CHINA IN CENTRAL EURASIA: SECURITY INTERESTS AND GEOPOLITICAL ACTIVITY
Abstract
Today, extended geographical links are the most important yet far from the only factor that makes Central Eurasia1 highly significant for China’s conceptualization of its security. The Soviet Union’s disintegration, which created newly independent states, also generated favorable conditions for China’s progress toward the superpower status. At the same time, Central Eurasia, or rather the advent of anarchy across its political space and the rising ethnoterritorial problems which might well affect China’s northwestern regions, called for fresh approaches to the area. By the same token, its geopolitical importance for China’s relations with its main rivals at the supra-regional level was exacerbated. In these conditions, China should become more actively involved in the Central Eurasian space freed from Soviet domination, which means that it should join the current rivalry for geopolitical control over the vast area. In this article I want to look at the security interests which form the cornerstone of Chinese policy in Central Eurasia, identify the geopolitical importance of this area for China, and trace the tactical specifics of China’s regional policies.
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Here I refer to the conception of Central Eurasia and Central Europe suggested by Eldar Ismailov who count-ed three post-Soviet regions as part of Central Eurasia: Cen-tral Europe—Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine; the Central Caucasus—Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia; Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,and Uzbekistan (for more detail, see: E.M. Ismailov, “Cen-tral Eurasia: Its Geopolitical Function in the 21st Century,”Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2 (50), 2008, pp. 7-29).
Calculated from: CIA World Factbook 2008—China, available at [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html].
See: K. Syroezhkin, “China in Central Asia: From Trade to Strategic Partnership,” Central Asia and the Caucasus,No. 3 (45), 2007, p. 41.
See: A. Khojaev, “China’s Central Asian Policy (Based on Chinese Sources),” Central Asia and the Caucasus,No. 3 (45), 2007, p. 27.
See: Sotrudnichestvo i bezopasnost v Tsentral’noy Azii: sostoianie i perspektivy, ed. by B.K. Sultanov, KISI at the RK President, Almaty, 2008, p. 146.
Ibidem.
According to conservative assessments, 150-200 million people have been made redundant in China (ibidem).
This is going on in some of the Southeastern Asian states: Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand.
The region covers 1,600 thousand sq km, or one-sixth of China’s territory.
See: K. Khafizova, “Separatism in China’s Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region: Dynamics and Potential Impact on Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (19), 2003, ð. 7; Zh. Huasheng, “China, Russia, and the U.S.: Their Interests, Postures, and Interrelations in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (29), 2004, ð. 117.
See: Y. Shichor, “Limping on Two Legs: Uyghur Diaspora Organizations and the Prospects for Eastern Turkestan Independence,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6 (48), 2007, ð. 119; K. Khafizova, op. cit., p. 9.
Sunni is the dominant Islamic branch both in Central Asia and SUAR.
K. Syroezhkin, “‘Separatizm’ v Sintsziane: mify i real’nost,” Tsentral’naia Azia, No. 10, 1997, available at [http://
ww.ca-c.org/journal/10-1997/st_14_siroegkin.shtml].
The highest wave of unrest in China’s western regions was raised in 1864-1865; it produced five independent states in the territory of Eastern Turkestan and Djungaria united, in 1867, into Yettishar with Yaqub Beg at the head. Later it was reintegrated into the Qing Empire by force (see: S. Okhotnikov, “China and Central Asia after the Beginning of the Anti-terrorist Operation in Afghanistan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (17), 2002, ð. 22).
See: Y. Shichor, op. cit., pp. 118-119.
K. Khafizova, op. cit., p. 15.
See: Ibidem.
See: Zh. Huasheng, op. cit., p. 117.
R. Burnashev, “Regional Security in Central Asia: Military Aspects,” in: Central Asia. A Gathering Storm? ed. by B. Rumer, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, New York, 2002, p. 127.
See: O. Oliker, “Conflict in Central Asia and South Caucasus: Implications of Foreign Interests and Involvement,”in: Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Implication for the U.S. Army, ed. by O. Oliker, Th.S. Sza-yna, Rand, Santa Monica, 2003, p. 214.
See: Ibidem.
Y. Shichor, op. cit., p. 119.
Y. Shichor, op. cit., p. 120.
See: R. Burnashev, op. cit.
See: Zh. Huasheng, op. cit., p. 117.
See: Zh. Huasheng, op. cit., pp. 117-118; M. Laumulin, The Geopolitics of the 21st Century in Central Asia, KazISS,Almaty, 2007, p. 121.
A. Kaukenov, “China’s Policy within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” Central Asia and the Caucasus,No. 3 (45), 2007, p. 65.
See: Ibidem.
See: K. Syroezhkin, “China in Central Asia: From Trade to Strategic Partnership,” p. 43.
See: Ibidem.
See: Zh. Huasheng, op. cit., pp. 117-118; Bao Yi, “China’s Strategic Interests in Central Asia. Cooperation with
Central Asian Countries,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5(11), 2001, ð. 101.
See: K. Syroezhkin, “China in Central Asia: From Trade to Strategic Partnership,” p. 44.
Ibid., p. 43.
Zh. Huasheng, op. cit., p. 118.
The Joint Communiqué on Establishing Diplomatic Relations between the U.S. and PRC of 1 January, 1979 stated that the United States recognized “the PRC government as the sole legitimate government of all China” and that “there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China” (see: K. Dumbaugh, “Taiwan: Texts of the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S.-China Communiqués, and the ‘Six Assurances,’” 21 May, 1998, available at [http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/
eta-crs-695:1]).
The presidential election in Taiwan, to which China responded with wide-scale military exercises on its coast and the Taiwan Strait, triggered the crisis. America responded with the most impressive demonstration of its naval might since the 1950s. It moved in two aircraft carriers and 36 ships and submarines (see: St.J.Yates, “The Taiwan Relations Act after 20 Years: Keys to Past and Future Success,” The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder #1272, 16 April, 1999, available at [http://www.heritage.org/research/asiaandthepacific/BG1272.cfm]).
Zh. Huasheng, op. cit., p. 119.
M. Imanaliev, E. Abdyldaev, “Globalization Challenges in Central Asia and Certain Aspects of China’s Central Asian Policies,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (45), 2007, p. 94.
See: M. Laumulin, op. cit.
See: A. Kaukenov, op. cit., p. 62.
A. Khojaev, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
See: G. Vitkovskaia, “Ugrozhaet li bezopasnosti Rossii kitayskaia migratsia?” Briefing at the Moscow Carnegie
Center, Vol. 1, Issue 8, 1999, available at [http://www.carnegie.ru/ru/pubs/briefings/issue08-99.pdf]; E. Wishnick, “Migration Issues and Russia’s Economic Integration in Asia,” 25 June, 2003, available at [http://gsti.miis.edu/CEAS-PUB/
Wishnick.pdf].
See: Li Lifan, “National Energy Security and Sino-Russian-Kazakh-Japan Energy Cooperation,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (43), 2007, p. 110.
See: Ibidem.
V. Belokrinitskiy, “Southwesterly Enlargement of Greater China,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (45), 2007,
This route forms part of the responsibility zones of the 5th and 7th U.S. fleets.
See: V. Belokrinitskiy, op. cit.
This pipeline will bring oil to Japan as well.
The Turkmen stretch will be 188 km long; it will cross Uzbekistan (530 km); Kazakhstan (1,300 km) and China
(over 4,500 km) (see: I. Tomberg, “Energy Policy and Energy Projects in Central Eurasia,” Central Asia and the Cauca-sus, No. 6 (48), 2007, p. 49).
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