidly hierarchical system dominated by one actor to introduce a regional anarchically-organized system. Although this structural change did indeed create a system that functioned as a regional complex1 of interdependent central security interests of the newly independent states, it nevertheless displayed cer-tain specific features.
Its dimensions and structural-political specifics make the system different from what is regarded as the classical standard Regional Security Complex (RSC), in which the closely interconnected security interests of all states are based on their geographic proximity2 and where “the security dynamics of the region are not determined by the unipolar power at its center.”3 B. Buzan and O. Weaver have de-scribed the regional system of the post-Soviet space as a “centered great power regional securi-ty complex.”4
At the same time, having detached them-selves from the metropolitan country, the newly independent states formed local interstate sys-tems—regional security sub-complexes. Such are the Baltic sub-complex, which includes Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, the East Europe-an (Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova), the Central Caucasian (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia),and the Central Asian (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). The newly formed sub-systems remain more or less autonomous, while Russia has preserved the function of the “center” that brings them together into a single “web” of interdependence of the post-Soviet security macro-complex (PSM).
Russia is the only geopolitical actor in this structure able to consistently spread its influence on a regional scale; by the same token, it is the key security factor for all the newly independent states in all the sub-systems described above.
his means that the development of the local complexes, the dynamics of the security rela-tions among all the states involved, and their ties with the outside centers of power are all products not only of endogenous factors, but also of their dependence on Russia’s geopolitical activity.
The very fact that four of the post-Soviet states (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) formed an alliance (GUAM) and it underwent subsequent development confirmed the specific features of the security system in the post-Soviet space described above. On the one hand, GUAM is the natural result of the development of the security sphere in the PSM “immature anarchical”5 and unbalanced political structure. On the other, it is the result of the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and outside centers of power. This means that GUAM’s future is part and parcel of the PSM’s internal development and its relations with the outside world.
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References
On the theory of regional security complexes (RSC), see: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder,Colorado, 1991, p. 190; B. Buzan, O. Weaver, J. De Wilde,Security. A New Framework for Analysis, Rienner Publish-ers Boulder, London, 1998, pp. 10-19.
See: B. Buzan, op. cit., pp. 188, 189, 191, 195.
B. Buzan, O. Weaver, Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 55.
Ibid., pp. 55, 62, 343.
For more information about “mature” and “imma-ture” anarchy, see: B. Buzan, op. cit., pp. 175-181.
The “pluralistic security-community” is normally understood as a group of political units (states), the relations among which are determined by the “dependable expectations of peaceful change” and “the real assurance that the mem-bers of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other (peaceful.—J.E.)way.” Karl Deutsch and his co-authors explain the trend toward “dependable expectations of peaceful change” by the emerging ties of confidence and mutual respect among societies and a “sense of community” (for more detail, see:
. Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey,1957, pp. 5, 36).
For more foreign policy priorities of the newly independent states, see: T. Kuzio, “Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Emergence of GUUAM,” European Security, Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 81-114.
In 2004 Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia joined NATO and the European Union.
I have in mind the unofficial support Russia extends to the separatist movements on the republics’ territories (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria) in the hope of keeping them within its orbit. For more detail, see: B. Coppieters, “The Politicisation and Securitisation of Ethnicity: The Case of the Southern Caucasus,” Civil Wars, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2001, pp. 74-75; A. Malashenko, “Postsovetskie gosudarstva Iuga i interesy Moskvy,” Pro et Con-tra, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 42-43; S.E. Cornell, R.N. McDermott, W.D. O’Malley, V. Socor, F.S. Starr, Regional Securi-ty in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Washington D.C., 2004, p. 16; S.E. Cor-nell, “Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Stud-ies, Vol. XX, No. 4, Summer 1997, p. 12; A.I. Utkin, Mirovoy poriadok XXI veka, Algoritm Publishers, Moscow, 2002,pp. 400-401; A. Mörike, “The Military as a Political Actor in Russia: The Cases of Moldova and Georgia,” The Interna-tional Spectator, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, July-September 1998, available at [http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/iai/iai_98moa 01.html], 13 December, 2007.
Azerbaijan, in particular, left the CST for several reasons, including possible stationing of Russia’s armed forces on its territory and the treaty’s inefficiency in settling the conflict with Armenia, during the course of which Az-erbaijan’s security and territorial integrity were violated (see: G.G. Tishchenko, “Voenno-politicheskiy kurs i vooruzhennye sily Azerbaidzhana,” Nezavisimy Azerbaijan: Novye orientiry, Vol. I, Russian Institute of Strategic Studies, Moscow, 2000, p. 240).
For more detail, see: M. Laumulin, “Multi-Vector Foreign Policies in Central Asia,” in: Central Asia and South Caucasus Affairs: 2006, ed. by B. Rumer, L.S. Yee, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo, 2007, pp. 38-45;M. Laumulin, “U.S. Strategy and Policy in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (46), 2007, p. 55;F. Tolipov, “Russia in Central Asia: Retreat, Retention, or Return?” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (47), 2007,p. 30; A. Kniazev, “Russia in Central Asia: Return,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (47), 2007, p. 34; N. Nor-ling, “EU’s Central Asia Policy: The Adoption of a New Strategy Paper 2007-2013,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (45),2007, p. 13.
The official letter about Uzbekistan’s discontinued GUUAM membership was dated 5 May, 2005. President Is-lam Karimov explained this decision: “The political orientation of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova is compelling Uz-bekistan to reconsider its attitude toward GUAAM” (see: A. Kamilov, “Uzbekistan: International Affairs,” in: Central Eurasia 2005, Analytical Annual, CA&CC® Press, Sweden, 2006, p. 308).
Signed in Moscow on 14 November, 2005 (see: Dogovor o soiuznicheskikh otnosheniiakh mezhdu Rossiyskoy
Federatsiey i Respublikoy Uzbekistan, available at [http://www.government.gov.ru/archiv/data/news_text.html-
he_id_103_news_id_19385.htm], 14 December, 2007).
The decision on restoring Uzbekistan’s CSTO membership was passed in Sochi on 16 August, 2006 at the meet-ing of the Inter-state EurAsEC Council.
The corresponding protocol was signed on 25 January, 2006 (see: Protokol o prisoedinenii Respubliki Uz-bekistan k Dogovoru ob uchrezhdenii Evraziyskogo ekonomicheskogo soobshchestva ot 10 oktiabria 2000 goda, available at [http://www.evrazes.com/ru/main/documentpage/149/], 14 December, 2007).
Ukraine since 2005 and Georgia since 2006 have been involved in the “Intensified Dialogue” with NATO (see:
ATO Launches ‘Intensified Dialogue’ with Ukraine, available at [http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/04-april/
b.htm]; NATO Offers Intensified Dialogue to Georgia, available at [http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/09-sep-tember/e0921c.htm], 18 February, 2008).
This social trend was most obvious in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine, the political elites of which,when dealing with Russia’s ever promising initiatives, had to take into account the generally negative attitude toward Russia as a source of the security threats.
Amid the economic ruins and ideological crisis that predated the downfall of the Soviet Union and survived into the first years of the Russian Federation, the Kremlin regarded the classical methods of preserving its domination in the former Soviet republics: direct military intervention: Tbilisi (1989), Baku (1990), Vilnius (1991); when the re-publics became independent de jure, the Kremlin moved its attention and latent support to the breakaway regions—
agorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Abkhazia, and South Ossetia (Georgia), the Transnistria Region (Moldova), and the Crimea (Ukraine).
Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Supremacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books,New York, p. 198.
This was outlined in A National Security Strategy for a New Century created by the Clinton Administration (see:
National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, May 1997, p. 22).
See: T. Kuzio, op. cit., pp. 85-86; F. Splidsboel-Hansen, “GUUAM and the Future of CIS Military Cooperation,”European Security, Vol. 9, No. 4, Winter 2000, p. 96; B. Parakhonskiy, “The Formation of Regional Cooperation Models in GUUAM,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2, 2000, p. 73.
N. Silaev, “GUAM and the Smaller Game in the Post-Soviet Expanse,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (40),2006, pp. 91-92.
They joined NATO and the EU in 2004.
N. Silaev, op. cit., p. 92.
Ibidem.
See: Sh. Igitaliev, A. Karimova, “Central Asian and Caucasian Strategy: Several Models of Interrelations among the U.S., China, and Russia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2 (44), 2007, pp. 43-44.
O.N. Barabanov, “Politika SShA v Tsentral’noy Azii i Zakavkazie,” pp. 13-14, available at [http://www.riss.ru/
ibrary/US-SRAZ.pdf], 11 February, 2008.
The year 2005 can be described as the year of its revival.
Quoted from: Sh. Igitaliev, A. Karimova, op. cit., p. 44.
Ibidem.
The Liberal Empire conception should be regarded in this context: Russia should restore its influence in the new-ly independent states by expanding into their economies (see: A. Chubays, “Missia Rossii v XXI veke,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 1 October, 2003). It was realized in Armenia where its economic entities were sold to Russia to pay off the debts,in Georgia where there were attempts to put its energy system under Russia’s control, etc. (for more detail, see: V. Papa-va, F. Starr, “In the Caucasus, a ‘Neo-Imperial’ Russian Revival,” The Daily Star, 20 January, 2006).
In Georgia, by buying the key energy facilities; in Ukraine, by helping pro-Russian presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich come to power.
This structure united Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, the Baltic states, Poland, Rumania, Macedonia, and Slovenia.
uch was done to involve “post-revolutionary” Kyrgyzstan.
The summit was attended by the GUUAM heads of state (with the exception of the president of Uzbekistan), as well as the presidents of Rumania and Lithuania, the OSCE chairman, and Steven Mann, special negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh and Eurasian conflicts who represented the United States.
See: Kiev Declaration on Establishment of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development—
UAM, available at [http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=130&info_id=1490], 23 May, 2006.
The agreements on the GUAM peacekeeping contingent were reached in Baku at the sitting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of member states in June 2007 (see: “Strany GUAM sozdaiut svoi mirotvorcheskiy contingent,”NEWSru.com, Monday, 18 June, 2007, available at [http://www.newsru.com/world/18jun2007/baku_guam.html], 4 Feb-ruary, 2008).
This question was raised in connection with the problems of energy supplies from Russia to Georgia and Ukraine in 2005 and 2006; this can be described as the Kremlin’s attempt to use its “energy domination” to put political pressure on these countries.
See: Kiev Declaration on Establishment of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development—
UAM.
The summit in particular reached agreements on the Baku-Supsa-Odessa-Brody-Plock project (see: “Prezident Ukrainy na summite GUAM prizval sdelat upor na edinoy energeticheskoy strategii,” available at [http://www.
ewsru.com/world/10oct2007/guamm.html], 4 February, 2008; “Kazakhskuiu neft razvernut na Pol’shu: Konsortium dlia prodlenia truboprovoda Odessa-Brody rasshiriaetsia,” Kommersant, No. 138 (4754), 1 October, 2007, available at [http://
ww.kommersant.ru/doc-rss.aspx?DocsID=809878], 4 February 2008).
For more detail, see: N. Muzaffarli (Imanov), “Politico-Economic Complementarity and Compatibility between Guam Member States” (see: present edition, pp.
For more detail, see: K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill, Boston, 1979, p. 186.
There are apprehensions caused by possible strengthening in the “free from Russia” space of external power centers with potential threats.
The theory of the RSC looks at overlay as one of the stabilization models (for more detail, see: B. Buzan, op. cit.,pp. 219-221).
Predominantly individualist approaches were obvious in the relations between the GUAM members and the Eu-ropean and Euro-Atlantic structures.
In 1991-1994, the United States concentrated on making a democratic state with a functional market economy out of Russia and preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan inherited from the Soviet Union (see: S.E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers. A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus,Curzon Press, 2001, p. 367).
To confirm this, we can go back to the macro-factors of the GUAM crisis discussed in the previous section.
See: K. Deutsch, et al., op. cit., p. 138.
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