CENTRAL EURASIA THROUGH THE PRISM OF TURKEY’S SECURITY INTERESTS
Abstract
After the Cold War, with the Soviet Union out of the way, Turkey found itself in a new security context. The U.S.S.R. as the main source of threat to Turkey vanished. But political processes in the post-Soviet space—armed conflicts, attempts of the former metropolitan state to keep the region in its orbit, and of the other actors to fill the resultant vacuum of power— created a fairly unstable geopolitical situation around Turkey. Moreover, in the absence of the Soviet threat, the West became noticeably less concerned with Turkey’s security. In this situation, Ankara had to rethink the importance of the post-Soviet space for its national security.
This article is an attempt to clarify the nature of Turkey’s security interests and the way they are related to Central Eurasia,1 Turkey’s key security interests in the region, and the specifics of its security policy.
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Here I refer to the conception of Central Eurasia and Central Europe suggested by Eldar Ismailov, who counted three post-Soviet regions as part of Central Eur-asia: Central Europe—Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine; the Central Caucasus—Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia;Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turk-menistan, and Uzbekistan (for more detail, see: E.M. Is-mailov, “Central Eurasia: Its Geopolitical Function in the 21st Century,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 2 (50),2008, pp. 7-29).
Quoted from: G. Winrow, Turkey and the Caucasus: Domestic Interests and Security Concerns, The Royal Insti-tute of International Affairs, London, 2000, p. 23.
Very much like the RF, Turkey has a rich Great Power past and traditions that still survive in particular from its domination in the Black Sea, which it strove to make an “inner sea.” The 500 year-long history of their relations is dotted with wars, many of them waged in the Black Sea. This has inevitably created fairly stable ideas about each other which can be described as hostile and competitive rather than friendly and cooperating.
See: S.E. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon Press, 2001, p. 392.
Ibidem.
The territory of the Ottoman Empire populated by Armenians covers the contemporary vilayets of Erzurum, Van,
Aðri, Hakkâri, Mush, Bitlis, Siirt, Diyarbakir, Erzincan, Bingöl, Malatya, Sivas, Amasya, Tokat and partly Giresun (see: Istoria Osmanskogo gosudarstva, obshchestva i tsivilizatsii, Vol. 1, ed. by E. Ihsanoglu, Transl. from the Turkish, Vostochnaia literatura Publishers, Moscow, 2006, p. 87).
[http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/htms/doi.html].
[http://www.armeniaforeignministry.com/htms/conttitution.html].
Turtsia mezhdu Evropoi i Aziey. Itogi evropeizatsii na iskhode XX veka, ed. by N.G. Kireev, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS-Kraft+, Moscow, 2001, p. 365.
See: A. Cohen, C. Irwin, “U.S. Strategy in the Black Sea Region,” Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder, No. 1990,13 December, 2006, p. 4, available at [http://www.heritage.org/research/russiaandeurasia/upload/bg_1990.pdf].
The first attempts to set up a Kurdish independent state date back to the 19th century; it was in the Ottoman Em-pire that the armed clashes produced numerous casualties (the riots in 1842-1847; 1854-1855; 1880; 1909-1914; 1919, etc.).
This was done, in particular, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-1829 (see: J.F. Baddeley, The Russian Con-quest of the Caucasus, Longmans, Green and Co., 1908, pp. 200-201).
Post-Soviet Russia explained its support of Kurdish separatists by Turkey’s policy in the Northern Caucasus and, in particular, its support of the Chechen separatists (see N. Uslu, “The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turk-ish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 3&4,Fall&Winter 2003, p. 166).
Ankara regarded unofficial Syrian and Iranian support of Kurdish separatism in Turkey as a threat to its security.
urkey’s response was harsh. In October 1998, Turkey threatened Syria with invasion if it refused to deport PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan (he and several thousand fighters of the Movement had found shelter in this country in 1979). In July 1999,Turkey did not hesitate to bomb the areas bordering on Iran and Iraq studded with PKK fighters’ camps (see, for example:
. Olson, “Turkey-Iran Relations, 1997 to 2000: The Kurdish and Islamist Questions,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 5,2000, pp. 878-879; I.O. Lesser, “Turkey in a Changing Security Environment,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54,No. 1, Fall 2000, p. 185; G. Winrow, op. cit., p. 23; L. Martin, “Turkey’s National Security in the Middle East,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2000, pp. 84-85).
See, for example: Î. Zhigalina, “The Kurds of Western Asia: Geopolitics Today,” Central Asia and the Caucasus,No. 1 (19), 2003, p. 19.
S.F. Larrabee, “Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007, available at [http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86408-p10/f-stephen-larrabee/turkey-rediscovers-the-middle-east.html].
See: CIA World Factbook 2010. Armenia, available at [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/am.html].
See: Istoria Osmanskogo gosudarstva, obshchestva i tsivilizatsii, p. 88.
See: R. Burnashev, “Regional Security in Central Asia: Military Aspects,” in: Central Asia. A Gathering Storm?Ed. by B. Rumer, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, p. 132.
L. Ruseckas, “Turkey and Eurasia: Opportunities and Risks in the Caspian Pipeline Derby,” Journal of Interna-tional Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 1, Fall 2000, p. 219.
See: Ibid., p. 220.
Z. Onis, “Turkey and Post-Soviet States: Potential and Limits of Regional Power Influence,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 2001, p. 67.
See: L. Ruseckas, op. cit.
See: N. Uslu, op. cit., p. 182; R. Sokolsky, T. Charlick-Paley, NATO and Caspian Security. A Mission Too Far?Rand Corporation, Washington, 1999, p. 42.
Z. Brzezinski, “A Geostrategy for Eurasia,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 5, September/October 1997, p. 57.
Turkey relied on the Montreux Convention of 1936 to limit the access of U.S. warships, meant to put pressure on the Kremlin during the 2008 war, to the Black Sea.
The pivotal point is that the regional problems should be addressed by the region’s states—Armenia, Georgia,Azerbaijan, Russia, and Turkey.
The tension between Israel and Turkey increased in June 2010 when Israeli warships arrested six ships of the so-called Flotilla of Freedom determined to break the blockade of Gaza; there were Turkish citizens among the 20 casualties. Ankara accused Tel-Aviv of interfering with the Middle East settlement; it recalled its ambassador, initiated discussion in the U.N. SC, and called off joint military exercises.
See: B. Aras, “Turkey’s Policy in the Former Soviet South: Assets and Options,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1,Spring 2000, p. 39.
Russia possesses 5.6% of the world’s oil reserves, while Iran has 10.3%; Russia has 23.7% of the world’s reserves of natural gas, while Iran has 15.8% (see: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2010, pp. 6, 22, available at [http://
ww.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2008/
TAGING/local_assets/2010_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2010.pdf]).
Turkey imports about 60% of the gas it needs from Russia (see: A. Murinson, “Russia’s Use of the Montreux Convention as a Factor in its New Policy toward Turkey,” Azerbaijan in the World, ADA Biweekly Newsletter, Vol. 1, No. 18,15 October, 2008, p. 8, available at [http://www.ada.edu.az/files/beweekly/26/ADA%20Biweekly_Vol.%201_No.%2018.pdf]).
G. Hewitt, “Abkhazia, Georgia and the Circassians (NW Caucasus),” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 18, Issue 4, 1999, p. 466.
A. Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1998, p. 316.
See: G. Winrow, op. cit., p. 32.
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