POWERS AND REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS: PARAMETERS AND TYPES OF INVOLVEMENT (POST-SOVIET SPACE CASE STUDY)
Abstract
It is hardly possible to correctly and fully assess the functioning and development of a regional security system without presenting a complete account of the entire range of ties and relations among the actors involved and the degree of influence of all the powers concerned.
Based on a case study of the post-Soviet space, the author studies the involvement of powers in regional security systems; his analysis of the key parameters of this involvement makes it possible for him to identify and describe two types of involvement: full and partial.
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See: J. Eyvazov, “Russia in Central Eurasia: Security Interests and Geopolitical Activity,” *The Caucasus & Globalization*, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 11-22; idem, “Iran’s Security Interests and Geopolitical Activity in Central Eurasia,” *The Caucasus & Globalization*, Vol. 3, Issue 4, 2009, pp. 19-30; idem, “China in Central Eurasia: Security Interests and Geopolitical Activity,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2010, pp. 8-19; idem, “Central Eurasia through the Prism of Turkey’s Security Interests,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 11, Issue 3, 2010, pp. 77-85; idem, “The West and Post-Soviet Central Eurasia: Certain Aspects of American and EU Security Strategy in the Region,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 2011, pp. 7-21.
The TRSC offers various types and forms of regional complexes; the most general typology distinguishes between a standard and a centered RSC. According to Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, in a centered RSC, the dynamics of security relations are determined by one power found in its center. The authors go on to identify three forms (depending on the specifics of “the central actor”) of this type: centered on a great power—Russia in the post-Soviet space; centered on a superpower—the United States in North America; and, finally, centered on an institution (institutional RSC)—the European Union (see: B. Buzan, O. Wæver, *Regions and Powers*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, pp. 55-61).
For more details, see: J. Eyvazov, “Some Aspects of the Theory of Regional Security Complexes as Applied to Studies of the Political System in the Post-Soviet Space,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 12, Issue 2, 2011, pp. 17-24; idem, “Central Eurasia through the Prism of Security: A Regional System or a Sub-System?” *The Caucasus & Globalization*, Vol. 5, Issue 1-2, 2011, pp. 6-15.
In 2004, these three former Soviet republics joined the EU and NATO, which reflects, at least, their involvement in the institutional RSC in Europe.
Here I am referring to the concept of Central Eurasia, Central Europe, and the Central Caucasus suggested by Eldar Ismailov, who regarded three post-Soviet regions as part of Central Eurasia: Central Europe—Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine; the Central Caucasus—Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia; Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (for more details, see: E.M. Ismailov, “Central Eurasia: Its Geopolitical Function in the 21st Century,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 2 (50), 2008, pp. 7-29).
The figures are taken from CIA World Factbook, 2013.
See: Ch. King, N.J. Melvin, “Diaspora Politics. Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy and Security in Eurasia,” *International Security*, Winter 1999-2000, Vol. 24, Issue 3, p. 118.
Today, there are Russian diasporas in all countries of the Central European, Central Caucasian, and Central Asian regions; the largest of them are found in Ukraine (17.3% of total population), Kazakhstan (23.7%), Kyrgyzstan (12.5%), Belarus (8.3%), Uzbekistan (5.5%), Azerbaijan (1.8%), and Georgia (1.5%) (see: CIA World Factbook, 2013).
Tajikistan is the only Central Asian post-Soviet state that speaks an Iranian language.
About 80% of Azerbaijan’s Muslim population is Shi‘a Muslims.
See, for example: R. Burnashev, “Regional Security in Central Asia: Military Aspects,” in: *Central Asia. A Gathering Storm?* ed. by B. Rumer, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, p. 132.
According to certain sources, there are about 7 million people with Caucasian roots among Turkish citizens (mainly Circassians, Abkhazes, Lazez, Georgians, and Azeris) (see: G. Winrow, *Turkey and the Caucasus: Domestic Interests and Security Concerns*, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2000, p. 32).
For more details, see: K. Khafizova, “Separatism in China’s Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region: Dynamics and Potential Impact on Central Asia,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 1 (19), 2003, р. 7; Zhao Huasheng, “China, Russia and the U.S.: Their Interests, Postures, and Interrelations in Central Asia,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 5 (29), 2004, р. 117.
According to the 2010 population census, about 1.46 million Kazakhs live in China.
According to the 2010 population census, about 187 thousand Kyrgyz live in China.
See, for example: K. Shamshidov, “China’s Approach to Multilateralism with an Emphasis on its Influence in Central Asia,” *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Vol. 13, Issue 4, 2012, p. 33.
For example, in 2009, ethnic Russians in Estonia accounted for about 26% of its total population. In 1989, on the eve of the Soviet Union’s collapse, there were about 30% of them. In Latvia, the share was about 30% in 2009 and 34% in 1989; the figures for Lithuania are 6% and 9.4%, respectively.
D. Trenin, “Russia’s Security Interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region,” in: *Contested Borders in the Caucasus*, ed. by B. Coppieters, Vubpress, Brussels, 1996, p. 91.
Starting in the 17th century, over the span of 240 years Russia and Turkey fought over ten wars, mainly in the Caucasus (for more details, see: A.B. Shirokorad, *Russko-turetskie voyny 1676-1918*, AST Publishers, Moscow; Harvest, Minsk, 2000).
See: A.L. Karaosmanoğlu, “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey,” *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1, Fall 2000, pp. 203-204.
Quoted from: G. Winrow, op. cit., p. 23.
Turkey was among the first to recognize Armenia’s independence in the early 1990s. However, they have no diplomatic relations, while the borders remain sealed off. Escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Armenian occupation of part of Azerbaijan’s territory exacerbated the problems between the two states inherited from the past. Ankara insists that Armenia abandon its demand that Turkey recognize the fact of Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire in 1915, and that Erevan abandon its claims to Turkish territory (the territory of the Ottoman Empire populated by Armenians that covers the contemporary vilayets of Erzurum, Van, Ağri, Hakkari, Muş, Bitlis, Siirt, Diyarbekir, Erzincan, Bingöl, Malatya, Sivas, Amasya, Tokat, and part of Giresum [see: *Istoria Osmanskogo gosudarstva, obshchestva i tsivilizatsii*, ed. by E. Ihsanoglu, Transl. from Turkish, Vol. 1, Vostochnaia literatura Publishers, Moscow, 2006, p. 87]) and withdraw from the occupied Azeri territories.
Radical Kurdish organizations are determined to create an independent Kurdish state in the territories on which their ancestors lived in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. A large number of ethnic Kurds live in Turkey’s eastern part. From time to time, Turkey uses the army to suppress the terrorist activities of the Kurdish separatists who, back in the late 1970s, united into the Kurdistan Workers’ Party responsible for over 30 thousand deaths.
B. Shaffer, “The Formation of Azerbaijani Collective Identity in Iran,” *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2000, p. 449.
The number of ethnic Azeris in Iran is about 16% of the 78.8 million-strong population according to CIA World Factbook in 2012. However, there are reasons to believe that their share is higher. Historically, the Iranian Azeris are the most politically active population group. Starting in the 16th century, two Azeri dynasties—Safavids (1501-1722) and Qajars (1795-
—replaced one another on the throne. Under the Persian Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979) and after the Islamic revolution, the Azeri provinces of Iran remained the most unstable part of the state, which Tehran can hardly control.
See: Zhao Huasheng, op. cit., pp. 118-119.
See: Ibid., p. 117.
See: Ibid., p. 118; M.T. Laumulin, *The Geopolitics of XXI Century in Central Asia*, KazISS, Almaty, 2007, p. 121.
B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 49.
B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p. 191.
See: Ibidem.
Under the 1828 Treaty of Turkmanchay, the Russian Empire and Persia divided the Azeri territories into Northern and Southern Azerbaijan.
B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 48.
See: D.A. Lake, “Regional Security Complexes: A Systems Approach,” in: *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, ed. by D.A. Lake, P.M. Morgan, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, p. 64.
Within the TRSC, securitization is represented as relative and autonomous, that is, as a process that totally depends on the actor: “…different actors securitize differently: different political and cultural situations enable securitization in different sectors and they have different dynamics…” (B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 87).
B. Buzan and O. Wæver have the following to say about the RSC seen from the prism of securitization: “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 44).
B. Buzan and O. Wæver distinguish three types of sociopolitical development of contemporary states: premodern states (with a very low level of inner sociopolitical cohesion and state organization, weak governmental control over territory and population); modern states (with strong governmental control of society, limited openness, sanctity of sovereignty and independence complete with their attributes (including territory and borders), placing stakes on self-sufficiency, self-assistance, and national identity); and postmodern states (with a moderate attitude toward sovereignty, independence, and national identity, economic, political, and cultural openness when dealing with the outside world) (for more details, see: B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., pp. 23-24).
For example, the ethnic Russians who remained in the Soviet successor-states, or the Muslims who remained in the Balkans when Ottoman Turkey withdrew from the region.
Here is an example: Russia protected the Slavic peoples of the Balkans and Armenians and Ossets in the Caucasus, which in the 19th and 20th centuries involved it, together with other factors, in wars with Ottoman Turkey. In 2008, Russia, which started a war against Georgia, argued that it had to defend the Ossets of Georgia. Before moving troops inside Georgia, President Medvedev made a fairly important statement: “Historically Russia has been, and will continue to be, a guarantor of security for peoples of the Caucasus” (quoted from [http://ncafp.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Implementation-Review-Russia-and-Georgia-Aug20111.pdf]). The same applies to the historical ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan and the Muslims of Georgia and the Northern Caucasus.
Russia’s inability to protect the Serbs and prevent the NATO bombings in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 and in Serbia in 1999 and effectively protect the rights of ethnic Russians in the Baltics is seen in Russia as its tangible defeat.
The TRSC uses these categories to identify the borders between regional complexes.
B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 62.
See: B. Buzan, op. cit., pp. 218-219; B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. De Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Rienner Publishers Boulder, London, 1998, p. 12.
B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., p. 373.
Ibid., p. 46.
Zb. Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. xiii.
Here I have in mind Russia’s unofficial support of separatist movements in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova—Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria (see, for example: B. Coppieters, “The Politicisation and Securitisation of Ethnicity: The Case of the Southern Caucasus,” *Civil Wars*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2001, pp. 74-75; A. Malashenko, “Postsovetskie gosudarstva Yuga i interesy Moskvy,” *Pro et Contra*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2000, pp. 42-43; S.E. Cornell, R.N. McDermott, W.D. O’Malley, V. Socor, F.S. Starr, *Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO*, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Washington D.C., 2004, p. 16; S.E. Cornell, “Undeclared War: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Reconsidered,” *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. XX, No. 4, Summer 1997, p. 12; A.I. Utkin, *Mirovoy poriadok XXI veka*, EKSMO Publishers, Moscow, 2002, pp. 400-401; A. Mörike, “The Military as a Political Actor in Russia: The Cases of Moldova and Georgia,” *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, July-September 1998, available at [http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/iai/iai_98moa01.html], 13 December, 2007).
In this context, the “liberal empire” concept deserves special mention, according to which Russia should restore its influence in the NIS through economic expansion (see: A. Chubays, “Missia Rossii v XXI veke”, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 1 October, 2003). It was realized when Russia bought economic facilities in Armenia in exchange for debts; it also tried to apply the same pattern to Georgian and Ukrainian energy infrastructure facilities, etc.
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