THE WEST AND POST-SOVIET CENTRAL EURASIA: CERTAIN ASPECTS OF AMERICAN AND EU SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE REGION
Abstract
The threat of a wide-scale armed attack on the United States and its European allies disappeared together with the Soviet Union. The post-Soviet space, however, became a zone of what can be described as “sustained political instability” and a source of new challenges on the Western agenda. Moreover, the new geopolitical entity and energy resources in its territory became a target of rivalry of the world powers. This meant that merely winning the Cold War was not enough: the victors needed a new strategy in the post-Soviet territory. Here I intend to outline some of the special features of the American and EU security strategy in Central Eurasia,1 their key security interests in the region and policy aimed at realization of these interests.
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Here I am referring to the conception of Central Eurasia and Central Europe suggested by Eldar Ismailov, who includes three post-Soviet regions in the political make-up of Central Eurasia: Central Europe—Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine; the Central Caucasus—Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia; and Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (for more detail, see: E.M. Ismailov, “Central Eurasia: Its Geopolitical Function in the 21st Century,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2 (50), 2008, pp. 7-29).
Calculated from CIA—The World Factbook 2010.
Here I have in mind the gas conflict with Ukraine which flared up in 2005 when Russia suspended natural gas deliveries to the Ukrainian and European consumers.
See: B. Buzan, O. Wæver, Regions and Powers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 62.
See: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. Second Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, Colorado, 1991, pp. 218-219; B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, London, 1998, p. 12.
B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 373.
The problem is not limited to the United States’ ability to use its European partners to realize its geopolitical in-terests. It is important to take into account how America’s rivals (Russia and China) respond to America’s leadership in the Western tandem. Not infrequently, they perceive everything the West is doing as another “American geopolitical project.”This downplays the role of the EU as a holder of its own interests in the eyes of other actors. In the absence of military-political mechanisms of their own, the Europeans have to follow in the footsteps of the United States, even if they are not interested enough in this or that aspect of Central Eurasian policy.
See: J. Simpson, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation in the Post-Cold War Era,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 70, Issue 1, 1994, p. 27. By the time the Soviet Union fell apart, the main elements of strategic and nuclear infrastructure and the larger part of the strategic nuclear weapons were concentrated in the RF. Ukraine had 130 launchers for UR-100HU (SS-19) and 46 launching silos for RT-23 UTTH missiles (SS-24), 19 Tu-160 bombers;25 Tu-9MC, and 2 Tu-95 bombers. In Belarus, there were 81 Topol ground missile sites (SS-25.) In Kazakhstan, there were 104 launching silos for R-36MUTTH/P-36M2 (SS-18) missiles and 40 Tu-95MC bombers (see: “Strategies iadernye sily SSSR i Rossii,” available at [http://www.armscontrol.ru/course/rsf/p9.htm]).
See, for example: S.E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers. A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon Press, Surrey, 2001, p. 367; R. Sokolsky, T. Charlick-Paley, NATO and Caspian Security. A Mission Too Far? Rand Corporation, Washington, 1999, p. 7; Ch. Fairbanks, C.R. Nelson, S.F. Starr, K. Weisbrod, Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., 2001, p. 11.
The West feared that other nuclear countries, including the Russian Federation itself, might fall apart; after all, in the early 1990s, the RF was living though a fairly unstable period in its history (see: J. Simpson, op. cit., p. 27).
See: “Strategies iadernye sily SSSR i Rossii.”
The Iranian regime is determined to stand opposed to Western values.
The political motivation for control over Iran’s huge oil and gas resources fits the logic of the developed countries’ mounting competition over gradually depleting energy resources and their efforts to oppose Russia’s attempts to use gas and oil against the West.
See: V.E. Novikov, Problema nerasprostraneniia iadernogo oruzhiia na sovremennom etape, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow, 2007, p. 229.
See: Ugrozy rezhimu nerasprostraneniia iadernogo oruzhiia na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke., ed. by A. Arbatov,V. Naumkin, Moscow Carnegie Center, Moscow, 2005, p. 25.
See: V.E. Novikov, op. cit., p. 231.
Since 2005, Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act.
A list of these companies can be found on the U.S. Department of State’s official website (see: Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, U.S. Department of State, available at [http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c15234.htm]).
See: Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. 123.
The conflict in South Ossetia was “defrosted” in August 2008 by the Russian-Georgian crisis, which developed into wide-scale hostilities.
S. Cornell, A. Jonsson, N. Nilsson, P. Häggström, The Wider Black Sea Region; An Emerging Hub in European Security, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, Washington and Uppsala, 2006, p. 51.
See: S. Cornell, A. Jonsson, N. Nilsson, P. Häggström, op. cit.
The Transnistrian region has enough production facilities; since 1996 it has been producing arms and ammunition exported to Kosovo, Chechnia, Abkhazia, and the Arab countries. In 2003, co-rapporteurs of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Jossette Durrieu and Lauri Vahtre, emphasized the threat represented by arms trafficking in the Tran-snistrian region (see: B. Radulescu, “The Transnistria ‘Republic’ and Illegal Arms Export,” Europe Front News, 2 January,2007, available at [http://www.europefront.com/news/267/the_transnistria_republic_and_illegal_arms_export.html]).
See: M. Bunn, “Securing the Bomb 2007,” Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Cambridge, MA, 2007, p. 17, available at [http://www.nti.org/e_research/Recuringthebomb07.pdf].
See: Ibid., p. 25.
See: U.S. Security Concerns in Central Asia, Opening Statement of Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chair, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia Hearing, 26 October, 2005 (quoted from: A. Ibrahim, “Evolving United States Policy toward the Caspian Region: A Delicate Balance,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (46), 2007, p. 38).
See: O. Oliker, “Conflict in Central Asia and South Caucasus: Implications of Foreign Interests and Involve-ment,” in: Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Implication for the U.S. Army, ed. by O. Ol-iker, Th.S. Szayna, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p. 223.
S. Cornell, A. Jonsson, N. Nilsson, P. Häggström, op. cit., p. 76.
Russia delivers about 46% of European imports of natural gas and 17% of oil (see: N. Norling, “EU’s Central Asia Policy: The Adoption of a New Strategy Paper 2007-2013,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (45), 2007, p. 11;A. Burkhanov, “The EU Strategy in Central Asia: Successes and Failures,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (45), 2007,p. 21).
See, for example: R. Burnashev, “Regional Security in Central Asia: Military Aspects,” in: Central Asia. A Gather-ing Storm? ed. by B. Rumer, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, p. 116; R. Sokolsky, T. Charlick-Paley, op. cit., p. 69;O. Oliker, op. cit., p. 221; Ch. Fairbanks, C.R. Nelson, S.F. Starr, K. Weisbrode, op. cit., p. 98.
Z. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 198.
See: Energy Diplomacy and Security Act of 2007, available at [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c110:2:./temp/
c110JBKdrz::].
See: Richard Lugar Speech in Advance of NATO Summit at Opening Gala Dinner of the Riga Conference, 27 No-vember, 2006 [http://www.rigasummit.lv/en/id/speechin/nid/36/].
L. Tchantouridze, “Eurasia, Geopolitics, and American Foreign Policy,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, ¹ 5 (53),2008, p. 15.
This was registered by strategic documents issued in the United States and the EU (see, for example: A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, Washington, D.C., October 1998. P. 39; European Community Regional Strategy Paper for Central Asia for the Period 2007-2013, 15 June, 2006, p. 7, available at [http://www.
elkaz.ec.europa.eu/pr/eng/REPOSITORY_assistance/Programmes_and_Projects/Geographic/DCI/CA_CSP&IP_2007-2010/
egional_%20Strategy_Paper_%20CA_2007-13_%20rev_%20june-15-2006_En.pdf]).
The U.S. Foreign Assistance program is one of the pertinent examples; in full accordance with the 1992 Freedom Support Act it was expanded to include the former Soviet republics, the TACIS program initiated by the European Com-munity in 1991, the Partnership for Peace program NATO launched in 1994, and the programs of financial, military and technical assistance to individual countries.
Georgia was supported in August 2008 during the military clash with the RF and Azerbaijan in July 2001 during the Caspian incident which involved Iran.
See: S.E. Cornell, op. cit., p. 367.
We have no reliable information to which extent Washington was involved in these revolutions; anyway, it is not my intention to plunge into a discussion which goes beyond the limits of this article. It was a well known fact that the United States hailed the revolutionary changes which produced an impression that it had been involved in them. The Section “Suc-cess and Challenges since 2002” of the 2006 National Security Strategy says: “The ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine,and Kyrgyzstan have brought new hope for freedom across the Eurasian landmass” (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, Washington, D.C., March 2006, p. 2).
Indeed, in January 2010 Victor Yanukovich, who five years earlier had been an object of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, was elected president. In April 2010 a revolution in Kyrgyzstan removed President Bakiev, one of the leaders of the Tulip revolution of 2005.
See: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, Washington, D.C., Sep-tember 2002, p. 5.
From the very beginning of the military operation against the Taliban, the United States stationed their air forces in Uzbekistan (where the Americans used the Karshi-Khanabad base) and in Kyrgyzstan (at the Manas military base). In 2005, vexed about the mounting tension in its relations with the United States, Tashkent demanded that America withdraw its armed forces from Uzbekistan. In November, America moved its air base to Kyrgyzstan.
Before and after the counterterrorist operation, the West regarded the production and trafficking of drugs as one of the most serious threats coming from Afghanistan stimulating Western involvement in this country and the relatively recent newcomers (the Central Asian Soviet-successor states). In post-Soviet times, this area has become the most promising market and the best transshipment base used by Afghan drug traffickers.
O. Oliker, op. cit., p. 224.
Kyrgyzstan’s approach differed from what the final document said. In October 2005, U.S. Secretary of State Con-doleezza Rice reached an agreement during her visit to Kyrgyzstan on moving the American air base from Uzbekistan.
See: Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Astana, 6 July,2005.
See: Th.N. Marketos, “European Energy Security and the Balkans: A Battleground for the U.S.-Russia Struggle for the Geostrategic Control of Eurasia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5 (53), 2008, p. 57.
NATO’s military operation in Yugoslavia launched in 1999 in connection with the Kosovo crisis aroused an un-precedentially tough response from Moscow and stirred up anti-Western sentiments in Russia.
Z. Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 98.
See: Ibid., p. 101.
A.I. Utkin, Mirovoy poriadok XXI veka, Eksmo, Moscow, 2002, pp. 358-359.
See: M. Laumulin, “U.S. Strategy and Policy in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (46), 2007,p. 47.
The foreign ministers of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan discussed this in March 1998 (see:
. Bülent, “Turkey’s Policy in the Former Soviet South: Assets and Options,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2000,p. 41).
In 2001, the counterterrorist operation in Afghanistan brought the West and Russia closer to a certain extent on the anti-Taliban basis, however the “thaw” was short-lived for the reasons discussed above.
See: S.F. Starr, “A ‘Greater Central Asia Partnership’ for Afghanistan and Its Neighbors,” Silk Road Paper, March 2005, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, Washington, D.C., 2005, available at [http://
ww.stimson.org/newcentury/pdf/Strategy.pdf]; S.F. Starr, “A Partnership for Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84,No. 4, July/August 2005, pp. 164-178.
See: S. Cornell, A. Jonsson, N. Nilsson, P. Häggström, op. cit.
At the first stage, it was expected to move up to 10 million tons of Kazakhstani oil every year.
See: S. Smirnov, “Morskoy flot. Kaspiy ne zhdet,” KAZAKHSTAN, No. 3, 2007, available at [http://www.
investkz.com/journals/52/500.html].
See: “The Eskene-Kuryk Oilpipeline,” available at [http://www.kmg.kz/page.php?page_id=1128&lang=1].
It was expected that the planned carrying capacity of the trans-Caspian pipeline would be within the 26-32 billion cu m limit (see: I. Tomberg, “Energy Policy and Energy Projects in Central Eurasia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus,No. 6 (8), 2007, p. 47).
Planned carrying capacity—26 to 32 billion cu m a year.
Planned carrying capacity—12 billion cu m a year.
See: B. Grgic, A. Petersen, “Escaping Gazprom’s Embrace,” The Journal of International Security Affairs, No. 14,Spring 2008, available at [http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2008/14/grgic&petersen.php].
See: “Azerbaijan and the United States Signed a Memorandum on Energy Security,” Day Az, 23 Match, 2007,available at [http://www.day.az/news/politics/74232.html].
See: I. Tomberg, op. cit., p. 44.
The reverse oil pipeline Odessa-Brody, which connects the Black Sea terminal and the Druzhba pipeline, was
completed in 2001. It is expected that the branch from Brody to Plock in Poland will move Caspian oil to Gdansk and fur-ther on to European customers (see: I. Tomberg, op. cit., p. 43).
See: “Energetichesky summit v Vilniuse,” Echo, No. 188 (1669), 11 October, 2007, available at [http://www.echo-az.com/archive/2007_10/1669/politica03.shtml]; “Na summit v Vilniuse pribyl glava Evrosoiuza,” Echo, No. 189 (1670),12 October, 2007, available at [http://www.echo-az.com/archive/2007_10/1670/politica04.shtml].
The Southern Corridor consists of several routes: Nabucco, Turkey-Greece-Italy, the White Stream, and the trans-Adriatic gas pipeline.
The pipeline, commissioned in 2003 and which passes along the bottom of the Black Sea, is the main pipeline via which gas from Russia reaches Turkey; its annual carrying capacity is 16 billion cu m.
See: B. Grgic, A. Petersen, op. cit.
See: “Serbia gotova ustupit ‘Gazpromu’ natsionalnuiu neftianuiu kompaniiu za 1billion,” NEWSru.com, 27 De-cember, 2007, available at [http://palm.newsru.com/finance/27dec2007/srpska.html].
The planned annual carrying capacity of the South Stream is 30 billion cu m. It is expected to pass along the bot-tom of the Black Sea to Bulgaria. There are two alternatives: it will either move to the southwest—across Greece and the Adriatic Sea to South Italy, or to the northwest—across Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Slovenia to Northern Italy.
azprom is prepared to implement either of these projects or both of them (see: Th.N. Marketos, op. cit., p. 59).
In May 2007, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan signed the Declaration on Building the Caspian Gas Pipeline with an annual capacity of 30 billion cu m. It will stretch along 360 km of the Turkmenian and 150 km of the Kazakh coast to join the Central Asia-Center main pipeline (see: I. Tomberg, op. cit., p. 50).
It is planned to increase the initial annual carrying capacity of 28.2 million tons to 67 million tons.
Russia, Greece, and Bulgaria signed the agreement in December 2007; the initial annual carrying capacity of 15 million tons could be increased to 50 million tons (see: “Podpisano soglashenie po nefteprovodu Burgas-Alexandrupo-lis,” 18 January, 2008, available at [http://top.rbc.ru/economics/18/01/2008/134533.shtml]).
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